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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
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1 Introduction 
 
Traditionally regarded as non tradable, services have been excluded for a long time from the 
multilateral trade negotiations and have benefited from little consideration in the economic 
literature. A paradoxical situation insofar, services account for the largest share of value added 
and employment in most developed countries (and increasingly in developing countries). 
However, the introduction of services trade issues in the framework of multilateral negotiations 
with the adoption of the General agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) during the Uruguay 
round in 1993, followed by the increasing tendency of considering services as a full part of any 
trade arrangements at regional as well as bilateral level have raised the interest of services trade 
issues in the last two decades.  
 
This is epitomized by the increase in studies covering different aspects of services trade, 
including notably the measurement of services liberalization and the impact of services 
liberalization1. However, because of the abstract nature of services and the lack of data, these 
studies have been limited in terms of regions coverage focusing on OECD countries2. Assessing 
services trade issues in developing countries in general and African countries in particular 
received little attention, despite the urgent challenges of competitiveness and productivity raised 
by the deficit of services in these countries. This thesis contributes to fill this gap, by focusing 
on African countries. 
 
Noting that the strengthening and the extension of the General trade agreements on trade in 
services (GATS) constitute an important component of the WTO’s current multilateral trade 
negotiations, while privatization operations are continuing in developing countries, the aim of 
this thesis is to assess the impact of services trade liberalization in Africa. 
 
Our analysis will be focused on two services: financial and telecommunications. This choice is 
dictated by a) the possibility to convert the qualitative information on sectoral liberalization and 
regulatory provisions into quantitative variables; b) the possibility to rank cross-country 
                                                 
1
 See the set of studies undertaken in this way by the common project common of the Australian Productivity 
Commission and the Australian National University in various sectors of services including notably: 
telecommunications (Warren, 2001), bank (McGuire et Schuele, 2001), maritime transport (McGuire et al., 2001), 
education (Kemp, 2001), distribution (Kalirajan, 2000) and professional services (Nguyen Hong 2000). 
2
 See OECD survey on services trade studies on developing countries by Nielson and Taglioni (2004). 
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differences in the liberalization and regulatory provisions along a meaningful scale; c) the 
availability of historical information for a long enough period of time; and d) the existence of 
sufficient variability over time and across African countries3.  
 
Beyond the data exigencies, the choice of telecommunications and the financial sector relies 
specially on the potential virtue of liberalization in these sectors in terms of price reduction, 
employment creation and improvement of the competitiveness and productivities (see Winter et 
al. 2001).  
 
In terms of price reduction  
Theoretically, liberalization is likely to prompt a decline in the price: first, the rationalization 
gains through the exploitation of economies of scale would lower costs of production. Secondly 
the introduction of competition would provide service providers with incitation to reduce their 
margin, and therefore to lower consumers prices. 
 
In terms of employment creation  
The liberalization of trade in services is likely to create direct jobs through the entry of Foreign 
Direct Investment (SDIs) and technological innovation that allow the development of existing 
activities as well as the creation of new opportunities. Thus, gains in products varieties that have 
accompanied the liberalization of the telecommunication sector in Africa have led not only to 
job creation by main telephone operators, but also to the emergence of new activities related to 
improvement of quality of telephony services and the introduction of new technology like 
internet (e.g. cyber café and call-center) 4. In the Cameroonian financial sector, the liberalization 
of activities related to money transfer, combined with the expansion of mobile phone and 
internet coverage has resulted in the emergence of a new business of money transfer between 
cities and villages, analogous to the “Western Union” mechanism at international level5. 
 
In terms of competitiveness and productivities  
                                                 
3
 The financial sector indicators have been provided by the survey of IMF on regulation and liberalization 
provisions on African financial sector in 1987 and 1997. Concerning telecommunications, the UIT- World Bank 
survey on basic telecommunications from 1995 to 2004 provide data on the telecommunications number of 
operators and the statute of the regulatory authority.  But concerning the multilateral liberalization, we used the 
WTO source to collect information on the countries members’ “commitments to liberalize” and to adopt the 
“reference paper”.  
4
 According to the report of French Embassy in Cameroun (Mission Economique française, 2006), in 2006, 400 
people were employed by cyber café, in major Cameroonian cities, while there nothing before 1996. 
5
 While this activity has started in Cameroon after 2002, a survey in 2007 by the local newspaper “Le messager” 
has identified 10 agencies dealing with transfers business with coverage of at least the five largest cities. 
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More than goods, services are essential inputs to production and marketing of other goods and 
services. Thus, a liberalization contributing to an improvement in their quality and price would 
participate in the competitiveness and productivity of the economy as whole. An efficient and 
well-regulated financial sector leads to an efficient transformation of savings into investment, 
ensuring that resources are deployed where they have the highest returns and an increased 
variety of financial products allows a better risk sharing in the economy (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 
1998). Levine (1997) identifies five major functions that financial systems perform which help 
in minimizing transaction costs and improving the allocation of real resources and then 
contributing to growth6.  
 
In the case of Telecommunications, the expansion of the networks generates cost savings to 
other markets by reducing transaction costs, improving the flow of information and increasing 
arbitration abilities (see Leff, 1984). The more widespread availability of mobile phone at 
reduced costs are often touted as a blessing for Africa, by increasing mobility, broadening trade 
networks and facilitating searches for employment, all of which are elements conducive to 
higher levels of economic growth7  
 
Beside the input role, services also assume an essential function in modern economic 
development, in coordinating the production processes needed to generate (differentiated) goods 
and to realize scale economies (See Francois 1990). For instance, the development of NTIC 
(telecommunications) and the facilitation of financial cross-border transaction make it possible 
for firms to adopt flexible structures and locations, contributing to the evolution of complex and 
large organizations in order to improve the productivities (See Wellenius, 1977). 
 
Nevertheless, several factors in the African context strongly suggest a risk of the absence of 
gains or misdistribution as a result of liberalization. Since liberalization in Africa was preceded 
by state monopolies largely benefiting from subsidies on prices and employment, there is a 
possibility that the total disengagement of the state through privatization could lead to a direct 
effect of higher prices (particularly in remote areas) of services and lead to jobs losses at least in 
the short term. Another risk in respect of liberalization effect relates to the distribution effect. It 
is not clear that IDEs services have an overall effect particularly favorable for the employment 
                                                 
6
 These functions include facilitating the trading of risk, allocating capital to productive uses, monitoring managers, 
mobilizing savings through the use of innovative financial instruments and lastly, easing the exchange of goods and 
services. 
7
 In fact, the World Bank (2006) notes that most of the recent growth in the telecommunications market has 
involved mobile phones outnumbering fixed ones. In Nigeria, for instance, the number of mobile subscribers 
jumped from 370,000 in 2001 to 16.8 million in September 2005. 
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of the poor in the short-term in Africa, as IDEs are worn by a logic of innovation and progress, 
which requires a workforce rather heavily qualified8.  
 
The actual effect of liberalization depends, in large part, on the willingness and capacity of the 
state to conduct a genuine policy for losers, in using notably the additional resources generated 
in the process and undertaking appropriate regulation to frame the private operators’ activities. 
However, in the African context, where states have often faced severe fiscal constraints and 
where the power of civil society remains very low (weakness of labor unions), the allocation of 
additional resources made available by liberalization is highly uncertain. Similarly, the 
weakness of some African states compared to powerful multinational companies operating in 
services, could leave oneself perplexed about the ability of government to impose binding 
regulations. The net effect of services liberalization is therefore an empirical question.  
 
Our thesis raises three main questions: (1) is there any problem of market power in African 
services market, and what is the role of services liberalization and regulation in improving this 
situation? (2) To what extent could the services performances (i.e. price reduction and services 
access) contribute to strengthening growth in Africa? (3) Is there any expectation from services 
liberalization in term of poverty reduction? The following chapters provide solutions to each of 
these questions chronologically.  
 
Before, it would be instructive to present in this introductory chapter some stylized facts and 
concepts characterizing trade in services: the next section shows the evolution of trade in 
services and its place in world economy. The third section provides an update on some 
important concepts related to services trade and services negotiations. The fourth section 
provides a brief overview of indicators used to measure services trade liberalization. The fifth 
section provides a summary of the thesis. The final section concludes by some policy 
recommendations and research perspectives. 
 
2 Evolution of commercial services in international trade and growth 
 
                                                 
8
 Based on survey data from the World Bank (1990-1993) on five African countries (Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe), a study by Willem  and Morrissey (2001) notes that even if Foreign firms pay more than 
others (20 to 40%), they are also more beneficial to people qualified (in terms of payroll). The authors explain this 
bias wage on the one hand, the technology-intensive activities of these firms and by the ability of qualified persons 
to demand a better sharing of pensions. 
 19
Thanks in particular to the new supports and means of transactions offered by innovations in 
new technologies of information and communications, the services trade has been as highly 
dynamic as that of goods during the two last decades. The report of WTO on the international 
trade (OMC, 2004) point out that, since 1985, the trade in services increased at the same rate as 
that of goods at a rate of 6%. During the same period, the contribution of services to the whole 
international trade has been maintained at 20%; that is to say a value of 1763 billion dollars in 
2003 (See table.1 column (1)) 9. The main services offered at the international level are notably 
transport, travel and “other services” in particular made up of communications, finances and 
others services (See OMC, 2004). 
 
However, like in the case of goods, the flow of services trade is very unequally distributed 
among the various parts of the world (See table.1 column (2)). Thus in spite of a sustained high 
growth in almost all the areas of the world during the last years, the developed countries (North 
America and Western Europe) represent alone more than 75% of the international trade in  
services. This figure reflects the importance of the services activities in these countries where 
they contribute to more than 30% to the foreign trade and generate more than 70% of the value 
added and employment.  
Table 1. Evolution of commercial services trade (exports) in the world in 2003 
  Value 
(Billon of 
Dollars) 
Share 
in the 
total 
World 
 Annual Variation in percentages 
  
  
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  2003 2003 1990-95 1995-00 2001 2002 2003 
World 1763 1 9 4 0 6 12 
United States 282 16.0 8 7 -3 1 4 
Latin America 60 3.4 8 6 -3 -4 6 
European Union (15) 802 45.5 7 4 3 10 16 
Developing Countries: 377 21.4 14 5 0 5 6 
Africa 36 2.0 7 3 1 3   
South Africa 6 0.3 6 1 -7 0 26 
Asia 345 19.6 15 3 -1 8 6 
Developing countries     
from Asia 
249 14.1 18 4 2 9 5 
Source: (OMC, 2004) 
 
                                                 
9
 In addition, because of intangible nature of majority of the services whose transactions require a bringing together 
between the supplier and the consumer, the immense share of their exchanges (80%) are carried out at the domestic 
level (Karsenty, 2000) and are thus not considered in the figures extracted the balance of payments above.. 
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Nevertheless, the progression of the trade in services was more important in developing 
countries thanks to Asian developing countries which, as evidenced the table, carried out the 
highest and most constant growth of the last ten years, to reach 249 billion dollars of exports in 
2003, which represent 14.1% of the world total. 
However, Africa remained at bay. Even if the growth of its exports of services was higher than 
that of the goods, it is by far lower than that of the rest of the world, and that of the whole 
developing countries. This portrays a strong marginalization of the continent whose exports of 
services estimated in 2003 at 36 billion dollars, accounts for hardly 2% of the world total. 
FIGURE 1.  Contribution of service to global GDP 
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This African marginalization has removed from the continent the main engine of the word 
“growth” during the last four decades. The figure 1 presents the contribution of services to the 
total value added in Africa, and in three groups of countries based on World Bank income 
categories (Low income, middle income and high income) on the period from 1970 to 2005. 
It appears that the countries constituting each of the three categories of income have benefited 
on average substantial increase in the contribution of service from 12 points in the case of low 
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income to 20 points for high income10. However, when the African countries trend is isolated, it 
reveals, on average, no change in the share of service contribution to GDP since 197011.  The 
services are nevertheless an essential component of the African economies, as they represent 
more than 20% of the foreign trade and generate from 20 to 70% of the value added according 
to the countries considered. 
 
3 Concepts of services and services negotiations 
 
3.1 Services classifications of GATS and relevant trade barriers 
 
The GATS of Uruguay Round fixing the general framework of the liberalization of the trade in 
services, distinguishes 155 types of services and 4 modes of supplies: Telecommunication and 
financial services are mostly concerned with modes 1 to 3. Mode 1 (cross-border supply) covers, 
for instance, a service of financial transfers abroad and incoming international phone calls: A 
telephone operator in, say, Cameroon, "exports" a cross-border service by allowing foreign 
suppliers to terminate international calls in its territory12.  
 
The Mode 2 refers to the “consumption abroad”, and corresponds to the case where an 
individual moves abroad in order to consume a service. Thus, commitments that might affect the 
mode 2 fall mostly in the framework of the tourism policy rather than sectorial measures for 
telecommunications or finance industries. However, services such as international simple resale, 
call back and mobile roaming may be considered mode 2 (consumption abroad), or at least a 
combination of modes 1 and 2. Businesses, as opposed to individuals, may also "consume" 
abroad when they purchase leased lines in other markets or use international capacity trading to 
buy minutes from a capacity wholesaler in another market. Hence, limitations on modes 1 and 2, 
when they exist, often restrict incoming traffic from "bypassing" the facilities-based operator, 
e.g. when new forms of services, such as voice resale and voice over internet, are not yet 
permitted.  
 
                                                 
10
 The high income has seen their service share moved from 58% in 1970 to 78% in 1980. The equivalent figures 
are 40% to 58% for middle income and 38% to 50% for low income. 
11
 The contribution of service to GDP in Africa has been the same in 2005 and 1970, 50%. 
12
 Telecommunications services can also be traded cross border via satellite and leased lines (e.g. the internet). 
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Mode 3 (commercial presence) refers to the establishment of foreign-owned subsidiaries to 
deliver telecommunications or financial services. Mode 3 commitments may permit foreign 
bank entry to supply the full gamut of financial services, or may permit their participation in 
only certain services. With the disengagement of governments in the services sectors including 
telecommunications and financial sector in Africa in the mid-1990s, foreign companies provided 
a large part of the necessary investment and technological innovations. For example, almost 90 
per cent of firms in mobile telephony market are controlled by foreigners (ITU, 2004). In the 
monetary zone of the communities of central African countries (CEMAC), say zone of franc, 
more than 65% of bank actives are controlled by foreign banks (see BEAC, 2008).  Typical 
restrictions on mode 3 refer to foreign ownership limitations, limits on the number of suppliers 
(e.g. monopolies or duopolies) and connectivity policies in relation to networks used to supply 
closed user group services.   
 
The mode 4 refers to « temporary movement of natural persons» abroad in order to supply the 
services. Discussions on mode 4 (temporary movement of natural persons) are more concerned 
with a number of general issues, such as visa policies, than with sector-specific restrictions. 
Essentially negotiations are based on the following four categories of physical persons (Intra–
Corporate Transferees (ICT), Business visitors (BV), Contractual service suppliers (CSS), and 
Independent Professionals (IP)) who are mainly related to commercial presence (excepted the 
IP). A typical request of developing countries in respect of this point is the creation of categories 
de-linked from mode 3 and the “Substantial improvements” of the coverage of existing 
categories by allowing less qualified persons and more long time journeys13.  
 
3.2 Services negotiations: GATS rules 
 
All WTO Members are subject to the general provisions of the GATS, notably various 
transparency obligations. The GATS sets a method of negotiation for all services (including 
telecommunications and finance) based on the system of requests and offers (commitments). 
The negotiations are based on the limitations on market access, national treatment (non-
discrimination rule) and other restrictive practices of trade in services. For each type of service, 
the negotiations must cover all or only part of the four modes of supply. Each commitment 
subscribed is concerned only by sectors and modes of services specified "positive list", and will 
                                                 
13
 See Communication from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Thailand and Uruguay at WTO, document TN/S/W/31 (18 February 2005). 
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benefit all WTO members (under MFN) excepted special exemption that should not exceed 10 
years “negative list". Beyond the general provision, each member is bound by its own schedule, 
which may contain commitments on particular sectors or modes of services.  
 
In the case of telecommunication, commitments may contain both value-added 
telecommunications services (mostly made during the Uruguay Round) and basic 
telecommunication services (mostly negotiated after the Uruguay Round).  A range of WTO 
Members with commitments on basic telecommunications made additional commitments on 
regulatory disciplines. Most of them did so by committing to some or all aspects of the so-called 
"Reference Paper". The Reference Paper contains a set of principles covering regulatory matters 
such as competition safeguards, interconnection guarantees, transparent licensing processes, and 
the independence of regulators.14 By February 1997, 72 governments have submitted schedules 
on basic telecommunications. Of these, 59 committed to the Reference Paper in whole or with 
few modifications.  
 
Financial services commitments have been negotiated through the “interim agreement” 
(negotiated in 1995 and involving 76 countries) and annexed on the second protocol of GATS, 
as well as the fifth protocol (negotiated in 1997 by 97 countries including those participated to 
interim agreements) and entered into force in 1999. At the starting of the current Doha 
negotiation, 104 countries have subscribed specific commitments on the financial services.  
 
Globally, the African countries have been little involved in the services liberalization process, as 
only fifteen and twelve of them have subscribed to a commitment on telecommunications and 
financial sector respectively15. This reticence with respect to a liberalization of trade in services 
on a global scale seems to reflect two major concerns16. First, these countries generally consider 
that any negotiated liberalization of such exchanges will produce largely unbalanced results in 
favor of the North because of the difference in ability to negotiate (see Cadot et al, 2007). In 
addition, developing countries are concerned by the implications of the control of key service 
sectors by multinationals in terms of national security and culture. Thus, the telecommunications 
                                                 
14
 See Reference paper available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/tel23_e.htm. 
15
 However, the absence of commitments does not necessarily imply that these countries do not allow for financial 
services trade (see Marion and Vennes, 2006). For example, banks with French ownership detained more than 60 
percent of market share in the Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) that so far made no commitments 
under GATS. 
16
 Another important factor relies on the LDC guidelines on services, negotiated among WTO Members, that permit 
LDCs to opt out (i.e. make no GATS offer at all) if they so choose. 
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industry in Gabon, have been for long time part of the Ministry of Defense, due to their 
"particular strategic importance" (see Ebang and ILEAP, 2005).  
 
4 Measure of services trade liberalization17 
 
Services trade barriers essentially consist of regulations limiting the access of foreign services 
providers to the domestic market or subjecting them to less favorable treatment than local 
providers.  The methodologies to measure the degree of trade restrictiveness in the services area 
are inspired by approaches used to characterize non-tariff barriers on goods.  Qualitative data on 
regulations or the behavior of economic agents is transformed into a system of scores, which is 
then used to construct a restrictiveness index. Hoekman (1995) constructs an index rating 
countries according to the number of sectors and modes committed under the GATS.  This index 
suffers from at least two shortcomings: first, it characterizes liberalization only in terms of 
GATS commitments, which may be quite different from reality (Chen and Schembri, 2002).  
Second, the same weight is accorded to each mode (and hence to each restriction), although not 
every mode is equally significant in each sector and restrictions are of a quite varied nature.   
 
Recent studies proposed more elaborated indicators based on the actual regulatory framework 
and ignoring the GATS commitments. For instance an IMF survey conducted by Gelbard and 
Pereira (1999) compute for a set of 38 African countries three financial liberalization indicators 
including  market structure, market openness and sectoral regulation. Each indicator is built as 
an average of scores (ranged from 1 to 100) related to a set of criteria considered as financial 
liberalization determinant.  
 
In line with Gelbard and Pereira (1999) approach, the study by Mattoo et al. (2006) on 
telecommunications and financial services assigns a liberalization score to each country on the 
basis of three criteria:  market structure, ownership (FDI) and independent regulator. However 
the Mattoo et al. (2006) study is more elaborated as they further build a single composite 
liberalization index by rating each component according to their presumed restrictive effects.  
Several studies used more sophisticated indexes examining both the quality of GATS 
commitments as well as the actual state of liberalization.  Such approaches have been pursued 
by Warren (2001) on telecommunication services, Fink, Mattoo and Neagu (2002), MacGuire et 
                                                 
17
 This section is build from Djiofack and A Keck (2006). 
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al. (2000) and Kang (2000) on maritime transport services, MacGuire (2002) on financial 
services, Kemp (2000) on education services and Kalirajan (2000) on distribution services.   
 
In this study, we will adopt the Gelbard and Pereira (1999) indicators to capture the 
liberalization in financial sector. For the telecommunication service, we will consider three 
aspects of liberalization: the unilateral liberalization (competition) measured by the number of 
operator in telecommunication market; the multilateral liberalization, measured by the quality of 
GATS commitments and the UIT indicator of the regulatory authority autonomy. 
 
 
5 Chapter outline and main results 
 
Chapter 2, “Determinants of Competition in a Context of Services Trade Liberalization: 
Analysis of Market Power of Firms in African Telecommunications Industry“, aims to 
estimate the market power and its sources in the African telecommunications industry.  
 
Particularly, we are interested in the role of the following factors in attenuating market power in 
telecommunication industry: (1) the services trade liberalization (number of operators allowed in 
each segment); (2) the quality of regulation including, the effectiveness of regulations at sectoral 
level (autonomy and experiences of regulatory authority) and the quality of governance at 
national level (quality of country institutions); (3) the organizational structure of 
telecommunications industry captured by the multimarket contact effect (reflecting the situation 
of two operators whose parent companies would be competing in more than one market). 
 
Study adopts the “multiple-indicator multiple-causes” (MIMIC) model. The intuition of the 
MIMIC approach is to represent the market power as a latent variable, which has causes and 
effects that are observable. Thus there are two kinds of observed variables in the model, 
“causal” variables and “indicator” variables, which are connected by a single unobserved latent 
variable. This approach, despite its own drawbacks, circumvents some limitations of the 
conjectural variation approach. These include notably the potential problem of specification 
related to the subjective choice of non linear form of demand function indispensable to identify 
market power parameters in NEIO models. 
 
The empirical estimate is based on aggregate price and quantity biannual data from 30 African 
countries between 1996 and 2003. Three main results emerge from our estimates: First, the 
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African telecommunication industry faces a strong and significant market power, which 
maintains the continent prices above the competition level. Second, beyond the increasing in 
penetration which contributes to attenuate the market power, three policy factors seem also to be 
affecting it negatively: the unilateral (domestic) efforts in term of liberalization (increasing in 
number of operators) as well as strengthening sectoral regulation, and the multilateral 
subscriptions of commitments to liberalize in the framework of the GATS at WTO. Third, it 
appears, as evidenced by Parker and Roller (1997), that multimarket contact of 
telecommunications operators is an important factor explaining the cooperative pricing 
behavior.  
 
Chapter 3 , “Impact Of The Liberalization Of Trade In Services On The African Growth: 
Case Of Telecommunications And Financial Services “, is concerned with assessing the 
impact of services trade liberalization on economic growth performances. We assessed the 
indirect linkage between trade liberalization in financial and telecommunications services and 
income growth, relying on a causality chain model based on Francois and Eschenbach (2002) 
and Bayraktar and Wang (2006). This includes the following three stage of causation: (1) 
services trade liberalization contributes to reduce the concentration in market structure, (2) 
which reduces market power and then contributes to the sectoral performances, (3) which in turn 
encourages higher economic growth.  
 
Our empirical assessment for the telecommunications services is based on 30 South Saharan 
African data from 1995 to 2004. As far as the financial services are concerned, the data cover 37 
South Saharan African countries for the period from 1980 to 2000. The estimates, using the 
3SLS, point to mitigate results. In telecommunications sector, the services trade openness, as 
measured by the country commitments in the framework of General Agreements of Trade in 
Services (GATS) at WTO, shows no correlation with the competition level (number of 
operators). However the level of competition has a strong effect on telecommunications services 
accessibility, which in turn influences significantly income growth.  
 
In the case of the financial sector, trade liberalization, as measured by the openness of cross-
border operators and operations (See Gelbard et al, 1999), emerges to be a strong determinant of 
market competitiveness, as measured by the level of concentration. However, the level of 
competition in the financial market shows no significant link with the sectoral performances 
whatever, the later is measured by the level of credit to private sector or by the interest rate 
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spread. As the last stage in the Francois et al. causality chain, the sectoral performances 
indicators emerge as strong determinants of income growth. 
 
As an important difference with the telecommunications sector, the financial performances 
effect on growth seem to be correlated to the development level, among Africa countries, the 
less developed countries enjoying the higher gain.  
 
There is, nonetheless, no evidence of complete causality chain of Francois et al, the only 
recurrence being the positive effect of sectoral performances and the growth, whatever the 
services considered.  
 
Chapter 4, “Impact of the Liberalization of Trade in Services on Africa: Case of 
Telecommunications Services in Cameroon “, aims to assess, the impact of 
telecommunications liberalization on poverty using a combined macro-micro simulation model. 
Based on Cameroonian economy, the analysis consists to link the output of CGE model 
simulations to households’ database, in order to compute poverty indicators. 
 
The CGE model follow the framework set in Rutherford et al (2005) and Konan et al (2006) and 
considers two channels of liberalization effects: the productivity effect and the markup effect. 
However, two contributions have to be underlined:  
 
First, instead of modeling productivity gain through the only variety effects, we model the 
overall productivity gains occurring from trade in services. This is done by introducing the level 
of penetration, as input of global productivity of factors (GPF). The penetration is based itself on 
the level of liberalization (number of operator). The two elasticities characterizing these 
relationships have been estimated in the chapter 2, using a model of simultaneous equations, 
estimating on the one hand, the effects of penetration on growth and on the other hand, the 
effects of liberalization on the penetration. Our approach allows capturing other sources of 
productivity gains than variety effects, which can be substantial in the case of trade in services.  
 
Second, instead of modeling the market power (markup) through the Lener equilibrium (profit 
maximization), we adopt the Eastman-Stykolt (1960) approach (see Warren (2000) and Konan 
et al (2002)). The Eastman-Stykolt approach consists for producer, to impose a surplus 
(representing the markup rate) over the average cost. The markup has been estimated in an 
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econometric model, allowing determining the market power and its elasticity with respect to the 
service liberalization indicator (number of operators).  
 
The micro module of the analysis uses the Cameroonian households income survey data of 2001 
(ECAM II), and is based on the accounting micro simulation approach developed in Chen and 
Ravallion (2003). 
 
Our results show that liberalization contributes to reduce poverty in Cameroon. The attribution 
of a supplementary license in the mobile segment of telecommunications would lead to a 
decrease of poverty incidence by 1.76% on average. It appears, as in Rutherford et al (2005) and 
Konan et al (2006), that the main gain procured by services liberalization are generated by 
productivity effects, even if the markup effect remain positive.  
 
 
6  Conclusions and policies recommendations  
 
Based on telecommunications and finance, this thesis analyses the effects of unilateral and 
multilateral liberalization of trade in services, on the sectorial performance (access to services 
and price), growth, macro-economic indicators and poverty.  
 
An examination of the legal framework reveals that the telecommunications market in Africa 
ranks among the most opened and having the highest level of competition in the world. Thus, 
the percentage of countries having now a monopoly in mobile telephony has decreased from 70 
in 1995 to 25 in 1999 and less than 10 in 2004. If deregulation was long awaited in fixed 
telephony, the process has been accelerated in the last years. While 97 per cent of operators in 
1998 were still exercising under the monopolistic structure, this share has rapidly declined to 60 
per cent in 2002 and 44 per cent in 2004; the same level as that of other developing countries. 
 
The same pattern is observed in the case of financial services where the process of liberalization 
began in the 1980’s, earlier than that of telecommunications. Thus, an IMF survey (see Gelbard 
and Fereira, 1999) showed that the percentage of African economies considered as opened 
moved from 40% in 1987, to around 68% in 1997. This same evolution is observed concerning 
the bank market structure. While 55% of African market structure in 1987 was considered as 
competitive, the figure moved to 65% in 1997.  
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This pattern of increasing services liberalization, result of domestic reforms undertaken under 
the guidance of donors, contrast with the Africa’s marginalization in the process of the 
multilateral negotiations in the framework of the GATS at the WTO. Since the beginning of the 
Uruguay Round in 1986, the number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa among the 41 WTO’s 
members who have subscribed at least a commitment to liberalization is 13 for 
telecommunications and 12 for the financial sector.  
 
While our findings may suffer from many limitations (see below), a number of policy 
implications can be drawn with respect to the services trade at domestic, regional and 
multilateral levels and the achievement of developments goal. 
 
In the current context of multilateral trade negotiations on services, our findings provide 
evidence that the commitments subscribed in the framework of GATS could be a 
complementary factor in enhancing competitiveness in telecommunications market in Africa. 
 
In this respect, the great disparity between the level of reforms (unilateral) and the current level 
of commitments (multilateral) undertaken in the framework of GATS is indicative of the huge 
margin that African countries possess to make new commitments on telecommunications and 
financial services without proceeding to additional measures at national level. Given the results 
of this study, African participation to multilateral negotiations should no longer be limited to the 
simple satisfaction of "requests" from partner countries (defensive tactics). It would be 
appropriate to make commitment that encourages the entry of more operators in national 
telephony markets and allow a strengthening of regulatory practices throughout the 
telecommunications market on the continent.  
 
The strengthening of regulation can be undertaken (1) by the adoption of the reference paper of 
GATS, (2) the creation of sub-regional partnership possibility and (2) the requirement of a 
guarantee in technical assistance prior to negotiations (EPAs and the GATS). 
 
(1) Align to the best regulatory practices at the international level  
 
The empirical results show that the most effective instrument to enhance the performance of 
telecommunications is unilateral regulation. The strengthening of this framework would be 
ensured by the adoption of the Reference paper (RP), which provides the fullest and most 
complete regulatory framework on basic telecommunications. Its adoption would enable African 
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countries, where the regulatory framework is recent, to benefit from the best practices in their 
task of price control, safeguarding of competition, management of interconnection, and 
universal service. Although our current results do not show a link between the adoption of the 
Reference Paper and sectorial performances, a better mastery of RP disciplines including those 
relating to interconnection is likely to result in lower cost at the level of the final-user, and a 
more efficient use of networks, forcing the incumbents to share the economies of networking 
with the newcomers following the viable economically modalities.  
 
(2) The creation of sub-regional or regional partnership possibility 
It seems that a regulation with a regional perspective would be more fruitful. Our finding that 
the multimarket contact enhances the market power clearly advocates for current projects to 
establish sub-regional or regional regulatory institutions in Africa. In addition, the creation of a 
sub-regional regulatory space would strengthen the independence and capabilities control of the 
regulatory authority. It would therefore be appropriate to make prevail over the schedules of 
commitments the MFN exception clause for the sub-regional integration areas, in order to 
preserve a possibility of creating a sub-regional or regional market regulation of 
telecommunications18. 
 
(3) Requirement of technical assistance on regulation as a precondition to negotiations  
 
Given the inexperience of regulatory bodies on the continent, and the crucial importance of an 
effective authority in attaining the objectives of liberalization specified above, African countries 
should easily enforce Article IV of GATS to obtain financing by the industrialized countries of 
technical assistance as a prerequisite to any participation in negotiations19. 
 
Researches perspectives  
 
Our analysis suffers from important limitations. First, and most importantly, in our data set, 
price and quantity data are only available at an aggregate level for each country. Furthermore, 
the aggregate nature of the data and the resulting empirical model do not allow for differences 
across firm behaviors. 
                                                 
18
 A regulatory partnership on the base of the existing technology partnership among 45 African countries, via the 
RASCOM (Regional African Satellite Communications Organization) that has led to the launch in 2007 of the first 
pan-African telecommunications satellite, could constitute a credible departure. 
19
 The Aid For Trade initiative of WTO offer an excellent framework to target this issue. Particularly the LDCs who 
are already engaged in the aid for trade mechanism of “Integrated Framework”, could introduce the strengthening 
of regulatory body among the priority of their Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies (DITS).  
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Second, as all international studies, ours also suffers from the lack of available variables across a 
large number of countries. Thus, for our main variable of interest, market power, we may have 
an omitted variable problem. For example, the literature evidences that cross-ownership across 
cellular operators (See. Parker and Roller, 1997), the number of years that the first market 
entrant enjoyed a monopoly prior to competitive and services qualities, are important predictors 
of market power. But we did not have data to test this hypothesis in our international context.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis failed to account for some important services for developing countries, 
notably services supplied through the mode 4. Various aspects of gains procured by services 
supplied through the mode 4 have been evidenced and include notably: (i) the potential of 
enhancing merchandise trade by reducing transaction costs (see Jansen et Al.  2005); (ii) the 
productivity improvement through imports of skills of engineering consultants or advisers to 
management (see Markusen and Rutherford, 2002); and (iii) the increased remittances (see 
Rodrick, 2001; Walmsley and Winters, 2002). Thus mode 4 constitutes the priority in “services 
commitments requests” by many African countries in the framework of EPAs as well as GATS 
negotiations20.  
 
However it’s also one of the most controversial issues of negotiations with two main positions: 
on the one hand, developed countries plead for the movement of qualified persons, on the other, 
developing countries prefer the openness for the non-qualified. This service therefore constitutes 
an interesting path of future research in trade in services. Given the lack of necessary data at 
international level for the econometrical analysis, a credible way to undertake instructive study 
on this issue would be notably through a CGE model capturing both the productivity and 
remittances effects of movement of worker. A comparison of the scenario of the displacement of 
qualified worker against non qualified worker would constitute a crucial input in the formulation 
of negotiations positions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 See the WTO members requests to the EU members available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/sectoral/services/wto_nego 
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1 Introduction 
 
While it is commonly accepted that the increasing liberalization of telecommunications 
services with the technical progress that accompanies it have significantly improved access to 
services in the world during the past decade, its actual effect on the price trends, however, 
remains in many respects ambiguous (ITU, 2004).  
 
This applies particularly to African countries where one decade after the launch of the first 
liberalization campaign, prices have not dropped (on average) in the two main segments of 
telephony, that is, local fixed and mobile telephone. As table 1 illustrates, between 1996 and 
2004, the prices of local fixed telephone have increased; in the segment of mobile, prices are 
higher in the countries supposed to be in competition (more than one operator) than in those 
with a monopoly. 
 
Table 1.  Tests of prices averages differences  
Segment Tests  Africa World 
Price of mobile 
Monopoly vs. competition Price increase Price unchanged 
(1997-1999) vs. (2000-2003) Price unchanged Price decrease 
Price of local fixed 
Monopoly vs. competition Price unchanged Price increase 
(1997-1999) vs. (2000-2003) Price increase Price unchanged 
Source: author’s calculation 
 
Therefore, the process of liberalization, which consists in distributing licenses to more than 
one operator in the case of African countries, seems to be a non sufficient condition for the 
systematic decline in prices in light of the competition. While regulatory bodies and 
institutions of competition are particularly poor on the continent (ITU, 2004) and that 
operators announce significant profits particularly in the segment of mobile telephony21, the 
objective of this chapter is to estimate the market power and its sources in the African 
telecommunications industry.  
 
Particularly, we are interested in the role of the following factors in attenuating market power 
in telecommunication industry: (1) the services trade liberalization(number of operators 
                                                 
21
 The boom in mobile telephony in Africa has generated a financial windfall estimated at over 10 billion U.S. 
dollars in terms of revenues, and more than 1 billion U.S. dollars of profits (Cf. UIT 2004). 
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allowed in each segment); (2) the quality of regulation including, the effectiveness of 
regulations at sectoral level (autonomy and experiences of regulatory authority) as well as the 
quality of governance at national level (quality of country institutions); (3) the organizational 
structure of telecommunications industry captured by the multimarket contact effect 
(reflecting the situation of two operators whose parent companies would be competing in 
more than one market).  
 
From the perspective of decision-makers (trade negotiators or policies), this analysis can 
provide useful insights with respect to questions such as the following: Is the consumer 
welfare in a particular country penalized by firms’ market power? What are the potential 
reasons for this market power? In the case of telecommunication services, what are the 
sources of the market power? Does it result from the limited number of competitors, the 
absence of commitments in the framework of GATS, the market saturation, the multi-market 
arrangements, or the lack of effective regulation?  
 
The few studies measuring the market power in telecommunications use the New Empirical 
Industrial Organization (NEIO) model of conjectural variation (Breshnan, 1989) and are 
generally based on the American economy. Our study makes contributions to the literature as 
follows:  
 
First, it is to our knowledge the first attempt to estimate the determinants of market power in 
the African telecommunications.  
 
Second, instead of the traditional method of conjecture variation, this study adopts the 
“multiple-indicator multiple-causes” (MIMIC) model, for the first time in 
telecommunications. Based on the models of latent variables, the MIMIC approach followed 
here has been developed in Joreskog and Goldberger (1975) and adapted by Mccluskey and 
Quagrainie (2004) to model market power in apple market in United State.  
 
The intuition of the MIMIC approach is to represent the market power as a latent variable, 
which has causes and effects that are observable. Thus there are two kinds of observed 
variables in the model, “causal” variables and “indicator” variables, which are connected by a 
single unobserved latent variable. This approach, despite its own drawbacks (See section II), 
would circumvent some limitations of the conjectural variation approach. These include 
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notably the subjective choice of non linear form of demand function indispensable to identify 
market power parameters in NEIO models 22. 
 
Thirdly, instead of measuring separately market power in telecommunication segments, either 
on mobile segment (see Parker and Roller (1997); Nunn and Sarvary (2004)), or on fixed 
segment (see Ward, 1995), this study considers simultaneously the two segments. This is 
possible thanks to MIMIC model which implies simultaneous estimation of at least two 
equations that share the market power as independent variable. In this study, we consider two 
equations representing prices in fixed and mobile telephone segments.  
 
Fourthly, we account for a major critics of MIMIC model, relative to the absence of economic 
theory to guide the specification, by presenting a theoretical framework (through the pricing 
rule in imperfect competition) justifying the relationship defining our latent variable (i.e. 
market power).  
 
Our empirical findings suggest the existence of significant market power in African 
telecommunications industry, which allowed the operators to keep the price at a level higher 
than in the competition condition. The market power of firms seems to be mitigated by three 
variables: the number of operators in fixed and mobile segments, the effectiveness of 
regulations at sectoral level and the subscription of the commitment at WTO. It is amplified 
by the situation of multi-contact market.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section describes the context of African 
telecommunications industry. Section 3 introduces the empirical model and its particular 
implementation in the international cellular context. Section 4 describes the data. The 
empirical findings are reported in Section 5, and the chapter ends with a discussion of the 
results and some concluding remarks. 
  
                                                 
22
 See Mccluskey et al (2004) for a critical analysis of conjecture variation method. 
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2  Telecommunications liberalization in Africa 
 
Traditionally, telecommunication systems in Africa were run by the government. The existing 
telecommunications infrastructure of the colonial area was inherited by the state after its 
independence. Public ownership of the telecommunications sector also squared with the 
economic thinking of the 1970s, which favored large investments in key sectors that were 
expected to stimulate economic growth. Telecommunications in Africa were often under the 
control of a specifically created ministry or, for instance in Gabon, due to their "particular 
strategic importance", they were part of the Ministry of Defense (Ebang and ILEAP, 2005).   
 
However, several factors contribute to crucial change in 1990s toward more liberalization. 
These include notably: (i) the need for greater efficiency of networks (see Plane, 2002); (iii) 
the technological innovations which amplified the costs of protection;23 (iv) the debt crisis of 
the 1980s which exposed the poor management of many publicly-owned enterprises in the 
context of structural adjustment programs by the IMF and World Bank.  These led to 
evolution not only at national level, but also to a coordination of efforts at the sub-regional 
level, like in the case of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).24  
 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the evolution from state monopolies to a more liberal market 
environment in the African telecommunications sector for both fixed and mobile telephony.   
Between 1995 and 2004, the share of African countries maintaining a state monopoly in the 
mobile segment has dropped from 70 per cent to less the 10 per cent. Liberalization in the 
fixed-line segment has been somewhat slower, but progress has been made over the last five 
years.  While all fixed operators in 1995 were state monopolies, this was still the case in only 
44 per cent of African countries by 2004.   
 
                                                 
23
 Modern switching techniques, for instance, led to the spread of call-back services. Call-backs allow users to 
circumvent higher prices in the domestic market and benefit from more competitive conditions offered abroad.  
Voice services over the internet enable users to make international phone calls at the local rate.  Technological 
developments of that nature increasingly undermined the view that basic telecommunications services 
constituted a natural monopoly.  For a more extensive discussion see Doumbouya (2004) 
24
 The membership of the Telecommunications Regulators Association of Southern Africa (TRASA) comprises 
the regulatory agencies of each SADC member state.  It was established to coordinate regulatory matters with 
the ultimate objective of promoting the establishment and operation of efficient, adequate and cost-effective 
telecommunications networks and services in the Southern Africa region.  For more see http://www.trasa.org.bw. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of competition in the mobile telephony segment in Africa, 
selected years (per cent) 
0%
20%
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60%
80%
1995 (23) 1997 (27) 1999 (33) 2001 (42) 2004 (43)
Monopoly Partial competition Full competition
 
Source: authors’ calculation from ITU (2004) 
Notes:  Partial competition:  two operators; Full competition: more than two operators.  Total number of 
countries in brackets. 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of competition in the fixed-line telephony segment in Africa, 
selected years (per cent) 
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1995 (35) 1998 (35) 2001 (44) 2002 (45) 2004 (45)
Monopoly Partial competition Full competition
 
Source: authors’ calculation from ITU (2004) 
Notes:  Partial competition:  two operators; Full competition: more than two operators.  Total number of 
countries in brackets. 
 
Table.2 provides the characteristics of liberalization in individual African countries in 2004 in 
terms of the level of competition in different market segments - i.e. mobile telephony, fixed 
telephony (local, domestic long distance, international) and internet - and the status of the 
regulatory authority.  
 
In short, competition in most African telecom regimes only began to be introduced around the 
year 2000.  Yet, by 2004, Africa had gone from a continent of monopoly control over fixed 
services to one in which less than half of countries still maintained these monopolies.  A 
number of governments, however, initiated duopolies in fixed telephony, rather than full 
competition.  In mobile telephony, by 2004, the proportion of African countries maintaining 
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monopoly service had shrunk to around 10 percent.  In practice, it is not uncommon for an 
African country to have 3 to 4 suppliers of mobile services. As the monopolies were opened 
up, foreign investment was generally permitted at one level or another, both in the former 
monopoly as well as in the new entrant fixed and mobile providers.  
 
 
Table 2. Competition and regulation in Africa in 2004 
Country Local Long distance 
Internat
ional. Mobile  Internet 
Year of 
creation of 
regulatory 
authority 
Independence 
of regulatory 
authority 
Decisions by 
committee (if 
yes, number of 
members) 
WTO Basic 
Telecom 
Commitments 
 
Angola C C C P C 1999 No Yes: 5  
Benin M M M C  2002 Yes Yes: 5  
Botswana M C M C C 1996 Yes Yes: 5 Yes 
Burkina Faso M M M C C 1998 Yes No  
Burundi C C C C C 1997 No No  
Cameroon M M M C C 1998 Yes No  
Cap-Verde M M M C C 2004 Yes Yes: 3  
CAR M M M C  
    
Chad M C M  C 1998 No No  
Congo C C P C C 
    
DRC C C C C  2002 Yes Yes: 7 Yes 
Côte d'Ivoire P P P P C 1995 Yes Yes: 10 Yes/RP 
Eritrea M M M C C 1998 No No  
Ethiopia M M M M M 1996 Yes No  
Gabon M C C C C 2001 Yes Yes: 6  
Gambia M M M P C 2004 Yes Yes: 6 Yes 
Ghana P P P P C 1997 Yes Yes: 7 Yes/RP 
Guinea P P P P C 1992 No No  
Guinea-Bissau M M M P C 1999 Yes Yes: 3  
Kenya P P P P C 1999 Yes Yes: 11 Yes/RP 
Lesotho P P P C C 2000 Yes No (value added 
only) 
Liberia P P C C  
    
Madagascar M M C C C 1997 Yes No  
Malawi M M P P P 1998 No Yes: 8  
Mali P P P P C 1999 Yes Yes: 3  
Mauritius C  C C C 2002 Yes Yes: 7 Yes 
Mozambique M M M C C 1992 Yes Yes: 5  
Namibia M M M M C 1992 Yes No  
Niger M M M C M 
    
Nigeria C P P P C 1992 Yes Yes: 9 Yes 
Rwanda C C  C C 2001 Yes Yes: 7  
S. Tomé & P. M  M   
    
Senegal C C C C C 
 Yes No Yes/RP 
Seychelles P P P P P 
    
Sierra Leone M M P C P 
    
South Africa C C C P C 2000 No Yes: 7 Yes/RP 
Swaziland M M M M  
    
Tanzania M M M C C 1994 Yes Yes: 7  
Togo P M P P C 1998 Yes Yes: 7  
Uganda P P P P  1997 Yes Yes: 7 Yes/RP 
Zambia M M M P P 1994 No Yes: 8  
Zimbabwe C P P C C 2000 Yes Yes: 7 (value added 
only) 
Source: authors’ calculation from ITU (2004) 
Note:  M:  Monopoly;  P: Partial competition;  C: Full Competition;  and RP:  Reference Paper. 
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Formal liberalization of non-facilities based telephony, such as international simple resale and 
voice over Internet calls, has yet to take hold in Africa, but most countries have now opened 
up value-added services, such as e-mail and data base access, to competitive forces.  In the 
course of the post-2000 liberalization, African countries have been able to draw on the work 
of regional and international telecom organizations and secure aid to hire regulatory experts.  
As a result, the new regulatory frameworks put in place tend to be largely consistent with 
notions of best practice in the sector, as well as the WTO Reference Paper. Countries are 
moving towards greater autonomy to the authority of regulation. Thus, in 2004, over 77 
percent of African countries were equipped with a separate regulatory authority of the 
traditional operator and supposedly autonomous in their decision making. 
 
Thirteen African countries committed at WTO to market access for foreign telecom suppliers, 
through agreements of Uruguay round in 1993 and on basic telecommunications in 1996. In 
the context of the Uruguay Round (1986-1994), six African countries committed to liberalize. 
For example, Nigeria had committed to open its mobile markets and Lesotho, Nigeria, and 
Zimbabwe had committed on value added services.  
 
WTO negotiations on basic telecommunications (in 1996) came too early for more than a 
handful of African governments to contribute. As figures 1 and 2 above show, most 
governments began liberalizing well after the WTO talks ended in early 1997. This is why the 
WTO commitments reflect so little of the liberalization Africa has accomplished to date.  
Seven governments committed in the basic telecommunications negotiations (Côte d'Ivoire, 
Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda).  Like other developing 
countries in the negotiations, they generally took so-called "phased-in" commitments to 
liberalize on a given date, in line with their reform plan.  Some, such as Uganda, committed to 
allow a duopoly.  Six of them (all but Mauritius) added the Reference Paper to their 
commitments, thus providing a guarantee to investors of a pro-competitive regulatory regime.   
 
In the new trade round, called the Doha Development Agenda, none of the recently 
liberalizing African countries has, as yet, made an offer to take on market access 
commitments in the telecommunications sector25. 
 
                                                 
25
 We have presented in the chapter 1 some factors explaining the poor participation of African to the 
multilateral services negotiations. 
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3 Litterature survey  
 
The empirical literature estimating the market power can be grouped in three main categories: 
(1) the approach of demand elasticities, (2) the approach of New Empirical Industrial 
Organization (NEIO) so-call the conjectural variation and (3) the approach of “multiple-
indicators multiple-causes” (MIMIC models). 
 
The first approach measures the degree of market power by estimating firms-specific demand 
elasticities. The reciprocal of the own-price elasticity, the Lerner index, provides an estimate 
of the percentage price markup over marginal cost for an unconstrained, profit maximizing 
firm. Finally, estimates of this price-cost margin provide the basis for measuring the potential 
deadweight loss from supra-competitive pricing. Ward (1995) applied this approach in long 
distance telecommunications in United State. The study concludes the existence of market 
power that induces a potential deadweight loss of at most 0.36% of total industry revenues 
during 1988-1991. However, if the method allows determining the markup, it is silent on their 
causes.  
 
The second approach from the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) is more refined 
and more widely used. It relies on the conjectural variation and allows the estimate of conduct 
and cost parameters of firms, even when full data on costs is not available. The parameter of 
conjectural variations of the firm (i) is estimated through the standard conjectural variations 
equation proposed by Bresnahan (1989): 
( )
( )
( )it itit
it it it
t it
d PX X
PX MC X
N d X
Ω
− =   
where ( )
( )
Ω = tit
it
d X
d X
 is the expected variation of rivals output when output of firm i varies, 
MC  is the individual marginal costs, PX  is the market price, tX is the aggregate quantity 
produced in the market (country), itX  is firm i’s output, and N is the total number of firms in 
the market. 
 
Assuming a non linear demand function in order to address the issue of identification (see 
Fageda, 2004), the model estimates the parameter of industry conduct, defined as Ω= itit Nλ , as 
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the proxy of market power. The NEIO approach has been widely applied, in various industry 
including, the finance (Sjöberg, 2004), aviation (Fageda, 2004), electricity (Vassilopoulos, 
2003) and cable television (see Rubinozvitz, 1993), but rarely in basic telecommunications. 
Among the few exceptions are the studies of parker and Röller (1997) and Nunn and Sarvary 
(2004). 
 
Parker and Röller (1997) consider the impact of regulation policy limiting entries on the 
American mobile telephone market. The empirical analysis uses panel data over the period 
1983-1988 covering different American telephone areas. Estimates of market power reveal 
that the prices are both higher than those of perfect competition and those of non-cooperative 
duopoly. In addition, they evidence that situations of “cross-properties” (when a firm detains 
shares in its competitor) and "multi-market contact» are strong determinants of the practice of 
non-competitive price. 
 
Nunn and Sarvary (2004), have resumed the same pattern as that of Parker and Röller (1997) 
relying on 10 OECD countries. Their results indicate that a larger number of operators in a 
country do not seem to result in any additional effects on the power market. But the antitrust 
commitment of a country contributes to the decline of the market power. Finally, the authors 
identify the lasting of reign of a monopoly before the opening to competition as a factor 
contributing to the rise of the market power. The authors conclude that the market power in 
various countries could have two sources: the price collusion between operators and the cost 
of changing suppliers for consumers. 
 
However, as pointed out Mccluskey et al (2004), the approach of NEOI considering the 
market power by inference has several limitations including notably the subjective choice of 
non linear form of demand function indispensable to identify market power parameters in 
NEIO models. 
 
These criticisms have encouraged the adoption of a latent variable approach based on the so-
called "model variations multiple-indicator multiple-causes” (MIMIC) presented in Joreskog 
and Goldberger (1975). This approach based on the assumption that even if the firm’s market 
power is not observable, it still has operational implications between observable variables that 
could be considered as indicators of behavior.  
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The method has its origins in the factor analysis literature of psychometrics (to analyze the 
quality concepts as intelligence) and are increasingly used in economic to estimate the 
underground economy (See Giles and Tedds, 2002; Bajada and Schneider, 2005; Dell’Anno 
and Schneider, 2003). The only application of MIMIC in estimating the market power is 
provided by Mccluskey et al (2004), who study the market of fresh apple in the United States. 
They represent the market power as a latent variable or index, which has causes and effects 
that are observable but which cannot itself be directly measured. Thus, a model is defined by 
connecting two kinds of observed variables (“causal” variables and “indicator” variables) with 
a single unobserved index. The fitted index predicted from the econometric estimation of the 
model is considered as an estimate of the magnitude of the market power. Our analysis adopts 
this approach. 
 
However, there is a major criticism which is quite common when latent estimation procedures 
are used. It refers to the reliability of “causes” and “indicators” in explaining the variability of 
the latent variable. Smith (2002), Hill (2002) and Breuch (2005) criticize the modeling of 
underground economy, especially the absence of economic theory to guide the specification. 
This critic could also be applied to Mccluskey et al (2004) study where they assumed 
subjective Constant elasticities of substitution (CES) function to characterize the link between 
the shipment of apple and the market power in the American market of apple. To face this 
criticism, we present in this study a theoretical framework (through the pricing rule in 
imperfect competition) justifying the relationship defining our latent variable (i.e. market 
power).  
 
 
4 Model: MIMIC model to estimate market power in 
telecommunications industry 
 
Before introducing the MIMIC model to be estimated, we present the basic model of pricing 
rule in imperfect competition, relating the market power in telecommunications market and 
price.  
 
4.1 Pricing rule in imperfect competition 
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The Telecommunications markets are characterized by oligopolies. To explore oligopoly 
interactions we use a Cournot conjectural variations model.26  It is assumed that each firm 
produces a homogeneous product, faces a downward sloping demand curve and adjusts output 
to maximize profits, with a common market price as the equilibrating variable.  The 
telecommunications industry is assumed to consist of N identical firms producing a collective 
output ct ictX NX=   
Where, ictX  is the quantity supplied by firm i in country c and period t  
 
Using a representative profit function yields the first order condition for each firm i in country 
c and period t:   
=ict ictMR MC           (1) 
i.e.  marginal revenue MRit equals marginal cost MCit with  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
ict ct
ict ict ict
ct ict
d PX d XMR PX X
d X d X
= +         (2) 
where ictPX  is the price of telecommunications services in firm i in country c and period t.  
 
Given N identical firms, the equilibrium condition (1) can be written as 
ict ict ict
ict ct ct
PX MC
PX N ε
− Ω
=           (3) 
yielding the oligopoly pricing rule, with ctε  being the price elasticity of demand.   
(3) can be rewritten as  
(1 )
ict
ict
ict
ct ct
MCPX
N ε
=
Ω
−
           (4)  
11 1
(1 )
ict ict
ict
ct ct
PX MC
N ε
  
  
  
= + −  Ω  
−    
        (5) 
[ ]1ict ict ictPX MC φ= +           (6) 
 
                                                 
26
 For an overview of alternative specifications of market structure see also Francois and Roland-Holst (1997). 
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Where 1 1
(1 )
ict
ict
ct ctN
φ
ε
 
 
 
= −
 Ω
 
− 
 
 represent the mark-up and hence a measure of an operator's. It 
is the percentage of surplus imposes by firms on marginal cost. 
 
For 0→Ω  or → ∞N  or ∞→ε , PX MC→  with the quantity produced by each firm 
approaching the perfect competition output and rents being eliminated.  Conversely, for N=1, 
we obtain a monopoly situation (total collusion of firms) with the mark-up corresponding to 
the inverse demand elasticity.   
 
For the rest of our analysis we consider the indicator ictθ  to capture the market power27 such 
as: 
[ ]1ict ictθ φ= +            (7) 
 
By introducing the equation (7) into the (6), the logarithmic transformation of equation (6) 
yields the following structural equation: 
log( ) log( ) log( )ict ict ictPX MC θ= +          (8) 
expressing the log of price as the sum of the logs of marginal cost and market power . 
 
4.2 MIMIC model 
 
The structural model defined above, in equation (8), is in line with the standard form of a 
MIMIC model since it contains an unobserved variable, log( )ictθ , connecting two set of 
observed variables, the causes variables ( log( )ictMC ) and the consequences variables 
( log( )ictPX ). For a given country (c), we assume the firms to be identical within each 
segment (mobile or fixed), but different between segments. Thus, the following relationship is 
writing without the index of firms (i), but with the introduction of subscript (s) indicating the 
segments of telecommunication.  
                                                 
27
 We are not using this indicator as the measure of market power, it is just an intermediate stage that would 
facilitate the market power determination. 
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The model to be estimated is of the following form:  
( ) ( ) ( )0
1
log log log
K
s s s s ss s
kctct ct k
k
SPX λ θ α α ε
=
+= + +∑  where 1,2s =   (9) 
 
This Equation consists of a system of two supply relations, one for each segment.  
sε are measurement errors with zero mean that are independently distributed over (c) and 
have a finite variance–covariance matrix.; 0
s
α  is the intercept.  
sSkct  are k’s exogenous factors on the supply side explaining the marginal cost for the 
segment (s) in the country (c) at the time (t). skα  is the coefficient corresponding to the k’s 
variable. Determinants of marginal cost consist of the output quantity sctSUBR , the output 
(services) quality, sctQLTE , the economic structure indicators and the production cost 
components. The production costs determinants include the energy prices index, ctENERG  the 
wage index, ctWAGE , the interest rate and the lending price index ctRENT . The economic 
structure variables include the population ctPOP , the density of population, ctDSTE and the 
GDP per capita, ctGDP .  
 
The log of the latent industry conduct variable ( )log sctθ  captures the market power. The 
model assumes the market power to be common in mobile and fixed segment. The market 
power measured in our model is therefore an average market power of telecommunication 
market for a given country. It can be specified in the following relationship, without index 
(s)28: 
( ) ( )K0
1
log log
ct
s
kct ctk
k
vFθ β β
=
= + +∑                   (10) 
Where 
ctv  is an independently distributed random disturbance with zero mean and finite 
variance; sktF ’s are observed independents variables that determine the market power and kβ , 
                                                 
28
 The market power is assumed to be the same in the fixed and mobile segment for a given market. 
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the corresponding coefficient. The determinants of market power ( )skctF include variables at 
segment level (with index (s)), and variables at sectoral and national level (without (s)). They 
include, the variables of liberalizations (domestics, sctLIBER , and multilateral, ctGATSLIBER ), 
the legal environment in the country ctGOUV , the quality of regulation, as measured by 
unilateral regulatory authority effectiveness, ctREG  , and the multilateral (GATS, Reference 
Paper) regulatory quality ctGATSREG . The last determinant considered is concerned with the 
characteristics of the market: the market saturation, sctSAT , and the multimarket 
contact, ctMMARKET
29
.  
 
Substituting into (9), ( )log ctθ  with its value of the equation (10), gives the reduced-form 
equation  
( ) ( ) ( )K0
1
0
1
 log log logs
ct ctk
k
K
s s s ss s
kctkct k
k
SvPX Fβ βλ α α ε
= =
= + + + +
 
+  
 
∑ ∑  (11) 
then  
( ) ( ) ( )
1
log log logs
ct
K K
ss s ss s
kctkct k ctk
k k
SPX c wFϕ α
=
= + + +∑ ∑     (12) 
Where the new random term is = +s st ct
svw ελ       (13) 
The constant term is 00= +
s ssc β αλ         (14) 
and  =s
k k
sϕ βλ            (15) 
 
The regression of the model implies estimating a system of two equations (12) (one equation 
for each segment) under the constraints of equations (14) and (15). However, the 
identifications of all parameters in equation (12) and (10) required the imposition of cross-
equation proportionality restrictions that differentiate the MIMIC model from the traditional 
approach of estimating structural equations (see Mccluskey et al, 2004). This consist to 
                                                 
29
 The choice of these factors represents a compromise between possible determinants of firm behavior and data 
availability for the maximum number of African countries.  
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normalize the industry conduct ( sλ ) in order to identify the parameters of market power, 
kβ . This is equivalent to assume sλ  equal to one in one of the two equations. Other 
restriction aiming to identify 0β , required to consider the intercept of one of the two 
equations, 0
s
α , equal to zero.  
 
An important criticism of MIMIC model (particularly those measuring the underground 
economic) by Breuch (2005) is the subjective normalization of a parameter necessary to 
identify the latent variable parameters. Following Mccluskey et al (2004), all restrictions, 
including the normalization, imposed in our model would be tested using the specification test 
of Gertler (1988). 
 
 
5 Regressions  
 
5.1 Data descriptions and sources 
The data used in this study cover 30 Sub- Sahara African countries on the period from 1996 to 
200330 divided in four sub-periods of two years. The table.3 below provides an overview of 
all variables and data sources. 
 
Table 3. Data description and sources 
Variable Variable description Description Source 
s
ctPX ; 1s =  Price mobile 
Costs of 3 minutes call from one mobile to 
another;  annual bill of average subscriber ITU 
s
ctPX ; 2s =  Price local fixed 
Costs of 3 minutes call from local fixed line;  
annual bill of average subscriber ITU 
s
ctSUBR ; 1s =  Mobile output Number of Mobile subscribers ITU 
s
ctSUBR ; 2s =  Fixed output Number of Fixed line subscribers ITU 
s
ctQLTE ; 1s =  Mobile quality  share digital subscribers ITU 
s
ctQLTE ; 2s =  Fixed quality  share of fixed calls failed ITU 
s
ctSAT ; 1s =  Penetration mobile 
Percentage of population subscribed and 
having telephone service activated within the 
last 9 months 
ITU 
                                                 
30
 The list of countries is contained in annex Table A.2 
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Table continued 
Variable Variable description Description Source 
s
ctSAT ; 2s =  Penetration fixed Percentage of population subscribed ITU 
s
ctLIBER ; 1, 2s =  
Unilateral openness 
(liberalization) Number of operators per segment ITU 
ctREG  Unilateral regulation 
Independence score of the regulatory 
authority multiplied by the numbers of years 
in existence 
ITU 
ctGATSLIBER  
Multilateral openness 
(liberalization) GATS commitments score WTO 
ctGATSREG  
Multilateral 
regulation Reference Paper score WTO 
ctMMARKET  Multimarket effect 
the total number of time that the firms in a 
given country are in competition in others 
African countries 
Collected 
by author 
ctGDP  Income GDP per capita  WDI 
ctDSTE  Population density 
Percentage of population per square 
kilometer WDI 
ctPOP  Population size  Total number of inhabitants WDI 
ctGOUV  Governance 
Kaufmann governance indicators: regulatory 
quality, policy stability, corruption control WB 
ctRENT  Rent Lending prices index WDI 
ctENERG  Energy Energy prices index WDI 
ctWAGE  Wage Wage index ILO 
Source Author’s construction 
 
5.1.1 Dependent variable: 
s
ctPX
 
The data for the dependent variables, the price ( sctPX ), come from the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU). The prices for mobile and local fixed telephony are 
measured by the official price of a three minutes phone call. However, this price does not 
account for discounts that are generally available in countries enjoying some level of 
competition.31 Hence, it is possible that this indicator suffers from a measurement error that is 
non-homogenous between countries. This may lead to the attenuation bias (i.e. 
underestimation of liberalization effects on price).  
 
5.1.2 Variables affecting market power:
s
kctF
 
Liberalization measure: 
                                                 
31
 Boylaud and Nicoletti (2001) estimate that discount prices in OECD countries are on average 25 per cent 
lower than regular rates.   
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For the liberalization indicator, we adopt an approach that examines both the domestic 
policies actually applied in the telecommunications sector as well as the level of commitments 
as specified in WTO Members' GATS schedules.  
 
To measure the level of actual (unilateral) domestic liberalization, sctLIBER , we rely on ITU 
survey data (ITU, 2005a like Mattoo et al. (2006), Li and Xu (2004), Fink et al. (2001)) and 
Wallsten (2001). However, we go further than these studies in a number of respects. Notably, 
we measure the degree of competition for each telecommunications segment separately 
instead of employing only a "hybrid competition score". The latter approach makes it difficult 
to disentangle the direct effect that competition within each segment has on segment 
performance. Wallsten (2001), for instance, simply approximates the degree of competition in 
the fixed-line segment by the number of mobile operators not owned by the incumbent. Li and 
Xu (2004) employ one dummy variable to describe the competitive situation in the fixed and 
mobile telephony segments together. Thus, The degree of competition is characterized by the 
existing market structure in each segment, with a score of "1" indicating a monopoly, "2" a 
duopoly and "3" three and more operators. 
 
Unlike most other studies, we also include multilateral liberalization 
commitments, ctGATSLIBER , which may lead to additional effects, not accounted for by 
unilateral measures.32  In particular in the African context, where political instability and 
insecurity are major drags on the level of investment, the quasi-irreversible character of 
external commitments in the GATS framework is expected to enhance the credibility of 
reforms, namely that the regulatory framework will be consistent, fair and predictable, thus 
lowering investment risks (Marchetti, 2004).33 GATS commitments are used as an indicator 
of a country's openness to foreign competition. It is measured by a dummy variable that takes 
the value of "1" for a country with at least one commitment under the GATS and "0" 
otherwise. This variable is quite weak as a liberalization indicator, since it does not contain 
                                                 
32
 Given the strong partial correlation we find between the unilateral and multilateral indicators of openness and 
regulation, we have also explored how each performs separately in the regression.  This robustness check leaves 
our results unaffected. 
33
 Marchetti (2004) notes that not every commitment may have the same effect on enhancing investor 
confidence.  Specific requests by mode and sector in the current negotiations may give an indication of the kind 
of regulatory assurances investors are looking for.   
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any information on the type or level of commitments. Moreover, as was said before 
commitments in the WTO may be far less liberal than actual practice34.  
 
Effectiveness of regulation  
Three regulatory indicators are considered:  
ctREG , the sectoral regulatory quality is approximated by a combination of two components: 
The principal element is the degree of independence of the regulatory authority from the 
government according to a range of criteria, such as legal autonomy (i.e. whether or not it is 
affiliated with the administration), budgetary dependence and process for appointment of 
members. "1" is attributed to countries where the regulatory authority is independent, while 
"0" where it is not. The independence indicator is then interacted with the number of years for 
which the regulatory authority has been in existence35.  This term allows for the fact that the 
degree of autonomy and its competence (proxied by its years of experience) may depend on 
one another. However, if the condition of “autonomy” is presented by UIT (2004) as 
necessary for an efficient regulation, it could not be a sufficient condition in particular context 
of African countries, as discussed in Plane (2001): Because of its proximity with the 
operators, it is not excluded that the regulator uses its discretion for purposes of personal 
interest in a corrupted environment, creating therefore the possibility for collusions36.  
 
ctGOUV , the governance indicators represented the quality of economy regulation and the 
political stability is from Kaufman et al. (2005).   
 
ctGATSREG , the third regulatory quality indicator is the adherence to the Reference Paper. A 
dummy is constructed taking the value of "0" for countries that have not subscribed to any 
regulatory disciplines in the telecommunications sector (beyond general GATS rules), "1" for 
countries which have committed themselves in regard to certain regulatory disciplines, but not 
                                                 
34
 This variable has been multiplied by the number of years since the submission of commitment at WTO by the 
country. This allows the utilization of fixed effect technique. 
35
 Alternatively, we use the size of the regulatory authority in terms of staff numbers (proxy for its overall 
resource endowments) to measure its competence. But this variable turn out to be non significant in all our 
regressions. 
36
 The effective “autonomy” of regulator will be guaranteed if regulatory mechanism impose the plurality of 
control (see Laffont and Martimort, 1997), or a multi-sectoral and/or multi-regional regulation (Eustache and 
Martimort, 1999). But these points are not accessed in this study. 
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the Reference Paper, and "2" for countries having adopted the Reference Paper in total or in 
part37.   
 
Multimarket contact ctMMARKET  
Multimarket contact is perceived to be one of those factors, which can facilitate and sustain 
implicit collusion among firms engaged in non cooperative rivalry according to “mutual 
forbearance” assumption (See Bernheim and Whinston, 1990). This is notably possible 
through the mechanism of “strategic effects” which allow the firms to distribute their market 
power “through pooling the incentive constraints” across the markets: they can reduce prices 
and renounce a part of profits in the more collusive markets in order to facilitate collusion, 
raise prices and augment profits in the more competitive markets, as long as their total profits 
are maximized (See Bernheim and Whinston, 1990). 
 
Figure 3. Evidence of firms multi-contacts in South Sahara African Mobile market 
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Sources: author estimation from data collected from UIT and nationals sources via internet. 
 
The multimarket contact, ctMMARKET  (alternatively, multimarket competition, multipoint 
rivalry) is measured by the total number of time that the firms in a given country are in 
competition in others African countries. The data were collected specially for this study 
through the internet sources. 
 
                                                 
37
 As this indicator show not effect probably because of little number of African countries (only 5) that have 
adopted this reference document, we have excluded its from our regressions.  
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The IUT provides the e-mails list of all telecommunications regulatory authorities or minister 
in the world. These sources provide us the history of each operator in the market, while giving 
the name of multinationals contributing to its capital.  The figure3 above gives the proportion 
of countries with operators which are also competing in another South Saharan African 
Country. It appears clearly that the multimarket contacts are growing quickly in African 
market. The share of country whose firms have no multimarket contacts decrease from 98% 
in 1997 to 58% in 2004.  
 
Market saturation 
s
ctSAT , the level of market saturation is proxy by the penetration.
38
 The Market saturation 
variable is expected to have a negative correlation with market power. More a market is 
saturated, more the operators would have incentive to adjust their price in order to attract new 
consumers. 
 
5.1.3 Economy structure and supply side variables ( sctS )  
The economic structure variables—the population of the country, per capita GDP and density. 
—were all available from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 2005 data base of the 
World Bank (World Bank, 2005). On the supply-side, ctENERG , the index of electricity 
prices across countries and ctRENT , the real interest rate were available from WDI. The 
average monthly wage of workers ( ctWAGE ) in the country was collected from the ILO. The 
quantity of telecommunications output, sctSUBR , measured by the number of subscribers in 
each segments is provided by ITU. The quality of telecommunications services, sctQLTE , have 
been measured by the share of calls failed. But as this indicator is not available for mobile 
sector, we considered a different indicator, which is the share of digital subscribers in the 
country. The two quality indicators were collected from ITU. We have also included the time 
trend and the country fixed effects. 
 
                                                 
38
 Nunn and Sarvary measured this variable as the cumulative growth rate of the telephone industry since 
introduction. The penetration seems to be more relevant as it captures the extent of the market to be conquered 
by the firms. 
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5.2 Econometric issues  
The first choice estimation technique in the context of simultaneous equations model is the 
3SLS (see Green, 2001). Thus, the simultaneity bias is corrected for by using internal 
instruments. The 3SLS estimation procedure is set out in Zellner and Theil (1962): First, the 
exogenous variables are taken as instruments for the endogenous variables using ordinary 
least squares (OLS). Then, each endogenous variable is regressed on both the exogenous 
variables and the predictions of the endogenous variables. This is the common two stage least 
squares procedure (2SLS). Finally, the generalized least squares (GLS) estimator is calculated 
in order to use the additional information of the contemporaneous correlation of the error 
terms.  
 
The main advantage of using 3SLS compared to the 2SLS is an increase in the efficiency of 
the estimations. However, if the 3SLS is asymptotically better, they have the disadvantage 
that any specification error in the structure of the model will be propagated throughout the 
system while the 2SLS estimator will confine a problem to the particular equation in which it 
appears. Therefore, we will present results for the two estimators. 
 
5.2.1 Endogeneity problems and choice of instrument 
We consider that the indicator of liberalization (number of operator) is endogenous 
(possibility of simultaneous bias). This relies on the fact that countries with high price or 
market power could have more incitation to introduce liberalization, in particular for economy 
under Adjustment structural Plan. As instrument for this indicator, we consider the market 
size (expressed as the ratio of national GDP on global African GDP). Our empirical 
estimations in chapter 2 show that this variable is a strong determinant of the number of 
operator in a given market. However, there is theoretically possibility of correlation between 
the market size and the price, trough the scale economy effect. This instrument is qualified as 
“external instrument”, since the 3SLS estimates assume all exogenous variables of the model 
as additional instruments (i.e. internal instruments) 39. The validity of these instruments is 
tested using the test of Hansen-Sagan presented, below. 
 
The indicator of GDP has been introduced with the lack with a period to circumvent a 
potential problem of simultaneity bias between the price and the GDP.  
                                                 
39
 See table. A4 for the identification details 
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5.2.2 Over-identification problem in simultaneous equation model40 
The estimation of a simultaneous system requires each equation to be identified. Two 
conditions have to be verified: the order and the rank conditions. 
 
The order condition require for each equation “s” that the number of exogenous variables 
included in the system, but excluded from equation (
sX ) is greater or equal to the number of 
endogenous variables in equation (s) minus 1.  
1
s sGX ≥ −  
 
Our model contains two equations, and each equation has two endogenous variables 
(dependant variables plus the indicator of liberalization measured by the number of 
operators). Therefore, the condition of rank is verified in our model, since for each equation 
included in the system, the number of excluded exogenous variables is always more than one.  
 
But this condition is necessary but not sufficient for identification. The rank condition is 
sufficient: and imply that the matrix of parameters for the excluded variables in each equation 
must have rank equal to number of equations in the system minus one. In practice this is 
always true if the order condition is met with 1
s sGX = − .  
 
But, if 1
s sGX ≥ − , as in our case, the model is say to be over identified and a test is 
necessary to verify the rank condition41.  The most using test is that of Hansen-Sargan for 
over-identifying restrictions in regression estimated via the 3SLS in which the number of 
instruments exceeds the number of regressors (see Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2006). This 
is the test for the joint null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid instruments, i.e., 
they are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the estimated equation. 
A rejection casts doubt on the validity of the instruments in 3SLS. The test computes a p-
value comparing the Hansen-Sargan statistic, J, (which is the minimum value) to a criteria 
build by Davidson & MacKinnon (2004).  
 
The criterion is that of the estimation in « minimum-distance » expressed as follow: 
                                                 
40
 All results presented in this section are proved in Green (2004). 
41
 See table. A4 for the identification details 
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( ) ( )( )11' 'criteria resid nbeq EXO* EXO EXO EXO resid Hansen / Sarg an stat(J)−−= ⊗ ∼  
Where, EXO and resid  are the matrix indicating the exogenous variables and the residue  
Under the null hypothesis ( )2J chi DL∼  
With * ( )DL nbeq nbEXO nbcoef net= −  
DL  is the Degree of Freedom, nbeq is the number of equation, nbEXO is the number of 
exogenous and ( )nbcoef net is the number of parameters net of parameters in constraints. 
If the Hansen-Sargan Chi2 p-value >5% the null assumption of the validity of instruments 
cannot be rejected. 
 
5.2.3 Test of model specification validity 
The validity of restrictions (14) and (15) as well as the normalization constraint on MIMIC 
model is tested using the minimum-distance test statistic described in Gertler (1988). This test 
allows to circumvent the problem of the subjective choice of the parameter of normalization 
in the reduce model as points out Breusch (2005). The following discussion is based entirely 
on Gertler (1988) in which results are proved. 
 
The statistic of the test is: 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2ˆ ˆ ( )ˆg f f bψ δ ψ δ ψ χ−′   = − −   Ω ∼       (16) 
 
ˆδ is the matrix of OLS estimate of the reduced form equation in (12) 
( )f ψ  is a function expressing the coefficients of reduced form equation (12), using the 
vector of parameters ψ ( sλ , kβ , kα ) estimated through the restrictions of MIMIC model. 
b is the difference between the number of parameters in the unrestricted reduced-form 
equations in (12) (i.e. number of ˆδ ) and the number of parameters in the restricted equations 
(9) and (10) (i.e. number of kβ  plus kα ). Therefore, the (joint) null hypothesis of this test 
is that the normalization and proportionality restrictions (i.e. equations 14 & 15) imposed by 
the MIMIC model are valid. 
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Ω  is the covariance matrix of residue of price in equation (11). It can be formulated as 
follow: 
( ) ( )s s s sct ctE v vλ ε λ ε= + + ′Ω  
 
       (17) 
Following Mccluskey et al (2004), λλ= ′Ω + ∑  
where λ is a vector of market power coefficients and ∑  is a diagonal matrix of variances, i.e. 
diag ( 21σ , 22σ ) with 2s =  indicating the number of equations (segments) of the system.  
 
5.3 Results 
 
5.3.1 Descriptive statistics (see Table A.1: in annex) 
 
Simple correlation analysis, presented in Table A.1, reveals that, among the variables 
expected to influence market power, only the effectiveness of regulation (quality of regulation 
in the country and the quality of regulatory authority) and the mobile saturation are 
significantly correlates with prices in both mobile and fixed segments. Clearly, this analysis 
provides limited insight. Table A.1 also shows that GDP per capita is correlated with other 
economic and demographic variables. Interestingly, although most of variables included in 
our model are correlated, none of these correlations is very high. Only one correlation 
between (institution and fixed line saturation) exceeds 0.5. Multicollinearity, therefore, does 
not seem to be a serious problem.  
 
5.3.2 Econometric results 
 
Before interpreting the results, it is relevant to test the validity of the hypothesis concerning 
the MIMIC model. The test relies on the statistic of Gertler in equation (16). The joint 
hypothesis that the normalization and proportionality restrictions are valid cannot be rejected 
at the 5% significance level. The value of the test statistic is 40, which is distributed as chi-
squared with 8 of freedom. Table.4 presents the estimates of the structural MIMIC model. 
The column (4) and (5) in on hand and the columns (6) and (7) on other represent the 
estimates of the MIMIC (system) model using respectively the 2SLS and the 3SLS. For each 
methodology, the first column represents the parameters of the equation related to mobile 
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segment and the second represent those of fixed segment. As expected, the 2SLS estimates 
are less efficient than those of the 3SLS. Therefore, the interpretations below are based 
exclusively on the 3SLS method. 
 
To test the validity of internal exogenous plus the market size as valid instruments of our 
model, we perform the Hansen-Sargan identification test. The statistic and test are presented 
in the last line of table 4.  The test can not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
valid (p-value =84%). The 3SLS estimates are then validated. 
 
We analyze our estimates results following successively the parameters of cost determinants, 
( skα ), Parameter of market (
sλ ), and parameters of market power determinants ( kβ ). To 
be interpreted, the parameters,
kβ , of market power determinants would necessitate the 
coefficient sλ  to be significant.  
 
Parameters of Cost determinants ( skα ) 
We are first interested in the various demand elasticities, indicated by the coefficients 
related to the telecommunications output (as measured by the log of the number of subscribers 
in each segment). As expected, the direct demand elasticities in both mobile and fixed 
segments are negative with the values of (-0.19) and (-0.25), respectively. However, if the 
result is strongly significant (at 1%) in the case of mobile telephone, it turns out to be no 
significant in fixed line segment. The absence of significance in fixed line may reflect the 
relatively important consumer switching costs across fixed operator services providers, due to 
longtime monopoly reign on this market42. It’s more likely that the markup in fixed segment 
would result in the decrease in minutes of calls, rather than changing the operator. 
 
The cross elasticity between the mobile and the fixed segments is positive, suggesting a 
potential complementary effect between the two segments. However, the result is not 
significant.  
 
                                                 
42
 Nunn et al (2004) evidence, in the case of mobile telephone,  that the number of years that the first market 
entrant enjoyed a monopoly prior to competition contributes significantly to reduce the sensitivity of consumer 
to price decrease, because of the existence of switching costs. 
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As far as the services quality indicator is concerned, the results point to a positive (0.72) and 
significant (5%) coefficient for the mobile segment, while showing no significant coefficient 
for the fixed segment. In the case of mobile where the quality is measured by the share of 
digital (opposite to analogy), the result traduce the fact the operators amputate to the 
consumer their investments efforts in modernizing telecommunications infrastructure. For the 
fixed, the absence of significant correlation between the price and the share of calls failed is 
consistent with the monopoly market structure that characterized this segment in most 
countries until the starting of years 2000.  
 
Concerning the economic structures variables, the GDP coefficient is positive as expected 
but not significant. This result suggests that the telephone price through the continent is 
independent to the level of the country’s wealth. The variable of population dispersion as 
measured by the population density has the expected negative sign, which suggests that price 
decreases with the density. This relationship is however only significant in the case of the 
fixed telephone, interpreting the higher potential of network effect in this segment compared 
to the mobile. 
 
Concerning the variables of production inputs, the energy price index and the wage index 
have positive and significant coefficients, for both mobile and fixed segments. This result is 
different from that of Nunn and Sarvary (2004), which find no significant effect of wage and 
a negative effect of energy price.  
 
Finally, the real interest rate has not significant effect, which is not consistent with the 
literature. Both Nunn and Sarvary (2004) and Parker & Roller (1997) evidence a strong 
positive effect of lending rate on mobile price. They justified their results by the fact that the 
credit financing is a common practice in the cellular industry. However, the absence of 
correlation in our case could be due to the fact that most of telecommunications operator in 
Africa are constituted of foreign capital and therefore are less sensitive to local interest rate. 
 
Parameter of market power ( sλ ) 
This parameter is the test on the existence of market power practice in a given segment (s).  
The result accords with the a priori expectation. The estimated market power parameter is 
1.09 for mobile telecommunications and is significant at the 5% level. The positive 
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relationship between industry market power and the price of mobile telecommunication 
implies that a higher market power leads to the increase of the prices in mobile and fixed 
telecommunications, which is consistent with economic theory.  
 
Our estimation results also provide information regarding the relationship between the two 
segments in terms of exercising market power. The positive sign of the estimated market 
power parameter for mobile segment suggests that an increase in market power in the 
telecommunication market would cause the price of mobile to increase relative to the fixed 
telephony.  
 
This finding suggests an ordering of telecommunications segments in the potentiality to 
exercise market power, i.e., the mobile segment has a greater potentiality than the fixed 
segment. The existence of market power therefore makes it interesting to explore its origins 
among the more recurrent factors in the literature: regulatory policy, market saturation, the 
number of competitor, the international commitments and the multi-contact effect. 
 
Parameters of market power determinants (
kβ ). 
The saturation (market penetration) 
The degree of market saturation, as measure by the penetration, contributes to the decreasing 
of telecommunications market power. The saturation parameter is negative (-0.07) and 
significant at 5% level. This result is consistent with the empirical finding of Nunn et al 
(2004). It also supports the theoretical hypothesis (Tirole, 1988) that, as the market grows to 
the saturation, the firms are obliged to compete on price in order to gain new market share 
from the competition. This suggests that the particularly high market power in 
telecommunications observed in Africa is partly related to the low level of penetration.  
 
Regulation 
The indicator of the quality of telecommunications regulation interacting with the 
independence and experience features a negative (-0,71) and significant (at level of 5%) 
correlation with the market power. This result is consistent with our expectation and the 
literature, while advocating for the strengthening of regulation efforts that have been 
undertaken in the continent this last years.   
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As the sector regulation, the whole economy regulation quality turns out to be not 
significantly linked to market power although its coefficient of correlation is negative as 
expected. This result is in opposition of a It should be noted that this indicator does not vary a 
lot in the time, then most of its effect could be already captured in fixed effects correction.  
 
Unilateral Liberalization: Market structure 
The parameter estimate for the number of competitors in both mobile and fixed segments is 
negative (-0.13). However, it is poorly significant at 10%. This finding is consistent with the 
theory, as the increasing number of competitors reduces the firms’ market power. It’s 
however in opposite of studies by Parker and Roller (1997) on US cellular markets, and by 
Nunn et al (2004) on a sample of CDEO countries43.  
 
Multilateral liberalization 
As expected, the multilateral liberalization contribute to attenuate the market power in 
telecommunications industry, as its coefficient turn out to be negative (-0,20 ) and significant.  
Its seems that the quasi-irreversibility of the GATS commitments lower the investment risks 
and then enhance operators to build a longer term strategy of rentability instead of a short 
term rental extraction. However, the pertinence of the GATS indicator considered here is to 
be questioned since it does not capture the differences between countries in terms of breadth 
(e.g. sub-sectors and modes of supply covered by the commitments) and quality of 
commitments. 
 
Multimarket contact 
Finally, the last important result is that, as expected, we find an empirical support for 
multimarket effect. The result in table shows a positive (0.06) and significant (at 10%) effect 
of multimarket parameter. This result brings a support to the model of Barnheim and 
Whinston (1990) and confirms the finding of Parker et al (1997), based on mobile telephone 
market in US. The similar results has also been evidenced on airlines industries by Evans and 
Kessides (1994) who show that tariff are higher on a routes where competing carriers have 
interoute contacts.  
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 Parker and Roller (1997) study justified their result by the fact that the FCC restricted the number of operators 
in American market to two, a situation which facilitated the collusion behaviors. Nunn et al (2004) justified their 
own result by a potential multicollinearity problem. Our study doesn’t suffer from any of those problems.   
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Table 4. 3SLS with fixed effect 
Variables categories’ Variables 2SLS 3SLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
Eq1 
 (S=Mobile) 
Eq2 
 (S=Fixed) 
Eq1 
 (S=Mobile) 
Eq2  
(S=Fixed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parameters of Cost 
determinants( skα ) 
Constant 
-21,76 
(-0,20) 
0 -18,00 
(-0,29) 
0 
Density 
-0,18 
(-1,17) 
-0,35 
(-1,77)* 
-0,16 
(-2,13)** 
-0,31 
(-2,25)** 
Wage  
1,14 
(2,85)*** 
0,67 
(1,75)* 
1,17 
(3,41)*** 
0,68 
(1,73)* 
Lag of GDP 
1,65 
(0,91) 
1,77 
(1,01) 
1,55 
(1,02) 
2,29 
(1,28) 
Population 
3,65 
(0,73) 
2,22 
(0,46) 
3,28 
(0,78) 
3,03 
(0,62) 
rent  
-0,32 
(-0,37) 
0,11 
(0,13) 
-0,46 
(-0,63) 
-0,04 
(-0,04) 
energy  
1,07 
(1,05) 
0,57 
(1,58) 
1,20 
(1,59) 
0,81 
(1,80)* 
Mobile output quantity 
-0,18 
(-1,79)* 
0,10 
(0,81) 
-0,19 
(-2,45)** 
0,08 
(0,97) 
Fixed output quantity 
0,10 
(0,81) 
-0,22 
(-0,55) 
0,08 
(0,97) 
-0,25 
(-0,95) 
Mobile quality (share digital) 0,72 (1,71)*  0,78 (2,15)**  
Fixed quality (share calls failed)  -0,05 (-1,12)  -0,05 (-1,41) 
Trend 
0,05 
(1,39) 
0,03 
(0,88) 
0,04 
(1,48) 
0,03 
(0,81) 
Parameter of market 
power ( sλ ) Market power 
1,06 
(2,39)** 
1 1,09 
(3,06)*** 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parameters of 
market power 
determinants (
kβ ) 
Constant 
-58,05 
(-0,89) 
-58,05 
(-0,89) 
-45,39 
(-0,71) 
-45,39 
(-0,71) 
Multilateral liberalization (GATS 
commitment) 
-0,20 
(-1,99)* 
-0,20 
(-1,99)** 
-0,15 
(-1,84)* 
-0,15 
(-1,84)* 
Unilateral liberalization  in fixed 
(number of fixed operator) 
 -0,13 
(-1,36) 
 -0,15 
(-1,67)* 
 
Unilateral liberalization  in mobile 
(number of mobile operator) 
-0,13 
(-1,36) 
 -0,15 
(-1,67)* 
 
Multimarket effect 
0,06 
(1,66)* 
0,06 
(1,66)* 
0,06 
(1,69)* 
0,06 
(1,69)* 
Unilateral regulation 
-0,29 
(-1,42) 
-0,29 
(-1,22) 
-0,71 
(-1,73)* 
-0,71 
(-1,73)* 
Governance 
9,70 
(0,60) 
9,70 
(0,60) 
-2,81 
(-0,19) 
-2,81 
(-0,19) 
Saturation: Mobile penetration 
-0,07 
(-1,81)* 
 -0,07 
(-2,11)** 
 
Saturation: Fixed penetration 
 -0,07 
(-1,81)* 
 -0,07 
(-2,11)** 
 
 
 
Statistics and tests 
Countries 30 30 30 30 
OBS: 30 X 4 99 99 99 99 
Hansen-Sargan test 
         J=34.351 
          H0: Chi-sq(22), 
          pval = 0.35 
                J=14.612 
           H0: Chi-sq(22), 
                 pval = 0.64 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.926 1.957 1.926 1.957 
2R  0.35 0.17 0.35 0.16 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses :* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Notes: (1) the eq1 and eq2 are the two equations constituting our model. They have been simulated 
simultaneously; (2) by assumptions, the parameters of market power determinants are the same in mobile and 
fixed segment; (3) Among, parameters of marginal cost, we have assume the intercept of fixed segment to be 
zero( 20 0
s
α
=
= ). We have also normalized the coefficient of market power related in fixed segment equation to 
one ( 2 1sλ = = ).  
 
 
Structure of market power in Africa 
After showing the evidence of the existence of market power and its determinants, we rely on 
the above estimates to compute (predict) its amplitude. The market power is derived from 
equations (4) and (10) following the formulation below: 
( )0 K1 log1ˆ ˆ ˆct kctkkEXP Fφ β β=
 
 
  
= − +∑        (18) 
 
Our calculations reveal average amplitude of market power (between 1996 and 2003) of 0.29. 
The minimum is 0.14 and the maximum is 0.37 (standard deviation of 0.05). This implies that 
the telecommunication price in Africa is majored on average by 29% because of the existence 
of market power practices. 
 
It’s particularly instructive to follow the evolution of the market power through the time. The 
figure4 below, show the prediction of the biannual average of market power in Africa 
between 1996 and 2003.  
 
Figure 4. Evolution of market power from 1996 to 2003 in Africa  
 
Source: Author’s construction  
 
The market power is following a slowing trend, moving from 0.37 in 1996 to 0.28 in 2003. 
This is the manifestation of the efficiency (even limited) of the reforms undertaken during that 
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period and which turn out to have significant effect in our estimates (increasing in number of 
operators, multilateral liberalization). It’s also due to the pressure imposing by the increasing 
saturation of market which constraints operators to reduce their price if they want to gain new 
market share.  
 
As the telecommunications policies are undertaken at national level, analyzing market power 
for individual countries could be of particular interest. The figur5 below reveals the prediction 
of market power for the 30 African countries of our sample in 2003. 
 
Figure 5. Prediction of Market power in African countries for the period of 2002-03 
 
 Source: Author construction 
The country with the least important market power is the Burundi (0.16), while the one with 
the more important is the Swaziland (0.37). The average African position is occupied by 
Angola with 0.29. The table A4 in annex ranks countries in the figure 5 according to the 
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market power amplitude while displaying the relevant level of competition prevailing in each 
segment of telecommunications. Globally, the countries on the top of the list of market power 
practice seem to be those maintaining monopole in all telecommunications segments. 
Conversely, the countries where the competition has been introduced partially or fully have 
least important market power practice44.  
 
 
 
                                                 
44This observation is a confirmation of the significant correlation perceived in our estimates and does not 
exclude others markup determinants reveal by our model.  
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6 Conclusions  
 
In this study, we use The MIMIC model to estimate the market power and its sources in 
telecommunication industry. The empirical estimate is based on aggregate price and 
quantity biannual data from 30 African countries between 1996 and 2003. We consider 
two “indicators variables” (or dependent variables) in our MIMIC model: the prices in 
mobile and fixed telephony segments. As “causes variables”, three set variables are used: 
(1) the variables of liberalization, including unilateral liberalization (number of operators 
allowed in each segment), and multilateral liberalization (subscriptions of commitments 
in the framework of GATS); (2) the variables of regulations at sectoral level (autonomy 
and experience of regulatory authority) and at national level (Kaufmann governance 
indicators: regulatory quality, policy stability, corruption control); (3) the organizational 
structure variable captured by the multimarket contact (reflecting the situation of two 
operators whose parent companies would be competing in more than one market). 
 
Three main results emerge from our estimates: First, the African telecommunication 
industry faces a strong and significant market power, which maintains the continent 
prices above the competition level. Second, beyond the increasing in penetration which 
contributes to attenuate the market power, three policy factors seem also to be affecting it 
negatively: the unilateral (domestic) efforts in term of liberalization (increasing in 
number of operators) as well as strengthening sectoral regulation, and the multilateral 
subscriptions of commitments to liberalize in the framework of the GATS at WTO. 
Third, it appears, as evidenced by Parker and Roller (1997), that multimarket contact of 
telecommunications operators is an important factor explaining the cooperative pricing 
behavior.  
 
While our findings may suffer from many limitations (see below), a number of policy 
implications can be drawn with respect to the telecommunications trade at domestic, 
regional and multilateral levels. At local level, it’s relevant to allow more licenses, 
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particularly in fixed segment where monopole still exists in numbers of African 
countries. The strengthening of regulation authority autonomy and competencies should 
remain a priority. Moreover, it seems that a regulation with a regional perspective would 
be more fruitful. Our finding that the multimarket contact enhances market power clearly 
advocates for current projects to establish sub-regional or regional regulatory institutions 
in Africa. Finally, in the current context of multilateral trade negotiations on services, our 
findings provide evidence that the commitments subscribed in the framework of GATS 
could be a complementary factor in enhancing competitiveness in telecommunications 
market in Africa. 
 
Our analysis has some important limitations. First, and most importantly, in our data set, 
price and quantity data are only available at an aggregate level for each country. 
Furthermore, the aggregate nature of the data and the resulting empirical model do not 
allow for differences across firm behaviors. 
 
Second, as all international studies, ours also suffers from the lack of available variables 
across a large number of countries. Thus, for our main variable of interest, market power, 
we may have an omitted variable problem. For example, the literature evidences that 
cross-ownership across cellular operators (See. Parker and Roller, 1997), and the number 
of years that the first market entrant enjoyed a monopoly prior to competitive, are 
important predictor of market power. But we did not have data to test this hypothesis in 
our international context.  
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Annexes 
 Table A.1: Partial correlation of main variables in market power model  
 
Mobile 
 price 
Fixed 
 Price 
GDP/ 
capita 
 
Institu- 
tion 
Mobile 
saturation 
Interest 
rate 
Electric 
cost 
Rent 
Indices 
Mobile  
penetration 
Fixed 
penetration 
GATS 
Commit 
ment 
DOC 
REF 
Operators 
collusion 
Nbre 
 mobile 
operators 
Nber 
 fixed 
operators 
Nber inter 
optors density 
urban  
Popult 
 
Regulator 
quality POP 
Nber 
Mobile 
lines 
 
 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10   11  12  13  14 15  16  17  18  19  20  21  
Mobile 
price 1                                         
Fixed 
 price 0.6577* 1                                       
GDP 0.5954* 0.7154* 1                                     
Institution 0.0059 -0.1523* 0.0523 1                                   
Mobile 
saturation -0.2807* -0.1062* 0.1177* 0.3352* 1                                 
Interest rate 0.1275 0.0177 -0.0298 -0.2279* -0.1987* 1                               
Electric cost 
-0.1122* -0.0283 -0.1566* -0.057 0.0011 0.0802 1                             
Rent 
indices -0.2536* 0.0351 -0.0721 -0.0012 0.1875* 0.0339 0.3279* 1                           
Fixed 
saturation -0.1360* -0.0042 0.3507* 0.5788* 0.5867* -0.1714* -0.045 0.0624 0.5867* 1                       
GATS 
commitment 0.0892 0.0523 0.0266 0.017 0.0415 -0.094 0.2236* 0.1415* 0.0415 0.0417 1                     
DOC 
REF 0.0203 -0.1161* -0.0584 0.1945* 0.1580* -0.0696 0.1742* 0.0535 0.1580* 0.1914* 0.5413* 1                   
Operators 
collusion 0.0533 -0.0541 -0.1548* -0.0883* 0.1211* 0.0626 -0.0494 0.0351 0.1211* -0.1700* -0.1581* -0.0716 1                 
Nber mobile 
operators 0.017 0.0341 -0.1121* 0.0117 0.2423* 0.0233 0.0221 0.0519 0.2423* -0.1291* -0.0309 0.0741 0.1792* 1               
Nbr  fixed 
oprtors -0.2569* -0.0758 -0.2174* -0.2552* 0.1722* 0.0449 0.2299* 0.0442 0.1722* -0.1658* 0.1454* 0.0418 0.0292 0.2378* 1             
Nber inter 
operators -0.1910* -0.0556 -0.2100* -0.1910* 0.2117* 0.1042 0.2975* 0.1213* 0.2117* -0.1759* 0.1007* 0.0432 0.082 0.3571* 0.7616* 1           
density 0.0187 0.1371* 0.0253 0.0631 0.0756 0.0471 0.0674 0.1514* 0.0756 0.1915* -0.0141 0.0927* 0.0294 -0.0382 0.0067 0.0456 1         
urban 
Popult 0.1107* 0.1584* 0.3713* 0.0019 0.3187* 0.045 0.0627 -0.0672 0.3187* 0.3896* 0.3410* 0.2355* -0.1371* 0.0549 0.0395 0.0053 -0.3101* 1       
Regulator 
quality -0.1814* -0.2060* -0.2631* 0.05 0.1542* -0.0568 0.2049* 0.0279 0.1542* -0.0036 0.0635 0.0651 0.1647* 0.0498 0.1923* 0.0988* -0.051 -0.0107 1     
POP 
-0.1750* -0.3763* -0.5869* -0.2070* -0.2822* 0.0765 0.2383* -0.0992* -0.2822* -0.4660* 0.2053* 0.2694* 0.1411* -0.0129 0.2593* 0.2009* -0.1018* -0.2686* 0.4169* 1   
Nbr 
Mobile lines -0.3966* -0.3102* -0.2419* 0.1435* 0.7673* -0.1436* 0.1403* 0.1074* 0.7673* 0.1800* 0.2334* 0.3353* 0.1928* 0.2641* 0.3628* 0.3559* 0.0318 0.1569* 0.4327* 0.3495* 1 
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Table A.2.  List of countries included in our econometric sample 
Number Countries 
1 Angola   
2 Benin   
3 Botswana   
4 Burkina Faso   
5 Burundi   
6 Cameroon   
7 Cape Verde   
8 Central African Rep.  
9 Cote d'Ivoire   
10 Gabon   
11 Ghana   
12 Kenya   
13 Madagascar   
14 Malawi   
15 Mauritius   
16 Mozambique   
17 Namibia   
18 Niger   
19 Nigeria   
20 Rwanda   
21 Senegal   
22 Sierra Leone   
23 South Africa   
24 Sudan   
25 Swaziland   
26 Tanzania   
27 Togo   
28 Uganda   
29 Zambia   
30 Zimbabwe   
Source: Author construction 
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Table A.3. Ranking of African countries in term of telecommunications market 
power practice and the relevant level of competition in 2003 
Rank 
 Country MARKUP 
Number of mobile 
Competitors in 2003 
Number of fixed 
Competitors in 2003 
1 Swaziland   0.37 M M 
2 Namibia   0.36 M M 
3 Rwanda   0.36 M M 
4 Mauritius   0.35 P M 
5 Cape Verde   0.33 C M 
6 Malawi   0.32 C M 
7 South Africa   0.31 C M 
8 Mozambique   0.31 C M 
9 Cameroon   0.30 C M 
10 Tanzania   0.30 C M 
11 Senegal   0.30 C M 
12 Sierra Leone   0.30 C M 
13 Angola   0.29 P P 
14 Niger   0.27 C C 
15 Botswana   0.27 C P 
16 Gabon   0.27 C P 
17 Sudan   0.25 M C 
18 Kenya   0.25 P P 
19 Cote d'Ivoire   0.24 P P 
20 Zambia   0.24 C M 
21 Madagascar   0.23 C C 
22 Ghana   0.23 P P 
23 Burkina Faso   0.23 P M 
24 Central African Rep.  0.23 C M 
25 Benin   0.22 C M 
26 Nigeria   0.21 P C 
27 Zimbabwe   0.20 C C 
28 Uganda   0.19 P P 
29 Togo   0.19 P P 
30 Burundi   0.16 C C 
Source: authors’ calculation  
Note:  M:  Monopoly;  P:  Partial competition; and C:  Full Competition 
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Table A.4 Identification of the model  
 
Category of variables 
Number 
of 
variables 
(category
) in each 
equation 
variables 
Dependant variable   Price of telecommunications 
Endogenous variables: 2sG =  
 
Price of telecommunications 
Unilateral liberalization  (number of operators) 
Internal exogenous variables 
 Density 
 Wage  
 Lag of GDP 
 Population 
 rent  
 energy  
 Trend 
 Multilateral liberalization (GATS commitment) 
 Multimarket effect 
 Governance 
 Unilateral regulation 
 Quality of services 
 Services Output 
 Saturation 
Excluded exogenous variables sX =2 Saturation  Quality of service 
External exogenous variables 
(instruments) 
 Market size (ratio of national GDP on global 
African GDP);   
Lagged of Market size (-1) 
Source: Author construction 
Notes: (1) 
sG is the number of endogenous variables in equation (s) . (2) sX  is the number of exogenous 
variables included in the system, but excluded from equation (s). (3) The order condition require for each 
equation “s” that 1
s sGX ≥ − .  
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CHAPTER III: IMPACT OF THE LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE IN 
SERVICES ON THE AFRICAN GROWTH:  
CASE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND FINANCIAL SERVICES 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In many developing countries, the widespread implementation of trade liberalization policies 
during the last two decades has not been reflected in sound economic performances. This is 
particularly the case of African countries, which remain marginalized in the international trade 
framework.  
 
Recent literature points to the poor quality and the insufficiency of services, as important 
explanatory factors of Africa’s marginalization. In fact, African service trade policies have been 
for long time characterized by numerous institutional rigidities including, a strong regulation, an 
omnipresence of the official monopolies, and (before the nineties) a strong discrimination 
towards Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in key services sectors such as telecommunications, 
electricity, transport and finances. These factors lead to high costs, which damage the 
competitiveness and productivity of entire economy. A study by Eifert, Gelb and Ramachandran 
(2005), using data from purchasing power parity (PPP) estimates, confirmed that Africa is high-
cost relative to its levels of income and productivity, while Collier and Gunning (1999) 
considered high transaction costs as the most significant impediment to economic growth in 
Africa.  
 
However, the results of the multiple reforms experimented on the African services sector seem 
rather mitigated. Only the telecommunication sector seems to have achieved confirmed results, 
particularly with the boom in the mobile telephony and internet market segments. While up to 
1995, there were less than 10 million mobile phone users in Africa, more than 13 million joined 
African networks in 2003 alone, carrying the total number of users to about 52 million. The 
International Telecommunications Union (UTI, 2004) estimates that African telecommunications 
operators in 2003 realized more than $10 billion in revenues and about $1 billion in earnings45.  
In other sectors, completely or partially privatized, the improvement of the performances is not 
obvious. Mattoo et al. (2006) showed in the case of Zambia that the benefits expected from 
establishing an open, private, and largely foreign-owned banking system in the early 1990s have 
                                                 
45
 Cf. UIT (2004) Indicateurs des Télécommunications Africaines 2004, P.1. 
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not so far materialized and that access to banking services is low, unequal and extremely 
expensive46.  
 
Noting that the strengthening and the extension of the General trade agreements on trade in 
services (GATS) constitute an important component of the WTO’s current multilateral trade 
negotiations, while privatizations operations are continuing in developing countries, the aim of 
this study is to assess the impact of services trade liberalization on economic growth 
performances. 
 
The extensive literature on the link between the services sector and growth has been for long 
time silent on the effect of services trade openness on growth. This is at least in part due to the 
lack of evidence of significant correlation that emerges from studies assessing the direct link 
between the services trade liberalizations and growth47. For example, Djiofack and Keck (2006) 
found no impact of telecommunication service trade liberalization –as measured by the number 
of operators and the commitments in the GATS– on growth in Africa for the period from 1997 to 
2003. Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and Min (1998) do not find any direct link between foreign banks 
and long-run economic growth for the period from1988 to 1995.  
 
Thus, main studies have focused on services sectoral performances and assessed, on the one 
hand, the link between services trade openness and sectoral performances (telecommunications 
infrastructure or financial development), and on other hand, the relationship between sectoral 
performance and growth. Overall, they find a positive and significant contribution of services 
trade openness to sectoral performances (see Claessens, D. Kunt and Huizinga, 2001 and 
Boylaud and Nicoletti, 2000), which in turn are growth-enhancing (see Norton, 1992 for the 
telecommunications role) and financial development (see Levine et al. 1999). 
 
These two categories of relationship suggest the existence of an indirect relationship between 
services trade openness and growth. This is increasingly assessing in literature, through the 
simultaneous estimation of both links, between services trade policy and sectoral performances, 
and between performances and income growth (see Bayraktar and Wang, 2006 and Francois and 
                                                 
46
 Credit to the private sector represented only 8% of GDP in 2005, which is lower than the level registered in 1990, 
while the average annual interest rate on loans was 48% in 2005. 
47
 Another reason is the lack of data (see Karsenty, 2000) due to the fact that the GATS (general Trade Agreements 
on Services) constitute a new dimension in multilateral trade agreements. 
  81
Eschenbach, 2002). Francois et al. (2002) established a causality chain from financial services 
trade openness to growth, including the following three stages of causation: (1) Services trade 
liberalization contributes to decrease the concentration of market structure, (2) which will reduce 
the market power and then contributes to the sectoral performances, (3) which ultimately 
participate to a higher economic growth. This study relies on this indirect approach to assess the 
link between the services’ trade openness and growth in South Saharan Africa. 
 
The first contribution of this chapter consists in extending this approach, developed in financial 
sector, to the telecommunication services and to apply it for the first time to a set of African 
countries. In addition, the usage of panel data allows overcoming the heterogeneity issue that the 
Francois et al. (2002) study suffers. Finally, we will assume that simultaneous causation exists 
between services sectoral performances and growth as in Röller and Waverman (2001). 
 
Estimates based on mobile telecommunications and banking services sectors, point to mixed 
results. In telecommunications sector, the services trade openness, as measured by the country 
commitments in the framework of GATS, shows no correlation with the level of competition 
(number of operators). However, competition has a strong effect on telecommunications services 
accessibility, which in turn influences income growth significantly.  
 
In the case of the financial sector, the services trade openness, as measured by the liberalization 
of cross-countries operations, appears to be a strong determinant of market competitiveness, as 
measured by the level of banking concentration. However, the level of competition in the 
financial market shows not significant link with the sectoral performances either captured by the 
level of credit to private sector or the interest rate spread. As the last stage in the Francois et al. 
causality chain, the sectoral performances indicators emerge as strong determinants of income 
growth. As an important difference with telecommunications sector, the financial performances 
effect on growth seems to be correlated to the development level, among Africa countries, the 
most developed countries enjoying higher gain.  
 
Finally, the results evidence like in previous studies a double causation between growth and 
sectoral performances (see Sridhar and Sridhar, 2004). This holds for the both 
telecommunications and financial sector. 
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This chapter is organized as follows: Section II presents a brief literature review of existing 
studies assessing services trade impacts on income growth. Section III sets out the model 
estimated. Section IV raises the econometric issues related to the three-stage least squares 
(3SLS) used in this study. Section V gives the econometric results and discusses their sensitivity. 
This part considers an alternative specification (GMM dynamic panel) to the 3SLS, and assesses 
the stability of results in respect to the development level of countries. 
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2 Literature review of services trade effects and growth 
performances48 
2.1 Telecommunications and income growth 
 
The literature mainly analyzed the growth effect of telecommunications, trough the 
telecommunications infrastructures role, which match to the last stage of the causality chain 
assessed in this study. One of the pioneering studies in this area is that of Hardy (1980), for a 
group of developed and developing countries, which indicates that telephones per capita had a 
significant impact on GDP. More recently, Waverman, Meschi and Fuss (2005) in their study 
of low and middle-income countries, find that mobile telephony has a positive impact on 
economic growth.  
 
Norton (1992), in assessing the transmission channel of telecommunications infrastructure 
effects on income growth, concluded that telecommunications penetration reduces transaction 
costs and increases income output, by improving capital markets’ efficiency and boosting 
investment. 
 
Instead of looking for infrastructure effects as in Norton (1992), Mattoo et al. (2006) assessed 
the direct link between the income growth and the liberalization of telecommunications 
services using a sample of developing countries. They find evidence for significant influence 
of telecommunications service trade openness on long run growth performance. 
 
However, an increasing part of the literature questioned whether the positive relationship 
between telecommunications and economic growth is really a result of reverse-causality i.e. 
that higher telecommunications accessibility is the result of higher growth and not vice versa. 
Madden and Savage (1998) investigates the issue using causality tests. Both studies find 
evidence of a two-way causality between telecom penetration and economic growth.  
 
To account for the simultaneity effect between the telecommunications performances and 
growth, Röller and Waverman (2001) estimated simultaneous model of growth and 
telecommunications penetration, using the 3SLS estimator. Relying on OECD group of 
                                                 
48
 A more comprehensive survey is provided in annex table A11. Also see Nielson and Taglioni (2004), for a 
comprehensive literature analyzing the role of services on growth, including a large variety of services. 
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countries, they found a strong two-way relationship between telecommunications 
infrastructure and productivity. This finding is confirmed by Sridhar and Sridhar (2004) who 
replicate the Röller and Waverman (2001) model for developing countries sample (including 
those of Africa). In this study, we follow this approach by estimating simultaneously a model 
of growth and penetration. 
 
2.2 Financial sector and income Growth49  
 
The importance of the financial sector for economic growth has long been documented, most 
authors focusing on the role of financial development on income growth, since the seminal 
work in this area by Goldsmith (1969). Globally financial development or performances is 
found to be significantly correlated with growth50. However, as noticed by Hoekman (2006), 
the literature on financial development does not sufficiently counter for the role of 
international trade in financial services and are generally silent on the role of policy. 
 
One of the exceptions is the study by Gelbard and Pereira (1999) using a set of 38 African 
countries over the 1987-97 period. They used a composite financial development variable 
including various financial policy aspects to find a positive impact of financial sector on 
growth51. In line with this approach, Mattoo et al. (2006) found econometric evidence that the 
financial sector openness (based on the commitments of countries in the framework of GATS 
and capital controls index of Dalaimi (1999)) influences long run growth performance.  
 
However, many studies investigating the direct link between foreign banks and growth could 
not find any robust results (see Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and Min, 1998). Thus, many 
researchers have been studying the indirect links between finance and growth. Francois and 
Schucknecht (1999) and Francois and Eschenbach (2002) established a causality chain 
between the two indicators, through a system estimations based on 130 countries. However, 
                                                 
49
 A very comprehensive survey on this literature is provided in Hoekman (2006) and Eschenbach(2004). The 
main studies in this area differ from each other by the choice of financial development performance indicators. 
The most recurrent being the credit to private sector (See Degregorio and Guidotti, 1995), interest rate distortion 
(Roubini and Sala-I-Martin, 1992), the interest rate spread (Johnston and Pazarbasioglu 1995), the financial 
depth (Goldsmith, 1969; Demetriades and Husein, 1996, King and Levine, 1993 and Levine and Ross, 1997) and 
the stock market activity (Arestis Demetriades and Luintel, 2001) 
50
 The study by Arestis Demetriades and Luintel (2001) belong to the few exceptions, as they found only a weak 
relationship between the market stock activity and growth. 
51
 The policy components of financial development indicators used in Gelbard et al. are, the level of financial 
liberalization, the institutional change and the financial products varieties 
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their study in cross-sections suffered from heterogeneity problems. In addition, the authors 
did not account for simultaneous bias between the sectoral performances and growth. 
 
A recent study by Bayraktar and Wang (2006) targets these issues, reinvestigating the direct 
and indirect links between foreign bank entry and economic growth through the GMM 
technique in dynamic panel. Using a two-step model, the first stage results show that a higher 
share of foreign banks lowers overhead costs and net interest margins of domestic banks, 
indicating higher efficiency. In the second stage, they show that a higher efficiency increases 
economic growth. As for telecommunications, we account for simultaneity effect in financial 
sector regression by introducing the growth as a control variable in financial performances 
model.  
 
As well for telecommunications as for financial sector, this study follows the indirect 
approach of growth effect. 
 
 
3 Empirical Model 
 
This section presents the three-stage causality chain between services trade liberalization and 
growth.   
 
First stage: Market structure as function of trade openness 
The market structure model, linking the level of competition to the service trade openness, 
constitutes the first stage in the causality chain tested in this study. As in Francois et al, the 
specification is given in equation (i): 
1 1 1 1log log log + log +wit it it it iCOMP b LIB PERF Eα λ β= + +     (xix) 
 
Where the market structure indicator itCOMP  is assumed to be a log-linear function of 
services trade liberalization (openness), itLIB , performance indicator, itPERF  (which allows 
to account for the simultaneous relationship between performances and market structure), and 
a set of exogenous controls variables, itE . iw  denotes the error term; 1α  , 1λ and 1β  are 
parameters to be estimated. 
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3.1  Second stage: Sectoral performances as function of services market structure  
 
3.1.1 Model specification 
 
The literature on telecommunications services performances considered generally a simple 
linear-form model specification. This holds for studies on developed countries (see Boylaud 
and Nicoletti, 2000) as well as developing countries (Fink, Mattoo and Rathindran 2003 and 
Doumboya, 2004). Regarding the specification of financial performances model, a more 
complex method is usually considered. As most of studies used banks level data, they 
generally considered a two-step model, including a banks level estimate (to account for the 
banks specific effects) and a countries level estimate (see Saunders & Schumacher, 1997; 
and Kalirajan, McGuire, Hong & Schuele (2000)52. 
 
Since the data used in this study is aggregated at the economy level, the specification 
considered is a simple log-linear form function as well for telecommunications as for 
financial services. The service performances model is then specified by the following 
reduced form where the performance indicator ( itPERF ) is expressed as the log linear 
function of the level of competition ( itCOMP ) in service sector and the matrix of controls 
variables ( itD )53. The growth indicator, itY , is also included to account for the simultaneous 
relationship between the growth and market performances. 
2 2 2 2log log log + log +vit it it it iPERF b COMP Y Dα λ β= + +     (xx) 
Where the i and t indices indicate the country and the period respectively. itv  is the error 
term in equation (i). 2α , 2λ  and 2β  are parameters to be estimated in performance 
equation.  
 
                                                 
52
 They estimate the two step estimation model of Ho and Saunders (1981). In the first step, they estimate, at 
banks level, the Net interest margin (NIM), from which they extract the pure spread (sum of constant estimation 
and the specific country effect). The second step estimates at the economy level the pure spread.  
53
 This is the specification adopted by Nicoletie and Boyleau (2000) and Doumboya (2004) for the 
telecommunications studies  
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3.1.2 Endogeneity problem 
As already pointed out, it is conceivable that the correlation coefficients between sectoral 
performances and the competition variable suffers from simultaneity bias and rather reflect 
the impact of performances on competition policies and not vice versa. Nicoletie and Boyleau 
(2000) point to this endogeneity problem arguing that, on the one hand low performances may 
make liberalization (introduction of competition) urgent and that, on the other, foreign 
operators are attracted by situations in which there are margins for productivity gains and the 
possibility to gain market shares through price reductions. However, as the previous literature, 
they do not correct for this problem. The simultaneous estimate of the performances with the 
market structure model, specified in below, will overcome the issue.  
 
3.2 Third stage: Growth model and sectoral performances  
Following the specification of the linkages between the services trade liberalization and the 
performances above, this section completes the causality chain by establishing the 
relationship between the sectoral performances and income growth.  
 
We consider a standard growth model, into which the performances indicators are introduced. 
The underlying model of endogenous growth of real GDP per capita follows Barro (1997). 
Apart from the classic explanatory variables, i.e. production factors (gross fixed capital 
formation as a proxy for investment, ratio of secondary education as proxy for human capital), 
the control variables are introduced for human development (life expectancy), 
macroeconomic policies (inflation), openness (exports as a share of GDP), governance 
(political stability)54 and demography (population growth ) (World Bank, 2005). We have not 
conducted any analysis of additional conditioning variables to be included in growth 
regressions in the African context (for instance via extreme bounds analysis (EBA) (Sala-i-
Martin, 1997) or Bayesian averaging of classical estimates (BACE) (Sala-i-Martin et al, 
2004), preferring to adopt the selection by Easterly and Levine (1997).55 Hence, we also 
include dummies for war (Banks, 2005) and colonial powers (Barro, 1999).56 
 
                                                 
54
 As a measure of "good governance", apart from policy stability, we have included alternatively other 
Kaufmann indicators, namely regulatory quality and corruption control.  See Kaufmann et al. (2005). 
55
 Easterly and Levine (1997) use a larger set of variables, but are in accordance with Sachs and Warner (1997), 
who rather emphasize the importance of trade openness and economic policies.  We also use individual dummies 
for European colonial powers, following Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2006). 
56
 These variables all turn out to be insignificant and therefore are not further discussed. 
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Beside these standards variables of growth literature, we finally introduce a measure of 
services performances. The model is specified as follow:   
 
3 3 3 ( 1)3log log + log log +uit it it i t iY b PERF C Yα β λ −= + +      (xxi) 
 
Where itY  denotes the average real GDP per capita and itC  is a vector of the growth controls 
variables. 3α  and 3β  are parameters to be estimated in growth equation.  
( 1)i tY −  denotes the lag of GDP per capita 
As discussed above, the performance indicator, PERFit  and the GDP influence each other, as 
we expressed the performance as a function of the revenue. Norton (1992) and Datta et al. 
(2004) raised the issue of the potential bias generated by this simultaneity effects, but do not 
bring any correction57. We follow Röller and Waverman (2001) by overcoming this through 
simultaneous estimation of growth and sectoral performances equations. The model to be 
estimated is then a system of three simultaneous equations containing real GDP per capita, the 
structure of market and performances indicators as left-hand side variables respectively.  
 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
3 3 3 ( 1)3
log log log + log +w ( )
log log log + log +v ( )
log log + log log +u ( )
it it it it i
it it it it i
it it it i t i
COMP b LIB PERF E i
PERF b COMP Y D ii
Y b PERF C Y iii
α λ β
α λ β
α β λ −
 = + +

= + +

= + +
 
 
The system would be estimated separately for each of the two sectors, telecommunications 
and finances, considered in this study. 
 
4 Descriptions and sources of data 
 
4.1 Data description  
The table1 here below lists the indicators introduced in each equation for both the 
telecommunications and financial services. 
                                                 
57In fact their treatments of endogeneity problem only consist to include the lagged value (Datta and Agarwal, 
2004) or the initial period value (Norton, 1992) of telecommunication performances to prove the existence of an 
effect of telecommunications on growth. But, they do not attempt to isolate the two effects.  
57
 For example, concerning the model of telecommunication performances, the more obvious omitted variable is 
the quality of services, since the better services quality will encourage subscriptions. 
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Table 1. Model specification: Presentation of indicators 
    
telecommunications 
  
Finances 
  
    Indicator 
expecte
d sign Indicator 
expected 
sign 
Eq (i) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
dependent variable : itCOMP  
Number  operator 
  
Competition 
 
Liberalization: itLIB  
Telecom services openness 
+ 
Financial openness 
 + 
Performances: itPERF  Penetration  - 
Spread /Credit to private 
 +/- 
Controls: itE  
  
Telecom regulation 
 + Market size  + 
Market size 
 + population  + 
Population 
 + Time  + 
Eq (ii) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 dependent variable : itPERF  
Penetration 
  
Spread/Credit  private sector 
  
 Growth: itY  GDP/capita  + 
GDP/capita 
 -/+ 
 Market structure: itCOMP  Number operator  + Competition  -/+ 
 Controls: itD  
  
  
  
Lag fixed price 
 + Interest instability  +/- 
Lag mobile price 
 _  Time  -/+ 
Density 
 +    
Time 
 +    
Eq (iii) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 dependent variable : itY  
GDP/capita 
 
GDP/capita 
 
 Performances: itPERF  Penetration  + Spread/Credit  private sector 
 
-/+ 
 
Lag of GDP/capita + Lag of GDP/capita  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
PoP growth 
 + PoP growth  + 
Trade openness 
 + Trade openness + 
Life expectancy 
 + Life expectancy  + 
Inflation 
 - 
Inflation 
 - 
Institutions 
 + Institutions  + 
Tertiary education 
 + Tertiary education  + 
 Investment  +    
 Time  + Time  + 
Source: Author construction 
 
4.1.1 Telecommunication model variables  
Telecommunications services performances ( itPERF ) can be defined in terms of quality of 
services (call failure rate), of industry productivity (ratio of labor input to number of lines), of 
services prices and services accessibility (see Boylaud and Nicoletti, 2000). Due to the lack of 
appropriate data, I will consider only the penetration in mobile sector. Doumbouya (2004), 
one of the rare quantitative empirical studies that exclusively focus on African countries, also 
considered this indicator58.  
 
                                                 
58
 Shirley (2001) adopts a descriptive approach presenting case studies of telecommunications reform in six 
African countries and various performance statistics. 
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The market structure ( itCOMP ) in telecommunications is measured by the number of operator 
in mobile segment. By introducing competition, the improvement of market structure is 
expected to be positively correlated with services accessibility.  
 
The telecommunications services trade openness, itLIB , is measured by the number of year 
since the commitment to the GATS.  
 
The matrix of controls variables, itE , of market structure equation (i) includes the following 
variables: (1) the market size which is the main services market structure determinants 
underlined by Francois et al. (2002), as a large market would increase the scope for 
competition in the presence of scale economies. It is measured by the population size and the 
weight of global GDP in total Africa GDP. (2) The performances indicator to account for the 
simultaneity causation between performances and the introduction of competition. 
 
The matrix of control variables in the performances model (equation (ii)), sitD , includes:  
i. The price of local fixed call, measured by the official price of a three minutes phone call 
in real constant dollars (at 2000 prices). Fink et al. (2003) underlined the importance of 
controlling for the performance of competing segment in order to capture the eventual 
complementary effect (economy of network). However, it is possible that the mobile 
and the fixed could be substitutable products, the two providing the same service. 
Therefore, the sign associated to fixed price could be as well negative as positive;  
ii.  The Mobile price: the expected sign is negative, as the decrease in price would allow 
more people to take a subscription; and  
iii. Other exogenous factors characterizing a country's economic structure (income levels, 
population density) identified in Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000).  
 
4.1.2 Financial sector variables’ specification 
Following the literature, this chapter will assess the impact of financial liberalization in term 
of efficiency and credit accessibility for private sector. The study by Francois et al. (2002) 
measured the performance, itPERF , in terms of market power of banks, using as indicators, 
the “net interest income over the total bank assets” on the one hand and the “commercial bank 
gross operating profit over the total banking assets” on the other. But, this does not account 
  91
for the sector efficiency, we use as alternative, the interest rate spread which account as well 
for the market power as for the sector efficiency.  
 
To account for the services accessibility aspect, we use the credit to the private sector (see 
Clarke, Cull, and Peria, 2001)59. However, contrary to the previous studies, this indicator does 
not rely on bank-level data. This is a serious drawback, since the study will use the aggregated 
data at country level and then fail to control for banks specific effects which could be source 
of bias (see Kalirajan et al. 2000).  
 
The market structure ( itCOMP ) in financial sector is measured by the level of banking 
concentration (Bank concentration ratio) built by Gelbard et al. (1999)60. It takes the values 
ranged from 0 to 100. A country with a value more than 50 is supposed to be in competition. 
The financial services trade openness, itLIB , is measured by a composite financial openness 
index built by Gelbard et al. (1999)61. It takes the values ranged from 0 to 100. A country with 
more than 50 is supposed to be opened. The table. A1-c in annex, presents the indicators or 
market structure and financial trade openness. 
 
The matrix of controls variables, itE , into financial market structure model, equation (i), 
includes the following variables: (1) Size of market, (2) and the frequency of financial crises, 
measured by a dummy taking one when a country has faced crisis for a particular year and 
zero otherwise. 
 
The matrix of controls variables in performances model, equation (ii), itD , includes: (1) The 
volatility of interest rate62 and (2) the GDP per capita. 
                                                 
59
 However, Gelbard et al. point to the difficulty of using this monetary indicator particularly in context of 
developing countries. The variable of scale for the credit to private sector is the GDP, which suffers from the 
weakness of national account in Africa. 
60
 Bank concentration ratio: Herfindahl index  applied on deposits and loans for the five largest banks. 
61
 It relies on the score attributed on the base of the following question: Are there significant restrictions to the 
purchase of domestic financial assets by nonresidents? Is there a parallel market for foreign exchange? Are there 
no significant restrictions on the purchase of foreign financial assets by residents? Has the country accepted the 
obligations under Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the IMF articles of agreement? Is there an exchange tax? 
Are there controls on interest payments? Are there controls on profits/dividend payments? Are there repatriation 
requirements for service earnings? Are there controls on liquidation of direct investment?: 
62
 Saunders et al. (1997) point to the interest rate volatility a strong determinant of spread. The volatility traduces 
the level of risks facing by the bank system and therefore justified the higher margin. 
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Other important determinants of the financial performance as prudential regulations (capital 
requirement and reserve liquid) are not introduced here because of the lack of data (see et al., 
1997) 
 
4.2 Data sources 
 
Data for the telecommunications performance indicators are obtained from the ITU (2005b). 
The telecommunication liberalization indicators have been developed on the basis of ITU 
surveys (ITU, 2005a) and WTO schedules of commitments, while financial liberalization 
indicator are provided by Gelbard et al. (1999). Data on Financial performances, economic 
structure and growth determinants are taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
2005 data base of the World Bank (WB) (World Bank, 2005). Governance indicators are from 
Kaufman et al. (2005). The Annex Table A1a provides an overview of all variables and data 
sources, while the Annex tableA1b presents their statistics characteristics (number of 
observations, means and standard deviation). 
 
 
5 Econometric issues  
5.1 Methodology of simultaneous equation estimate 
 
In order to conduct a joint estimation of the system of three equations, (i) , (ii) and (iii) 
containing respectively, the structure of market, performances indicators and growth as left-
hand side variables respectively, we use the three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimator. Thus, 
the simultaneity bias is corrected for by using internal instruments. The 3SLS estimation 
procedure is set out in Zellner and Theil (1962): First, the exogenous variables are taken as 
instruments for the endogenous variables using ordinary least squares (OLS). Then, each 
endogenous variable is regressed on both the exogenous variables and the predictions of the 
endogenous variables. This is the common two stage least squares procedure (2SLS). Finally, 
the generalized least squares (GLS) estimator is calculated in order to use the additional 
information of the contemporaneous correlation of the error terms63.  
                                                 
63
 In order to address different forms of endogeneity bias (due to simultaneity, omitted variables, measurement 
problems), the GMM estimator is the preferred method in the literature (Wooldridge, 2002). In the presence of 
conditional heteroskedasticity, GMM is more efficient than 3SLS.   
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The main advantage of using 3SLS as compared to 2SLS is an increase in the efficiency of 
the estimations. However, if the 3SLS is asymptotically better, they have the disadvantage 
that any specification error in the structure of the model will be propagated throughout the 
system while the 2SLS estimator will confine a problem to the particular equation in which it 
appears. Therefore, we will present results for the two estimators. 
 
5.2 Over-identification problem in simultaneous equation model 
 
For the simultaneous model considered above, the endogenous variables are over-identified. 
In fact for each equation included in the system, the number of excluded exogenous variable 
is always more than two, i.e. more than the number of endogenous variables determined in 
each equation considered64.  
 
As explained in chapter 1, the IV method of 3SLS used here considered the excluded 
variables as instruments and the model will be correctly identified if these variables are 
validate instruments. To verify this, we run the test of Hansen-Sargan for over-identifying 
restrictions in regression estimated via the 3SLS in which the number of instruments exceeds 
the number of regressors (see Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2006). 
 
This is the test of the joint null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid instruments, 
i.e., uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the estimated equation. A 
rejection casts doubt on the validity of the instruments in 3SLS. The test computes a p-value 
comparing the Hansen-Sargan statistic, J, (which is the minimum value) to a criteria build by 
Davidson & MacKinnon (2004).  
5.3 Omitted variables  
The model of services performances and growth specified above may suffer from omitted 
variables problems65. More generally, to address the problem of omitted variables as well in 
the performances as in the growth model, all regressions will be applied the fixed effect 
trough the “average-difference” approach. This allows the correction of omitted variable bias 
for times invariant factors. Furthermore, the introduction of time dummy allows to control for 
                                                 
64
 Contrary to the model in chapter 1, we have not considered any supplementary endogenous variables than the 
dependent variables. 
65
 The typical omitted variable in model evaluating the liberalization impact is the political will which would 
influence the effective implementation of reforms the country officially committed to. 
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time specific effect notably technology progress which turn out to be very determinant in 
telecommunication and financial sectors 
 
In the case of financial performance model, an important omitted variable is an indicator of 
prudential regulation (see Saunders et al., 1997). But, the panel database for financial sector 
has only two periods, which makes inappropriate the usage of “average difference” method. I 
will counter for fixed effect by introducing five regional dummies for five main regional trade 
zones in Africa (CEMAC, ECOWAS, SADC, EAC and SACU). 
 
 
6 Regressions and results 
 
6.1 Telecommunication results 
Regressions are based on an unbalanced panel dataset for 30 African countries, over the 
1995-2004 period and divided into 5 identical sub-periods. The choice of this period is 
essentially due to data availability; however it also coincides to the period when the major 
reforms in the telecommunications sector in Africa were carried out (see Djiofack and Keck, 
2006).  
Figure.1 below presents the evolution of telecommunication penetration in Sub Saharan 
Africa, between 1995 and 2004, for both the mobile and the fixed segments. It points out a 
boom of mobile telephony in Africa on that period, the penetration of mobile moving from 
less than 0.1% in 1995, on average, to 10% in 2004. Giving the poor variation of the 
penetration in fixed segment, which increased for only 1% between 1995 and 2004, the 
analysis on telecommunications will focus on mobile segment only. 
Figure 1. Evolution of telephone penetration in Africa 
 
Source: author construction from IUT (2005b) data base 
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The results for the simultaneous system estimate of equations from (i) to (iii) are presented in 
table.2. All variables are corrected from fixed effects and the system is estimated successively 
by 2SLS (column1) and 3SLS (column 2). The Hansen-Sargan test does not reject the null 
hypothesis that the internal instruments are validated (p-value =84%).  
 
The simultaneous regressions for 2SLS (table 2 columns 1) and 3SLS (table.2 columns 2), 
have quite similar coefficients, and as expected the 3SLS parameters are more efficient. Thus, 
even if an equation in the system suffered a misspecification problem, it has no affected the 
whole system estimates, as result of 3SLS utilization66.  
 
6.1.1 Effect of services trade openness on market structure: equation (i) 
 
As far as the equation (i) is concerned, the 3SLS estimator points to the absence of correlation 
between the telecommunications trade openness, as measured by the presence of GATS 
commitments, and penetration. While this lack of effects could be due to the low level of 
participation by African countries (only 13) in terms of GATS commitments in the 
telecommunications sector, it is in line with a study by Djiofack and Keck (2006) based on a 
world sample. However, the pertinence of the GATS indicator considered is to be questioned 
since it does not capture the differences between countries in terms of breadth (e.g. sub-
sectors and modes of supply covered by the commitments) and quality of commitments.  
 
More often stressed in the literature as important determinant of market structure (See 
Francois et al. 2002), the market size coefficient in the equation (i), explaining the market 
structure, emerges to be positive and highly significant (at 5%). More important is the 
economy size, the more competitive will be the telecommunications market. As a final lesson 
from the equation (i) estimate by the 3SLS, the assumption of the existence of a double 
causality between the performances and market structure is not confirmed, since the 
coefficient of the penetration, introduced as an explanatory variable of market structure, 
emerges to be negative but not significant.  
 
                                                 
66
 We have run a Hausman test of specification to compare the both models. Their coefficients turn out to be 
globally identical. 
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6.1.2 Market structure and telecommunications performances: equation (ii) 
With regard to the 3SLS results, the simultaneous estimator for the equation (ii) reveals a 
positive (1.31) and significant (at 5%) contribution of competition, as measured by the 
number of operators to market penetration67.  
 
This is inconsistent with Doumboya’s (2004) result that used a single equation model for a set 
of African countries and found no significant linkage between the number of operator and the 
penetration. However, the 3SLS result is confirmed when running a single equation as that of 
Doumboya (2004) with our sample68. In fact, Doumboya’s result suffered from the lack of 
variability in the competition variable, since his sample (before 2000) did not cover 
extensively the main period where reforms were carried out in Africa. Another important 
outcome from the equation (ii) estimation is that, the coefficient of the fixed segment price is 
negative and significant, denoting a complementarities effect between fixed and mobile 
segments69. 
 
6.1.3 Growth and Telecommunications performances: equation (iii) 
The previous section has set the link between the services trade liberalization (openness), 
market structure and the sectoral performances. We are interested now in testing whether 
liberalization beyond better sectoral performance of telecommunications and financial 
services trickles through to have an impact on economic growth. 
 
The descriptive statistics do not show any evidence of a link between any sectoral 
performance indicator (penetration) and growth as illustrated in the Annex Table.A2 where 
the partial correlation coefficients, between growth and penetration turns out to be non 
significant. However, figure 2 below, displaying trends of economic growth and penetration 
for the Africa between 1995 and 2004, suggests a possible linkage between the two variables. 
In fact, while the evolutions of the penetration and growth have been opposed before 2000, 
they become more similar in the period after. 
 
                                                 
67
 In the performance equation, the both indicators of fixed price and the revenue, are introduced with a lag of 
one period, in order to account for a potential simultaneity bias. 
68
 I run separately the equation (ii) using three methods: the Random effect, the fixed effect and the fixed effect 
corrected from the heteroskedasticity. Results are presented in annex (table.A3, column 2 to 4).  
69
 This result even counterintuitive traduces the possibilities of network economy in telecommunication sector. 
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Figure 2. Telephone penetration and GDP growth in Africa 
 
Source: author construction from ITU (2005b) database 
 
 
The 3SLS estimation of the growth model equation (iii), points to the positive (0.012) and 
highly significant (at 1%) coefficient for the penetration variable70 (see table 2 below). This 
result is the validation of the existence of a reverse relationship between growth and 
penetration, as the coefficient of the per capita income introduced as explanatory variable in 
penetration model (equation ii) is positive and highly significant (at 1%). This outcome is 
consistent with the Sridhar and Sridhar (2004) study on a set of developing countries. 
However, our income elasticity of demand for cellular services, (9.77), is very far from the 
Sridhar and Sridhar finding, 1.15, for all telecommunications services (including fixed and 
mobile). 
 
To conclude, even if the international commitment does not contribute to the competition in 
telecommunication market, enhancing the market structure to 1 percent lead to an increase of 
(1.31) percent of accessibility to the mobile telephony services. And the augmenting by 1 per 
cent of the services accessibility translates into a 0.012 per cent higher level of real GDP per 
capita in Africa. This result is strongly consistent with previous findings especially that of 
Sridhar and Sridhar (2004), who found that for every 1 per cent increase in cell phone 
penetration, national output increases by 0.01 in developing countries. 
 
 
 
                                                 
70
 The result is confirmed when estimating the equation (iii) separately and using alternatives techniques. We 
estimate the equation (iii) in random and fixed effects corrected from heteroskedasticity. The Annex Table.A4 
column (4 and 5) gives the results. They point to the positive and highly significant (at 1%) coefficient for the 
penetration variable. In order to test, if there is any direct link between the competition and the growth, we 
introduced in the equation (iii) the competition indicator (number of operator). The results of news estimates are 
in Annex table.A4 (column 1 to 3). The penetration coefficient is still positive and significant. In opposite, the 
market structure coefficient turn out to be non significant whatever the techniques used (random or fixed effect).  
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Table 2.  Simultaneous regressions of growth and telecommunications 
performances model 
 (1) (2) 
 2SLS 3SLS 
(i)   
 Number  operator Number operator 
Penetration -0.034 -0.017 
 (0.38) (0.21) 
Telecom regulation -0.020 -0.012 
 (0.25) (0.16) 
Market size 0.050 0.050 
 (2.17)** (2.28)** 
Population 1.727 1.272 
 (0.75) (0.59) 
Telecom  services openness -0.032 -0.034 
 (1.05) (1.20) 
Constant 0.013 0.012 
 (0.37) (0.36) 
(ii)   
 Penetration Penetration 
GDP/capita 9.227 9.771 
 (2.09)** (2.51)** 
Density 10.249 9.739 
 (3.20)*** (4.03)*** 
Lag fixed price -0.091 -0.103 
 (1.46) (2.35)** 
Lag mobile price -0.152 -0.031 
 (0.90) (0.25) 
Number  of operators 1.173 1.312 
 (1.61) (2.27)** 
Year 0.257 0.260 
 (2.98)*** (3.92)*** 
Constant -514.004 -518.987 
 (2.98)*** (3.92)*** 
(iii)   
 GDP/capita GDP/capita 
Penetration 0.014 0.012 
 (3.09)*** (3.15)*** 
Investment 0.027 0.053 
 (0.83) (2.24)** 
Population -0.019 0.001 
 (1.07) (0.09) 
Trade openness 0.041 0.041 
 (1.15) (1.58) 
Life expectancy 0.116 -0.055 
 (0.80) (0.53) 
Inflation 0.005 0.008 
 (0.70) (1.71)* 
Institutions 1.262 1.256 
 (0.75) (1.02) 
Tertiary education 0.039 0.056 
 (1.35) (2.60)*** 
Lag of GDP/capita 1.56 1.43 
 (6.60)*** (8.60)*** 
Constant 0.002 0.005 
 (0.26) (0.97) 
Observations 97 97 
Countries :30 X 5 30 30 
Hansen-sargan pvalue J=24.773 
 H0: Chi-sq(26), 
 pval = 0.53 
J=18.862 
H0:  Chi-sq(26), 
pval = 0.84 
   
R-squared 0.27-0.12-0.80 0.27-0.12-0.80 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (i) indicates the bloc of variables included in 
competition equation; (ii) Indicates the bloc of variables included in performance equation; (iii) indicates the 
bloc of variables included in growth equation.  
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6.2 Financial sector estimates 
Financial sector regressions are based on a database from 1980 to 2000 on 33 African 
countries and divided into two periods. The choice of both periods is constrained by the 
availability of the variable of interest, the policy indicators, which are only available for the 
years 1987 and 1997. I will assume that the policy indicators of 1987 represent the situation 
of the 1980s, while that of 1997 represent the 1990s71.  
 
6.2.1 Descriptive statistics 
Before regressions results, it is instructive to analyze some descriptive statistics relative to 
African financial sector. Table.3 summarizes the differences in average performances (interest 
rate spread and credit to private sector) between non competitive and competitive markets, on 
the one hand, and between the 1980s and the 1990s on the other. The results in the table point 
to the deterioration of financial performances between the 1980s and 1990s, as the interest 
rate spread has significantly increased, while the credit to private sector slowed. This 
evolution traduces logically the state of crisis which characterized many African financial 
economies during the1990s as illustrated by the figure.3, below. 
 
Table 3. Average differences of financial sector performances  
  
1980s 
 VS.  
1990s 
Non competition  
         Vs. 
 Competition 
Credit to private 
sector Decrease Increase 
Spread Increase Unchanged 
Source: author construction 
 
The performances comparison between non competitive and competitive markets shows an 
increase in ratio of credit to private sector. A result which is confirmed in Annex Table.A7, 
show a positive partial correlation between market structure and credit to private sector. This 
outcome matches our expectation that the improvement of market structure would enhance 
the credit to private sector. 
 
                                                 
71
 The annex (Table. A1-c) provides the list of countries involved in financial regressions with the relevant 
financial liberalization indicators. 
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However, the second financial performances indicator, the interest rate spread, has no link 
with the introduction of competition, as the comparison between non competitive and 
competitive shows no change. 
 
Figure 3. Frequencies of financial crises in Africa 
Frequence of Financial crise in Africa 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
1980 1990 2000-2003
decade
frequence of crise for 32
countries
 
Source: author construction  
 
Concerning the financial performance and growth relationship, the Table.4 summarizes the 
differences in average income growth and performances (interest rate spread and credit to 
private sector) between, on the one hand, non competitive and competitive markets and 
between the 1980s and the 1990s on the other. Comparisons built in the table.4 point to the 
absence of variation in income growth between 1980s and 1990s, while the countries with 
competitive financial market structure emerge as the better growth performer.  
 
Table 4. Growth and Performances evolution 
  
1980s 
 VS  
1990s 
Non competition 
 Vs  
Competition 
GDP Growth Unchanged Increase 
Credit to private 
sector Decrease Increase 
Spread Increase Unchanged 
Source: author construction 
 
Comparing the growth and the evolution of sectoral performances throughout the time, the 
GDP growth has not common trend with any of financial performances between 1980s and 
1990s. The performances have deteriorated while the growth globally remains unchanged 
between the two periods. However, when this comparison is set up on the perspective of 
competition introduction, a common pattern emerges between the income growth and the 
credit to private sector ratio. In fact, the both credit to the private sector and the growth 
performance are better in countries with competitive market 
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6.2.2 Regressions results 
The results for the simultaneous system estimate of equations from (i) to (iii) are presented in 
table.5, below, for the financial sector.  
 
Table 5. Simultaneous regressions of growth and financial performances model  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 2SLS 3SLS 2SLS 3SLS 
(i)     
 Competition Competition Competition Competition 
Financial openness 0.358 0.358 0.323 0.295 
 (3.15)*** (3.57)*** (2.65)*** (2.82)*** 
Spread -0.059 -0.050   
 (0.44) (0.42)   
Credit  private sector   0.067 0.086 
   (0.75) (1.09) 
Market size 0.078 0.078 0.061 0.084 
 (1.74)* (1.97)** (1.76)* (1.85)* 
Time 0.133 0.125 0.091 0.105 
 (0.84) (0.89) (0.73) (0.96) 
Constant 2.901 2.896 2.744 2.880 
 (7.23)*** (8.19)*** (5.98)*** (7.26)*** 
(ii)     
 Spread Spread Credit Credit 
GDP/capita -0.058 -0.049 0.489 0.453 
 (0.67) (0.64) (4.51)*** (4.90)*** 
Interest instability 0.264 0.265 -0.444 -0.431 
 (2.83)*** (3.23)*** (3.81)*** (4.28)*** 
Competition 0.312 0.272 -0.125 0.142 
 
(0.91) (0.92) (0.29) (0.40) 
Time 0.816 0.826 0.012 -0.054 
 (4.60)*** (5.32)*** (0.05) (0.28) 
Constant -0.908 -0.823 1.083 0.299 
 (0.69) (0.72) (0.66) (0.21) 
(iii)     
 GDP/capita GDP/capita GDP/capita GDP/capita 
Spread -0.362 -0.388   
 (1.55) (1.75)*   
Credit private sector   0.124 0.140 
   (1.62) (1.89)* 
Tertiary education 0.388 0.319 0.368 0.386 
 (2.18)** (2.30)** (2.51)** (3.43)*** 
Life expectancy 1.219 2.115 1.991 1.815 
 (0.64) (1.41) (1.84)* (2.21)** 
Population -25.016 -17.729 -21.774 -28.097 
 (1.13) (1.03) (1.33) (2.24)** 
Lag of GDP/capita 0.280 0.257 0.284 0.248 
 (3.00)*** (3.50)*** (3.35)*** (3.76)*** 
Trade openness 0.095 0.218 0.112 0.115 
 (0.35) (1.03) (0.47) (0.61) 
Inflation -0.044 0.026 0.047 -0.005 
 (0.14) (0.11) (0.33) (0.04) 
Institutions 0.091 0.072 0.086 0.155 
 (0.79) (0.80) (0.84) (1.93)* 
Time -0.637 -0.560 -0.262 -0.272 
 (0.72) (0.79) (1.21) (1.56) 
Constant -1.532 -5.566 -4.466 -4.604 
 (0.20) (0.92) (0.91) (1.22) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 
Hansen-sargan pvalue J=  17.35 
H0: Chi-sq(16),  
pval = 0.3849 
J=  18.436 
H0: Chi-sq(16),  
pval = 0.2849 
J=  19.35 
H0: Chi-sq(16),  
pval = 0.172 
J=  20.436 
H0: Chi-sq(16),  
pval = 0.0.949 
R-squared 0.76-0.51-0.43 0.74-0.50-0.42 0.81-0.54-0.42 0.80-0.52-0.40 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (i) indicates the bloc of variables included in competition 
equation; (ii) Indicates the bloc of variables included in performance equation; (iii) indicates the bloc of variables included in 
growth equation.  
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The fixed effect is account by introducing 5 regional dummies and a time dummy. For each 
performance each of the two financial performance indicators considered in this study, the 
system is estimated successively by 2SLS and the 3SLS (column 2). The estimate including 
the credit to private sector are reported in (columns 1 and 2), while those including the 
interest rate spread are in (columns 3 and 4).  
 
The Hansen-Sargan test does not reject the null hypothesis that the internal instruments are 
validated for any of the four system specifications72. 
 
6.2.2.1 Financial liberalization and market structure: equation (i) 
Contrary to the telecommunication, the 3SLS estimator of equation (i) shows a positive and 
significant effect of financial services trade openness on the sectoral competition. This holds 
whatever the performances indicator or the estimator (2SLS, or 3SLS) considered. An 
openness equivalent to one point will translate into 0.30 to 0.36 (depending on specification) 
points of market structure amelioration.  
 
As in the telecommunication sector, the size of the market emerges as an important 
determinant of market structure. 
 
6.2.2.2 Market structure and sectoral performances: equation (ii) 
The 3SLS estimator of financial performances equations reveals unexpected results, as the 
market structure indicator emerge to be insignificant. This holds whatever the performance 
indicator considered. If these results do not match the expectations, they are in line with 
descriptive statistics observation, as the partial correlation between market structure and the 
financial performance is not significant (see Annex Table A.7). The same result is found 
when estimating separately the equation (ii)73.  
 
This outcome comes in opposition to the previous studies on developed countries (See 
Saunders and Shumacher, 1997) as well as those on developing countries (see Clarke, Cull & 
                                                 
72
 The simultaneous regressions for 2SLS and 3SLS have quite similar coefficients, and as expected the 3SLS 
parameters are more efficient. Thus, even if an equation in the system suffered a misspecification problem, it has 
no affected the whole system estimates, as result of 3SLS utilization. 
73
 We estimate separately the equation of performance (ii), using the OLS on poling data (see Annex table.A8) 
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Peria 2001). However, it is consistent with a recent study by Mattoo et al. (2006) on 
Zambia74.  
 
Nevertheless, the absence of an effect of market structure on performances could be due to the 
quality of competition indicator used. The banking concentration, used here, is an output 
indicator, and it is conceivable that it does not reflect the quality of the actual policy. In fact, a 
financial system could be very concentrated while functioning under competitive rule, if the 
actual policy allows contestation from foreign banks. To account for this issue, we have 
directly included in the performances model, equation (ii), the indicator of financial services 
trade openness to traduce contestability. However, the estimation in Annex Table A.8 
(column 3 and 4) does not show any significant link between financial services trade openness 
and performance indicators.   
 
Another possible explanation of the lack of effect of competition is that the estimation may 
also suffer from the omitted variables issue. Notably the quality of the prudential regulation in 
financial system, which emerged in previous studies as important determinant of 
performances (see Kalijaran et al, 2000) and could, therefore, conditioned the effect of 
competition introduction. Due to the lack of an indicator of financial regulation, we account 
for this omitted issue by introducing in the equation (ii) an “output indicator” of the financial 
crisis. This variable take 1 when a country for a particular year faced the financial crisis and 
zero otherwise. The new equation (ii) is estimated separately. But the results in table A8 
column (5 and 6) show not significant link between financial crisis and any of performances 
indicators. More importantly, the coefficients of competition indicator remain non significant. 
 
6.2.2.3 Growth and Financial performances 
 
When considering the estimation of the growth model of equation (iii), the results show that 
all controls variables are significant with expected signs (except inflation). As far as 
performances indicators are concerned, the results point to the significant coefficients with the 
expected signs for the both credit to private sector and interest rate spread. An increase of 1 
point in credit to private sector would be translated into 0.140 points of income growth 
                                                 
74
 In the case of Zambia, Mattoo et al. (2006) explained the poor sectoral performance by the “eviction effect”, 
as the state massively solicited bank to finance their fiscal deficit, this detrimental to private. They also point to 
the inappropriate sequence of reforms, as the liberalization took place before establishing a new legal and 
regulatory framework for the banking system that would encourage prudent risk-taking and market discipline. 
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improvement, while the decrease of 1 point in interest rate spread would generate an 
improvement of 0.38 points of income growth. These results hold when estimating separately 
the equation (iii)75. 
 
As final outcome from the 3SLS estimator of the system, the assumption of existence of the 
reverse causality between the credit to private sector and the income growth is validated. The 
coefficient associated to the GDP variable in equation (ii) with credit to private as left hand-
side variable is positive and significant. But, this assumption is not validated when the 
financial performance is the interest rate spread.  
 
Summarizing, the financial services trade openness contributes to the strengthening of the 
competition, as measured by the banking concentration. But, contrary to Francois et al. 
finding, the banking concentration reduction does not lead to the amelioration of financial 
performances in terms of access to the credit and in term of efficiency and market power 
(interest rate spread) reduction. Nevertheless, the financial sector performances emerge as 
significant determinants of income growth. 
 
6.3 Discussion 
 
6.3.1 GMM as alternative to 3SLS in growth model 
As an alternative method to correct for possible endogeneity problems linked to simultaneity 
bias, to measurement errors or omitted variables, we run the growth model regressions using 
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator, i.e. we have estimated a dynamic 
panel in first differences using lagged values of the endogenous variables as instruments76.   
The model specification is a follows:77 
( 1) 3 3 33log log log + log +u
s s s s s s
it i t it it iY Y b PERF Cα βλ −= + +      (xxii) 
The dynamic GMM model shows a positive and significant correlation between penetration 
and growth. This method allows accounting for endogeneity of others growth determinants 
(Investments, inflation and education) by generating internal instruments as discussed above. 
                                                 
75
 We estimate separately the equation (iii) using an OLS estimator on pooling data Results in Annex Table.A9. 
The above results hold, whatever introducing separately the interest rate spread (column 1) and the credit to 
private sector (column 2), or when introducing the both indicators simultaneously (column 3).  
76
 This method is not applied for financial sector since its data include only two periods.  
77
 This specification applies to the GMM estimation; the alternative estimation methods do not include lagged 
GDP as an explanatory variable. 
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The result in Annex Table.A5 shows a coefficient between growth and penetration which is 
far smaller (0.008) compare to the 3SLS estimate (0.012) and less significant (5% compared 
to 1% in 3SLS). 
 
6.3.2 Stability of liberalization effects in respect to development level  
 
There is an important concern in the literature about the linearity of liberalization effects with 
respect to the development level. Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) note that 
the comparative functions of foreign banks and domestic banks are very different in 
developing and industrial countries, possibly because of a different customer base, different 
bank procedures, and different regulatory and tax regimes. Using the same sample as Mattoo 
et al. (2006), EL Khoury and Savvides (2007) established through the Hansen’s (2000) 
“Threshold Model” the evidence of the existence of a threshold level of development in the 
relationship between services trade liberalization and growth. In the case of financial services, 
they point to the positive and significant contribution of liberalization for the most developed 
countries (above the threshold) and the absence of effect for less developed countries (below 
the threshold). The scheme is reverse for the telecommunication, lest developed countries 
gaining while the most developed enjoy no effect.  
 
To test the stability of the services effects, I reconsider the simultaneous model of growth 
including equations (i to iii). In each equation, we introduce successively a multiplicative 
variable, called “development threshold”, which is the multiplication of the main interest 
variable of the equation by the initial GDP per capita78.  
 
This specification is run in three different samples: Africa, Developing Countries and World. 
If the development threshold variable for a given equation emerges significant, then we 
conclude to the existence of a threshold in the effects. The results are reported in annex table- 
A6 for the telecommunications and table.A10 for the financial services. 
 
6.3.2.1 Development threshold 
For telecommunication sector, the results in the Annex table.A6 (column 1 and 2) show no 
evidence of threshold existence based on development level, as well for the relationship 
                                                 
78
  The interest variables are the openness (liberalization) for equation (i), the level of competition (market 
structure) for equation( ii),  and the sectoral performances for equation (iii). 
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between growth and penetration as for the relationship between the market structure and the 
sectoral performances. This result holds in both Africa and world sample.  
 
Concerning the financial sector, there is no evidence of financial trade openness effect 
variability in respect to the development level. However in opposite to the 
telecommunications sector, the market structure effect on sectoral performances and the 
effects of sectoral performances on income growth seem to be dependent to the development 
level, the less developed among African countries gaining significantly more. This result 
holds, whether, the performances indicator is measured by credit to private sector or the 
interest rate spread.  
 
6.3.2.2 Africa specificities in telecommunications sector  
We then substitute the “development threshold” by a new multiplicative variable named 
“Africa Threshold” which is the multiplication of the main interest variable by the Africa 
dummy. That variable is introduced successively in a developing countries and world sample. 
The estimate allows perceiving an Africa particularity in term of telecommunications effects, 
compared to developing and the world. The results in the Annex table.A6 column (3 and 4) 
show evidence of a higher impact of market structure in penetration and a lesser impact of 
penetration on growth compared to developing countries and the world. This result is in line 
with Sridhar and Sridhar (2004) study, which evidence a higher growth effects of penetration 
in developed countries compared to developing one. 
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7 Conclusions 
This study has assessed the indirect linkage between trade liberalization in financial and 
telecommunications services and income growth, relying on a causality chain model based on 
Francois and Eschenbach (2002) and Bayraktar and Wang (2006). This includes the following 
three stage of causation: (1) Services trade liberalization contributes to reduce the 
concentration in market structure, (2) which reduces market power and then contributes to the 
sectoral performances, (3) which in turn encourages higher economic growth.   
 
Our empirical assessment is based on the South Saharan African data from 1995 to 2004 for 
telecommunications services and from 1980 to 2000 for financial services. The estimates 
point to mitigate results. In telecommunications sector, the services trade openness, as 
measured by the country commitments in the framework of General Agreements of Trade in 
Services (GATS) at WTO, shows no correlation with the competition level (number of 
operators). However the level of competition has a strong effect on telecommunications 
services accessibility, which in turn influences significantly income growth.  
 
As an important robustness test of the results, the estimates show evidence of the coefficients 
stabilities, in respect to development level among Africa countries. Furthermore, the results 
evidence, as in previous studies (see Sridhar and Sridhar, 2004), a higher impact of services 
trade competition on penetration and a lesser important influence of penetration on growth in 
Africa, compared to the rest of the world. 
 
In the case of the financial sector, trade liberalization, as measured by the openness of cross-
border operators and operations (See Gelbard et al, 1999), emerges to be a strong determinant 
of market competitiveness, as measured by the level of concentration. However, the level of 
competition in the financial market shows no significant link with the sectoral performances 
whatever, the later is measured by the level of credit to private sector or by the interest rate 
spread. As the last stage in the Francois et al. causality chain, the sectoral performances 
indicators emerge as strong determinants of income growth. 
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As an important difference with the telecommunications sector, the financial performances 
effect on growth seem to be correlated to the development level, among Africa countries, the 
less developed countries enjoying the higher gain.  
 
Finally, the results evidence, like in previous studies, a double causation between growth and 
sectoral performances (see Sridhar and Sridhar, 2004). This holds for the both 
telecommunications and financial sectors (when the performance is measured by credit to 
private sector). 
 
There is, nonetheless, no evidence of complete causality chain of Francois et al, the only 
recurrence being the positive effect of sectoral performances and the growth, whatever the 
services considered.  
 
Further research on this topic should improve the trade openness indicator, notably the 
commitment in the framework of the GATS which should account for the breath dimension. 
In addition, the role of regulation should be more stressed. It should be particularly 
instructive, in respect to the consumer’s welfare, to assess the regulation influence on 
providers’ market power when determining the price of services access.  
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Annexes 
Table A1.  -a Data description and sources 
 
Variable Description Source 
Price mobile Costs of 3 minutes call from one mobile to another;  annual bill of 
average subscriber 
ITU 
Price local fixed Costs of 3 minutes call from local fixed line;  annual bill of average 
subscriber 
ITU 
Price international fixed Costs of 3 minutes call to the United States WDI 
mobile Penetration  Percentage of population subscribed and having telephone service 
activated within the last 9 months 
ITU 
fixed Penetration  Percentage of population subscribed ITU 
Unilateral openness Number of operators per segment ITU 
Unilateral regulation Independence score of the regulatory authority multiplied by the 
numbers of years in existence 
ITU 
Multilateral openness GATS commitments score WTO 
Multilateral regulation Reference Paper score WTO 
Quality of telecom services Share of digital lines per segment  ITU 
Income GDP per capita  WDI 
Population density Percentage of population per square kilometer WDI 
Population size  Total number of inhabitants, urban population WDI 
Governance (1) Kaufmann governance indicators: regulatory quality, policy 
stability, corruption control; 
(2) Freedom Political Rights 
(1)WB; 
(2)Freedom 
House 
Other growth determinants  Ratio of secondary schooling, share of exports in GDP, inflation, 
gross fixed capital formation, labour force 
WDI 
 
Table. A1-b. Summary variables (Bi-annual data) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP/capita 145 853.02 1326.88 56.52 7618.54 
GDP/capita growth 145 1.88 7.48 -31.65 89.83 
Penetration 147 3.19 7.97 0.00 68.04 
Investments 142 20.59 11.23 1.80 113.58 
Tertiary education 140 3.11 2.91 0.00 18.54 
Pop growth 140 2.46 1.14 -1.66 10.21 
Life expectancy 143 49.36 8.52 31.69 72.95 
Trade openness 145 76.20 39.71 12.80 275.23 
Inflation 145 44.45 321.17 -24.08 5399.53 
Operator (market structure of 
mobile) 
144 1.91 0.88 1.00 3.00 
Market size 145 -11.73 3.05 -32.24 -5.39 
Governance 140 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.01 
Population 150 1.37E+07 2.03E+07 7.53E+04 1.29E+08 
Telcom regulation quality 142 0.70 0.88 0.00 3.56 
Reference paper 140 0.18 0.55 0.00 2.00 
Liberalization telecom (GATS 
commitments) 
140 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Density 150 72.61 101.22 2.00 608.00 
Mobile price 144 0.60 0.49 0.00 3.15 
Fixed price 148 0.11 0.09 0.01 0.70 
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Table. A1-c: financial liberalization indicators   
countries  Financial services 
trade openness 
Liberalization of credits 
interest rate interest   
Market structure 
(concentration de depot et 
du credit)  
  
 1987 1997 1987 1997 1987 1997 
Angola* 1 15 23 0 23 31 31 
Benin 2 38 77 20 43 65 74 
Botswana 3 54 46 20 65 76 92 
Burkina Faso 4 38 69 20 73 63 78 
Cameroon 5 15 46 40 39 58 59 
Cape Verde 6 38 62 0 47 26 41 
Comores 7 38 62 20 27 55 56 
Central African Rep. 8 31 46 20 23 40 41 
Congo 9 31 62 20 63 15 27 
Cote d'Ivoire 10 54 85 20 68 58 71 
Eritrea* 11 31 54 0 3 38 39 
Ethiopia* 12 15 23 0 7 19 41 
Gabon 13 54 77 20 64 62 77 
Gambia, The 14 62 85 44 69 62 62 
Ghana 15 38 85 20 45 66 79 
Eqatorial Guinée 16 31 62 20 69 47 57 
Guinea 17 31 54 20 63 62 72 
Guinea-Bissau 18 54 92 20 30 62 63 
Kenya 19 77 100 20 77 47 56 
Lesotho 20 23 46 20 52 40 52 
Madagascar 21 54 69 20 61 57 68 
Malawi 22 31 46 20 43 56 62 
Mali 23 31 77 20 68 43 58 
Mauritius 24 92 100 60 86 61 76 
Mozambique 25 38 62 0 63 69 82 
Namibie 26 38 69 20 71 75 88 
Niger 27 54 85 20 67 58 73 
Nigeria 28 23 54 20 40 67 82 
Sao Tome e Principe* 29 38 54 20 40 23 38 
Senegal 30 31 62 20 70 47 62 
South Africa 31 62 62 60 93 93 93 
Swaziland 32 62 77 40 63 62 63 
Tanzania 33 46 85 20 68 49 56 
Togo 34 46 77 20 68 54 70 
Uganda 35 46 92 20 67 59 71 
Zambia 36 62 85 20 67 67 68 
Zimbabwe 37 23 62 20 57 69 73 
Source : Gelbard et al. (1999 
Note:* indicates the countries which are not included in our regressions 
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Table A2.  Descriptive statistics related to telecommunications regressions 
  
GDP 
 growth Popgrowth Invest 
Fixed 
 price 
Mobile 
 price openness 
Live  
expectancy 
Tertiary 
 education Gats 
 
Reference 
paper 
Nber inter 
 operators 
Nber mobile 
operators 
Number fixed 
operator 
Penetration 
mobile 
Penetration 
Of fixed GDP M3 
  
  
                 
   
 
GDP growth 1                      
Pop-growth -0.0034 1                    
Investment 0.1097 0.0018 1                  
Fixed price -0.0471 0.0262 0.4640* 1                
Mobile price -0.1862* 0.1750* 0.4884* 0.9013* 1              
openness 0.3309* -0.1982* 0.1392* 0.1217 0.0486 1            
Digital mobile penetration  0.0171 -0.1762* 0.055 -0.069 -0.0691 -0.0754            
Live expectancy 0.0379 0.0005 0.0238 0.1008 0.0167 0.2513* 1           
Tertiary education -0.0201 -0.5401* 0.2457* -0.1036 -0.136 0.4943* 0.4246* 1          
Gats comittments -0.1483* -0.1385* 0.1750* 0.1323* 0.2172* 0.1343* -0.059 0.0613 1         
 
 Reference paper -0.0256 -0.083 0.0492 -0.1109 -0.0695 -0.0618 0.1026 0.1299 0.5546* 1        
Nber international oper -0.1994* 0.0124 -0.0808 -0.0597 -0.1296 0.0313 -0.0659 0.1196 0.093 0.0026 1       
Nber mobile oper -0.1568* -0.1358* -0.0017 -0.1308* 0.0216 -0.1455* -0.1495* 0.0688 0.1561* 0.1113 0.4022* 1      
Nber fixed oper -0.1656* -0.0109 -0.0884 -0.0847 -0.1291 -0.0538 -0.0585 0.0761 0.1342* -0.0088 0.7519* 0.2767* 1     
Penetration mobile -0.0336 -0.3802* -0.0763 -0.0976 -0.1205 0.2893* 0.2740* 0.8278* 0.0033 0.1011 0.1599* 0.1475* 0.1223* 1    
Penetration fixe 0.021 -0.3612* -0.0346 -0.0875 -0.1099 0.3899* 0.6657* 0.8536* -0.0798 0.0437 -0.0391 -0.0111 -0.0595 0.6940* 1   
GDP 0.2841* -0.016 0.2842* 0.8529* 0.8197* 0.3485* -0.0302 -0.0198 -0.0272 -0.0706 -0.0957 -0.0986 -0.1081 0.0384 -0.025 1  
lnM3 -0.1240* -0.2417* -0.0934 0.1139 0.1045 0.3402* 0.5458* 0.6044* 0.0731 0.0153 -0.0787 -0.0437 -0.1197* 0.4778* 0.7371* -0.0829 1 
Population -0.0514 -0.0168 0.1610* -0.1868* 0.0091 -0.2611* -0.2001* -0.1029 0.2631* 0.1353* 0.1541* 0.1240* 0.2894* -0.0807 -0.1735* -0.1377* -0.1069 
popurbaine1 -0.0151 -0.1838* 0.0987 0.2666* 0.2977* 0.2532* 0.3562* 0.3646* 0.3556* 0.2112* 0.0065 0.1567* 0.0214 0.3091* 0.2826* 0.1928* 0.2089* 
Policy stability 0.2010* -0.2045* -0.1498* -0.0541 -0.1860* 0.2882* 0.3763* 0.4653* -0.1290* 0.0232 -0.3215* -0.0666 -0.4618* 0.3115* 0.4395* 0.0504 0.4018* 
Nation Quality regulation  0.018 -0.2683* -0.1697* -0.1351* -0.1139 0.1712* 0.4027* 0.5837* -0.018 0.2026* -0.3279* -0.0407 -0.3998* 0.3455* 0.5567* -0.1404* 0.4924* 
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Table A3. Mobile penetration and number of operator 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 RE FE FE-H FE-H 
 Penetration Penetration Penetration Penetration 
Density 0.150 9.452 9.452 8.074 
 (1.63) (3.66)*** (4.98)*** (4.41)*** 
Number operator 
(competition) 
0.593 0.574 0.574 0.465 
 (3.23)*** (2.84)*** (2.84)*** (2.54)** 
Lag GDP/capita 1.255 -0.806 -0.806 -0.448 
 (10.82)*** (0.65) (0.61) (0.33) 
Lag Mobile price 0.156 0.180 0.180  
 (1.37) (1.26) (1.14)  
Lag fixed price -0.200 -0.140 -0.140 0.010 
 (1.86)* (0.96) (1.01) (0.12) 
Time 0.581 0.448 0.448 0.452 
 (17.24)*** (7.05)*** (9.03)*** (10.12)*** 
Constant -1,170.759 -927.019 -927.019 -931.012 
 (17.44)*** (7.86)*** (9.94)*** (11.23)*** 
Observations 125 125 125 137 
Number of group 30 30   
R-squared  0.89 0.95 0.95 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses     
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
RE:Random effect; FE:Fixed effects; FE-H: Fixed effects corrected from 
heteroskedasticity 
    
Table A4. Growth and telecom performances 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 RE FE FE-H FE FE-H 
 GDP/capita GDP/capita GDP/capita GDP/capita GDP/capita 
Penetration 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
 (2.72)*** (3.46)*** (3.61)*** (3.46)*** (3.61)*** 
Competition (number 
operators) 
-0.004 -0.004 -0.004   
 (0.16) (0.22) (0.23)   
Investments 0.019 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
 (0.50) (0.34) (0.23) (0.34) (0.23) 
Lag pop growth -0.063 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 
 (1.60) (0.87) (0.94) (0.87) (0.94) 
Life expectancy 0.218 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 
 (1.05) (0.14) (0.21) (0.14) (0.21) 
Trade openness 0.165 0.152 0.152 0.152 0.152 
 (4.00)*** (4.76)*** (5.04)*** (4.76)*** (5.04)*** 
Inflation 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.47) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) 
Tertiary education 0.088 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 
 (2.35)** (1.79)* (1.77)* (1.79)* (1.77)* 
Lag of GDP/capita 1.05 1.15 1.16 1.15 1.15 
 (6.00)*** (5.76)*** (6.04)*** (5.76)*** (6.04)*** 
Constant 4.405 5.301 5.301 5.301 5.301 
 (5.69)*** (8.69)*** (12.54)*** (8.69)*** (12.54)*** 
Observations 116 116 116 116 116 
Number of group 30 30  30  
R-squared  0.46 1.00 0.46 1.00 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses      
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Table A5. GMM growth regression on penetration 
 
GDP/capita 
Lag  GDP/capita 1.013 
 (22.83)*** 
Mobile Penetration  0.008 
 (1.83)* 
Population growth 0.015 
 (0.62) 
Investments 0.041 
 (1.27) 
Life expectancy 0.102 
 (0.63) 
Inflation -0.013 
 (1.81)* 
Telcom market structure -0.035 
 (1.05) 
Governance 4.601 
 (1.02) 
Trade oponness 0.028 
 (0.62) 
Tertiary education -0.049 
 (1.38) 
Constant -0.577 
 (0.81) 
Observations 136 
Number of group 30 
Robust t statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table A6.  Robustness of liberalization effect (3SLS regressions) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Africa World Developing countries World 
     
(i) Operator Operator Operator Operator 
Penetration 0.298 0.102 0.108 0.134 
 (4.74)*** (3.18)*** (3.78)*** (4.81)*** 
Telecom regulation 0.011 0.043 0.056 0.072 
 (0.17) (1.50) (1.82)* (2.24)** 
Market size 0.014 0.017 0.020 0.007 
 (0.80) (1.72)* (1.89)* (0.64) 
Population -5.932 -1.001 -1.421 -2.204 
 (3.42)*** (1.38) (2.08)** (3.15)*** 
Telecom openness (gats commitments) -0.042 -0.042 -0.042 -0.038 
 (0.67)* (0.74) (5.51) (0.15) 
Constant 0.014 -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.45) (0.45) (0.43) (0.23) 
(ii) 
    
 Penetration Penetration Penetration Penetration 
GDP/caita 4.658 0.687 0.234 3.795 
 (1.43) (0.43) (0.15) (2.46)** 
Africa   -0.018 -0.013 
   (0.27) (0.20) 
Density 10.025 2.337 2.851 4.864 
 (5.19)*** (2.73)*** (3.11)*** (4.33)*** 
Fixed price -0.190 0.042 0.030 0.063 
 (1.69)* (0.81) (0.55) (1.14) 
Mobile price 0.102 -0.102 -0.108 -0.123 
 (1.02) (1.91)* (1.94)* (2.21)** 
Competition (number operators) 1.576 1.741 0.562 0.262 
 (7.95)*** (9.42)*** (0.91) (0.37) 
Time 0.297 0.389 0.391 0.341 
 (6.05)*** (10.24)*** (9.97)*** (8.17)*** 
Competition*Africa   0.972 1.163 
   (1.60)* (1.69)* 
Competition*initialGDP 0.102 0.211   
 (0.30) (0.55)   
Constant -594.244 -776.998 -781.579 -682.295 
 (6.05)*** (10.23)*** (9.97)*** (8.17)*** 
 
    
(iii) GDP/capita GDP/capita GDP/capita GDP/capita 
Penetration 0.014 0.033 0.042 0.034 
 (3.66)*** (10.68)*** (10.56)*** (7.69)*** 
Investment 0.041 0.018 0.026 0.019 
 (1.82)* (0.80) (1.22) (0.86) 
Pop growth -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.027 
 (0.22) (0.87) (0.57) (2.11)** 
Trade openness 0.048 0.082 0.071 0.039 
 (1.89)* (2.82)*** (2.51)** (1.32) 
Life expectancy -0.036 0.131 0.019 0.114 
 (0.42) (0.99) (0.13) (0.81) 
Inflation 0.007 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (1.60) (0.17) (0.20) (0.23) 
Tertiary education 0.047    
 (2.67)***    
Institution 2.260 1.970 2.289 3.104 
 (1.90)* (1.80)* (2.16)** (2.68)*** 
(Initial GDP)*penetration 0.012 -0.010   
 (1.42) (0.75)   
Initial GDP -0.030 -0.054   
 (1.94)* (2.46)**   
Africa*penetration   -0.026 -0.013 
   (4.64)*** (2.13)** 
Africa   -0.002 -0.006 
   (0.27) (0.78) 
Constant 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.001 
 (0.58) (1.07) (0.35) (0.18) 
R square 0.30-0.10-0.84 0.36-0.10-0.71 0.40-0.10-0.78 0.37-0.10-0.82 
Observations 94 271 151 182 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (i) indicates the bloc of variables included in competition 
equation; (ii) Indicates the bloc of variables included in performance equation; (iii) indicates the bloc of variables included in 
growth equation. 
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Table A7.  Partial correlation on financial sector regressions sample 
  
GDP/ca
pita 
Financial Market 
struct 
Finance 
Liberalization 
Finance 
Regulation crise 
Zone 
Franc 
cfa 
Spread 
Credit to 
private 
sector 
Live 
expectancy 
Population 
growth 
Populat
ion 
Tertiary 
education 
Trade 
openness 
Inflati
on 
Market 
size 
  
    
                          
GDP/capita 1                             
Fin Market 
struct 0.2142* 1                           
Fin 
Liberalization 0.1684* 0.5022* 1                         
Fin 
Regulation 0.3321* 0.4430* 0.6086* 1                       
Crise -0.215* -0.0834* 0.0503 0.1279* 1                     
Zcfa 0.0394 -0.0710* -0.0033 0.0672* 0.0518 1                   
Spread -0.208* -0.0392 0.2478* 0.2012* 0.166* 0.099* 1                 
Credit to 
private 0.3645* 0.0889* 0.0401 0.0796* -0.190* 0.028 -0.351* 1               
Live 
expectancye 0.5525* 0.0302 0.2259* 0.1454* -0.106* -0.104* -0.168* 0.2535* 1             
Population 
growth -0.091* -0.0254 -0.0752* -0.0675* -0.0458 0.125* 0.0122 -0.1289* -0.0552 1           
Population -0.256* 0.1233* -0.1446* 0.0014 0.137* -0.184* -0.121* -0.0334 -0.1045* 0.0006 1         
Terciary 
education 0.6426* 0.2430* 0.2075* 0.3803* -0.0185 0.059 -0.105* 0.4005* 0.3881* -0.0942* 0.070* 1       
Trade 
openness 0.5311* -0.0790* 0.1759* 0.1986* -0.114* -0.0397 0.057 0.2737* 0.3770* -0.0713* -0.285* 0.3811* 1     
inflation -0.272* -0.0034 -0.1180* -0.0724* 0.146* -0.373* 0.245* -0.3478* -0.1833* 0.043 0.196* -0.1842* -0.1238* 1   
Market size 0.1988* 0.3252* -0.0547 0.1847* 0.0372 0.0326 -0.161* 0.1534* -0.0329 0.0292 0.594* 0.4090* -0.2688* 0.1469* 1 
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Table A8. Financial performances and market structure: OLS estimation 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 spread Credit spread credit credit spread 
GDP/capita -0.094 0.302 -0.128 0.287 0.162 -0.142 
 (1.32) (2.80)*** (1.83)* (2.45)** (0.88) (1.66) 
Competition 0.092 0.115 -0.060 0.044 -0.082 -0.067 
 (0.33) (0.46) (0.24) (0.18) (0.28) (0.34) 
Financial openness   0.371 0.169   
   (1.45) (0.62)   
Interest rate 
instability 
0.142  0.155   0.069 
 (2.10)**  (2.22)**   (2.14)** 
Zone CFA 3.986 5.995 2.708 5.414 6.024 5.656 
 (1.15) (1.21) (0.83) (1.06) (1.34) (1.41) 
Financial Crise     -0.433 0.064 
     (1.39) (0.31) 
Time 0.601 -0.021 0.475 -0.083 -0.049 0.526 
 (3.59)*** (0.09) (2.29)** (0.31) (0.19) (3.54)*** 
Sadc 1.408 1.004 1.660 0.996 3.678 1.859 
 (0.88) (0.34) (0.87) (0.34) (1.41) (1.08) 
Eca -0.560 -4.290 -2.518 -4.969 -8.759 -3.271 
 (0.24) (0.69) (0.82) (0.82) (1.18) (1.08) 
Sacu -1.886 3.375 -0.263 4.081 6.270 4.266 
 (0.62) (0.53) (0.07) (0.64) (0.79) (1.43) 
Cedeao 0.461 -2.417 0.959 -2.250 -4.489 -4.876 
 (0.10) (0.38) (0.24) (0.35) (0.80) (1.06) 
Cemac -3.137 -3.975 -2.302 -3.594 -2.816 -3.465 
 (1.98)* (1.60) (0.99) (1.28) (1.26) (1.97)* 
Constant 0.875 0.350 0.416 0.163 2.111 2.124 
 (0.68) (0.30) (0.31) (0.13) (1.04) (1.74)* 
Observations 63 69 63 69 49 44 
R-squared 0.38 0.28 0.43 0.28 0.32 0.47 
Robust t statistics in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A9. Growth and finance performances: OLS estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 GDP/capita GDP/capita GDP/capita GDP/capita 
Credit to private  0.058 0.390  
  (2.49)** (2.14)**  
Spread -0.299  -0.359  
 (2.01)*  (1.60)  
Financial openness   0.007  
   (0.03)  
competition    0.317 
    (1.11) 
State intervention   0.291  
   (0.95)  
Lag of GDP/capita 0.342 0.320 0.404 0.236 
 (2.57)** (2.34)** (2.02)* (1.55) 
Life expectancy 1.499 0.885 3.052 2.249 
 (2.33)** (1.44) (2.87)*** (2.38)** 
Pop growth -17.228 -23.199 -20.541 -21.500 
 (1.62) (1.79)* (1.39) (2.07)** 
Tertiary education 0.217 0.206 0.320 0.338 
 (2.12)** (2.36)** (2.38)** (2.62)** 
Trade openness 0.218 0.423 -0.037 0.087 
 (0.93) (2.04)** (0.10) (0.30) 
Inflation 0.105 -0.074 0.160 0.062 
 (1.36) (0.87) (1.32) (0.64) 
institution -0.003 0.031 0.384 0.416 
 (0.01) (0.15) (1.22) (1.44) 
Market size 0.058 0.104 -0.373 -0.394 
 (0.22) (0.44) (1.04) (1.13) 
Zone CFA 3.457 2.492 12.188 3.553 
 (0.96) (0.70) (2.58)** (0.87) 
time -0.110 -0.381 -0.194 -0.364 
 (0.47) (2.03)** (0.56) (1.65) 
SADC -2.748 -2.644 -3.086 -3.151 
 (1.26) (1.46) (1.42) (1.34) 
ECA 7.306 7.540 8.935 5.879 
 (0.79) (0.89) (0.94) (0.70) 
SACU -2.293 -2.826 -2.990 1.188 
 (0.24) (0.30) (0.31) (0.13) 
ECOWAS -5.383 -4.615 -13.144 -9.745 
 (1.27) (1.05) (3.74)*** (1.70)* 
CEMAC -0.129 0.114 -1.707 2.453 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.45) (1.05) 
Constant -1.472 0.354 -17.927 -14.972 
 (0.24) (0.07) (1.85)* (1.83)* 
Observations 61 67 50 53 
R-squared 0.80 0.79 0.88 0.81 
Robust t statistics in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A10.  Linearity in finance:3SLS estimation 
 (1) (2) 
 3SLS 3SLS 
(i)   
 structure Structure 
Credit to private 0.015  
 (0.21)  
Spread  -0.046 
  (0.52) 
Financial openness 0.294 0.259 
 (2.02)** (1.80)* 
Openness*initialGDP 0.004 0.006 
 (0.36) (0.67) 
Market size 0.080 0.068 
 (1.81)* (1.65)* 
Time 0.092 0.133 
 (0.85) (1.05) 
Sadc 1.573 1.569 
 (1.13) (1.13) 
Eca -3.004 -2.578 
 (1.09) (0.95) 
Sacu 1.709 1.072 
 (0.55) (0.34) 
Cedeao 1.929 1.999 
 (0.68) (0.74) 
Cemac -3.905 -4.303 
 (1.90)* (2.06)** 
Zone CFA 1.634 2.177 
 (0.64) (0.87) 
Constant 2.987 3.073 
 (6.70)*** (8.17)*** 
(ii)   
 Credit to 
private 
sector 
Spread 
GDP/capita 0.821 -0.438 
 (4.25)*** (2.90)*** 
Instability of interest -0.380 0.230 
 (3.98)*** (2.98)*** 
Competition 0.218 -0.300 
 (0.69) (1.16) 
Competition*initialGDP -0.058 0.063 
 (1.72)* (2.40)** 
Time 0.216 0.676 
 (1.00) (4.04)*** 
Sadc -2.756 2.043 
 (0.99) (0.94) 
Eca -2.040 4.272 
 (0.37) (0.99) 
Sacu 4.369 -7.175 
 (0.75) (1.59) 
Cedeao 0.005 -4.841 
 (0.00) (1.18) 
Cemac -4.685 -4.103 
 (1.14) (1.28) 
Zone franc CFA 4.466 10.131 
 (0.98) (2.85)*** 
Constant -1.457 2.726 
 (0.94) (2.16)** 
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 continued (Table A.10) 
 (1) (2) 
 3SLS 3SLS 
(iii) GDP/capita GDP/capita 
Credit to private 1.443  
 (1.64)*  
Spread  -1.877 
  (5.11)*** 
Spread*initialGDP  0.207 
  (3.75)*** 
Credit*initialGDP -0.168  
 (1.60)  
Initial 0.638 0.075 
 (1.96)** (0.89) 
Life expectancy 1.546 1.938 
 (1.55) (2.28)** 
Pop growth -20.543 -8.631 
 (1.57) (0.84) 
Trade openness -0.104 0.015 
 (0.44) (0.08) 
Tertiary education 0.394 0.265 
 (2.52)** (2.45)** 
Inflation 0.188 0.269 
 (1.42) (2.72)*** 
Institution 0.058 -0.026 
 (0.72) (0.39) 
Time -0.331 0.299 
 (1.60) (1.20) 
Sadc -0.311 -0.095 
 (0.12) (0.04) 
Eca 6.332 7.385 
 (1.16) (1.87)* 
Sacu -3.006 -6.349 
 (0.48) (1.39) 
Cedeao -10.200 -10.231 
 (1.76)* (2.31)** 
Cemac 2.445 -0.940 
 (0.64) (0.32) 
Zone Franc CFA 4.994 10.573 
 (0.91) (2.80)*** 
Constant -5.096 -1.287 
 (1.04) (0.33) 
Observations 50 50 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (i) indicates the bloc of variables included in competition 
equation; (ii) Indicates the bloc of variables included in performance equation; (iii) indicates the bloc of variables included 
in growth equation.  
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Table A11. Literature survey 
I. Telecommunications effects 
  Telecommunication  performances 
author 
y
e
a
r countries 
pe
rio
d 
main 
dependent 
variables main independent variables 
metho
d of 
analysi
s results 
 Olivier 
Boylau
d and 
Nicolett
i 
 
2
0
0
0  
 
 23 
OECD 
 19
91-
97 
 performance 
(productivity, 
quality and 
price) 
 regulation, market structure and 
country specificities in economic 
structure (proxied by the share of new 
entrants or by the number of 
competitors) 
 Panel 
estimat
ion 
techniq
ues 
 competition generally brings about productivity and quality improvements and reduces the 
price of all the telecommunications segments including the fixed telephony, the mobile 
telephony and international 
The prospect of competition (as proxied by the number of years remaining before 
liberalization) generally has a strong positive effect on the productivity and the quality of 
services and a strong negative effect on prices 
Fink, 
Mattoo 
and 
Rathind
ran  
2
0
0
3 
86 
developin
g 
countries  
19
85 
to 
19
99 
performance 
(mainline 
penetration 
level of 
productivity) 
combinations and sequences of 
introducing competition  and 
privatization; 
 
Panel 
estimat
ion 
techniq
ues 
comprehensive program of reforms, integrating as well the competition component as the 
participation (private Vs state) component, and framed by an independent body of regulation, 
led to an increase of 8% of the number of telephone lines and to a rise of 21% of the level of 
productivity compared to the years when the reform was only partial or non-existent 
They also found that the sequence of reform matters: mainline penetration is lower if 
competition is introduced after privatization, rather than at the same time 
Wallste
n  
1
9
9
9 
30 pays 
africains 
et latino-
américain
s  
19
84-
19
97 
sur plusieurs 
indicateurs de 
performance 
la privatisation, de la concurrence et 
de la réglementation  panel 
positive relationship between increased competition and sectoral performance (as measured by 
price reductions to consumers, phone line penetration or labor productivity).  
l’impact de la privatisation est mitigé  
 
Sékou 
Falil 
Doumb
ouya 
 
2
0
0
4 
39 Sub 
Saharan 
Africa 
19
85 
to 
19
99 
sectoral 
performances 
alternatives reforms : privatization and 
the instauration of competition 
(increasing number operators) 
Panel 
estimat
ion 
techniq
ues 
Reforms aiming to transform historical operator in shareholders enterprises as well as those of 
privatizations are associated to a significant higher penetration of mainline. However, the 
instauration of competition in mobile segment lead to positive effect but which is non 
significant. 
More notable, the competition in fixed segment is associated with lower penetration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  127
Continued (Table A11) 
 Telecommunications and income growth 
author 
y
e
a
r countries period 
main 
dependent 
variables 
main independent 
variables 
method of 
analysis results 
Hardy  
1
9
8
0 
 15 developed and 
45 developing 
nations 
1960 to 
1973,  
 
 GDP per 
capita 
on lagged GDP per 
capita, sectoral 
performances ( 
lagged telephones 
per capita, and the 
number of (lagged) 
radios) 
 
using cross-
section data 
telephones per capita had a significant impact on GDP, while the spread of 
radios did not 
Norton  
1
9
9
2 
47 developed  and 
developing 
countries  1957-1977 
income 
output 
sectoral performances 
(penetration) 
cross-section data 
analysis 
the Telecommunications penetration lowed transaction cost and increase 
income output, this by improving the capital market efficiency and the 
investments 
Waverman, 
Meschi and 
Fuss  
2
0
0
5 
low and middle-
income countries  
economic 
growth mobile telephony 3SLS estimator 
mobile telephony has a positive and significant impact on economic growth, 
which is twice as large in developing countries when compared to that in 
developed countries 
Anusua Datta 
and Sumit 
Agarwal  
2
0
0
4 
22 OECD 
countries  
between 
1980 and 
1992 growth Penetration panel found the evidence of strong contribution of penetration to growth 
Madden and 
Savage  
1
9
9
8 
27 CEE 
transitional 
economies 
1990 -
1995 
income 
growth 
Penetration fixed 
telephone 
 Kormedi and 
Meguire (1985) 
using OLS 
evidence of a two-way causation between telecom investment and economic 
growth. 
Mattoo, 
Rathindran et 
Subramanian  
2
0
0
6 
60 countries 
Including 37 
developing  
countries 
 1990-1999 
income 
growth 
liberalization of 
telecommunications 
services 
cross-section data 
analysis 
They find evidence for significant influence of telecommunications service 
trade openness on long run growth performance 
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continued(Table A11) 
 Reverse causality analysis 
author 
ye
ar countries 
perio
d main dependent variables main independent variables 
met
hod 
of 
anal
ysis results 
Röller and Waverman  
20
01 on OECD countries  
simultantely 
telecommunications 
performances and growth 
simultanitely 
telecommunications 
performances and growth 
3SL
S 
esti
mat
or 
a strong two-way relationship between 
telecommunications infrastructure and 
productivity 
Sridhar and Sridhar  
20
04 
Developing countries sample 
(including those of Africa). 
 
1990
-
2001 
simultaneitely 
telecommunications 
performances and growth 
simultaneity 
telecommunications 
performances and growth 
3SL
S 
esti
mat
or 
a strong two-way relationship between 
telecommunications infrastructure and 
productivity 
Farid  Gasmi, paul 
Noumba and laura recuero 
Virto 
20
07 
29 developing countries and 
23 developed countries 
1985
-
1999 
Performance regulation (proxy 
by penetration) 
Regulatory governance 
(political accountability) 
GM
M 
Evidence of a relative weak effect of polical 
accountability on the performance of 
regulation in developed countries and a much 
more clear-cutting effect in the case of 
developing countries: higher political 
accountability yields higher regulatory 
performance 
Source: Author construction 
  129
Continued (Table A11) 
II. Financial sector 
 
 Impact on efficiency: Net interest margin (NIM) 
author 
y
e
a
r countries 
perio
d 
main dependent 
variables main independent variables method of analysis results 
Saunders 
and 
Schumach
er  
1
9
9
7
banks information 
for six selected 
European 
countries and 
United state  
from 
1988 
to 
1995 
the net interest 
margin (NIM) of 
banks, and  
pure spread market structure (concentration) 
step estimation model of Ho and 
Saunders (1981) accounting for the 
banks specific effects 
They found that market structure and interest 
rate volatility were very significant 
determinant of spread rate, and therefore of 
NIM 
Kalirajan, 
McGuire, 
Nguyen-
Hong & 
Schuele  
2
0
0
0
27 economies 
(developped ans 
emerging 
countries) 
from 
1988 
to 
1995 
the net interest 
margin (NIM) of 
banks 
and  
pure spread 
non-prudantial restrictions on trade 
in banking services : services trade 
restrictions, including domestic and 
international components 
step estimation model of Ho and 
Saunders (1981) accounting for the 
banks specific effects 
The foreign trade restriction emerge as a 
significant determinant of spread and 
therefore of the NIM 
Claessens, 
Demirgüç-
Kunt and 
Huizinga  
2
0
0
1
bank-level data for 
80 countries  
1988-
95 
Banks 
performances ( 
profitability and 
overhead 
expenses) 
openness (the foreign share of bank 
ownership) 
weighted least squares, with the weights 
being the inverse of the number of 
domestic banks in a country in a given 
year (include country and time-specific 
fixed effects) 
increasing the foreign share  
of bank ownership makes domestic 
 banks more competitive and more  
efficient reducing their profitability  
and overhead expenses 
Barth et 
al.  
2
0
0
1
60 countries ( 24 
OECD 14 Latin 
American, 12 
from SSA, and 12 
from Asia,) 
1970-
1999 
(b) securities 
development (a) 
bank development 
(c) industrialc 
ompetition 
1.bank regulatory restrictions  
2. mixing banking and commerce 
and  
3. state ownership of banks  
simple correlations, and probit 
regressions  
 
There is no reliable statistical relationship 
 between and a) how well-developed the 
banking sector is,  
b) how well-developed securities markets and 
nonbank financial intermediaries are, or c) the 
degree of industrial competition. 
 Impact on financial depth: Credit to private sector 
Clarke, 
Cull & 
Peria  
2
0
0
1 
4,000 enterprises in 
38 developing 
(including six 
African) 
late 
199
0s 
Access to credit (average 
share of investment 
financed through bank 
lending) 
foreign bank presence and of 
financial competition 
(decreasing of concentration). 
standard 
maximum 
likelihood 
estimation 
foreign penetration in the banking sector raises the average share of 
investment financed through bank lending. In addition, the concentration 
tends to make access to such financing more difficult 
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continued(Table A11) 
  
 Financial sector and income Growth  
 
author 
y
e
a
r countries period 
main 
dependent 
variables main independent variables 
method of 
analysis results 
Goldsmit
h  
1
9
6
9 
35, all 
groups 
 
1860-
1963 
 
real GNP p.c. 
 
Financial Development 
FIR (˜domestic credit/GNP) 
 Cross-country 
rough correlation between 
financial development and 
growth 
 
E. 
Gelbard, 
S. 
Pereira  
1
9
9
9 
38 African 
countries  
 1987-
97  Growth 
composite financial 
development variable 
including various financial 
policy aspects Cross-country 
positive impact of financial sector on growth  
the best contributor to the growth emerge to be the level of financial 
liberalization, the institutional change and the financial products varieties 
Mattoo, 
Rathindr
an et 
Subrama
nian 
2
0
0
6 
60 countries 
Including 37 
developing  
countries 
 
1990-
1999 
income 
growth 
the financial sector openness 
(based on the commitments 
of individual countries under 
the GATS and capital 
controls index of Dalaimi) Cross-country the financial sector openness   influences long run growth performance 
Demirgu
c-Kunt, 
Levine, 
and Min  
1
9
9
8 80 countries  
1988 - 
1995 
economic 
growth foreign banks 
weighted least 
squares 
cannot find any direct link between foreign banks and long-run economic 
growth. 
Francois 
and 
Eschenba
ch  
2
0
0
2 
130 (including 
many developing 
and transition 
countries) 
1990-
1999 growth GDP  
Banking concentration/ the 
net interest margin (NIM) of 
banks 
 
cross-country 
data base of 
3SLS 
(1) Services trade liberalization contributes to decrease the concentration of 
market structure, (2) which will reduce the market power and then contributes to 
the sectoral performances, (3) which in turn participate to a higher economic 
growth. 
Bayrakta
r and 
Wang  
2
0
0
6 
28 developing and 
developed 
countries (none of 
which is Africa)  
1994-
2003 
growth rate 
of GDP per 
capita asset share of foreign banks 
GMM technique 
in dynamic panel 
 The asset share of foreign banks has a significant positive effect on the growth 
rate of GDP per capita. The first stage results show that a higher share of foreign 
banks lowers overhead costs and net interest margins of domestic banks, 
indicating higher efficiency. In the second stage, they show that a higher 
efficiency increases economic growth.  
Source: Author construction 
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CHAPTER IV: IMPACT OF THE LIBERALISATION OF TRADE IN 
SERVICES ON POVERTY IN AFRICA: CASE OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES IN CAMEROON 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last 80’s, Cameroonian government has undertaken a set of reforms in the services 
sector, leading notably to the privatization and openness to competition of important services, 
such as telecommunications, electricity, transportations and finances. The last majors acts of 
this long process have been the submission in 2005 of a pre-commitment list of multilateral 
liberalization in the framework of GATS (General Agreements on trade in services) at WTO 
and the publication in 2006 of the privatization offers of the last two important publics 
companies, in transportation sector (Cameroon air lines: CAMAIR) and telecommunications 
sector (Cameroon Telecommunications CAMTEL).  
 
Among sectors involved in liberalization process, telecommunications which has been 
partially liberalized with the entry of two private operators in mobile segment (between 1999 
and 2001) is undeniably the sector showing the most spectacular transformation, notably with 
the increase of services varieties, the decrease of prices (Djiofack and Keck. 2006) and the 
amelioration of penetration; the number of telephone subscribers increasing from 200 000 in 
2001 to 2 million in 2004, and 3 million in 2008. 
 
If reforms aimed at boosting activity in particularly inefficient and dramatically unbalanced 
sectors, they were also a means to alleviate commitments of the State (facing an unsustainable 
debt burden) and are nowadays an entire part of global policy to reduce poverty. In fact, from 
the statute of an Intermediary income country in 1985, Cameroon is since 2000 ranked among 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), with an external debt over 240% of exports in 2000 
and the poverty incidence over 41% in 2001 (ECAM II report, 2001).  
 
In a crucial moment where Cameroonian government is about to attribute a private license in 
fixed telephony segment and a third license in the mobile segment, the aim of this work is to 
assess, the impact of telecommunications liberalization on poverty using a combined macro-
micro simulation model. 
 
The telecommunications services trade liberalization can affect households, either directly 
through prices or employments, or indirectly via economic growth (Dollar and Kraay, 2001). 
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Even if the direct effect is not very intuitive since telecommunication is traditionally an urban 
activity in Africa, it seems however, potentially important due to the recent transformations 
which set the telecommunications as a mass consumption product. The indirect effect is more 
obvious because of the crucial role that telecommunications services play in the 
competitiveness and productivity of the economy (as a whole), as an important input in 
production activities and as an exchange facilitators (Konan et al, 2002).  
 
Number of recent studies evidences the positive effect of services trade liberalization on 
household welfare (see Warren, 2000; Verikios et al, 2002; Hertel et al, 1999). However, only 
the study of Rutherford et al (2005) on Russia assessed the impact of services liberalization on 
poverty. The main innovation of their model is that they account for the foreign direct 
investment in business services and consider additional varieties of business services that 
endogenously increase the productivity of sectors using that service through the Dixit-Stiglitz 
variety effect. 
 
This chapter follows the framework set in Rutherford et al (2005) and Konan et al (2006), by 
considering the imperfect competition in services sectors and modeling the productivity gain. 
However, three contributions have to be underlined:  
 
First, instead of modeling productivity gain through the only variety effects, we model the 
overall productivity gains occurring from trade in services. This is done by introducing the 
level of penetration, as input of global productivity of factors (GPF). The penetration is based 
itself on the level of liberalization (number of operator). The two elasticities characterizing 
these relationships have been estimated in the chapter 2, using a model of simultaneous 
equations, estimating on the one hand, the effects of penetration on growth and on the other 
hand, the effects of liberalization on the penetration. Our approach allows capturing other 
sources of productivity gains than variety effects, which can be substantial in the case of trade 
in services79.  
 
Second, instead of modeling the market power (markup) through the Lener equilibrium (profit 
maximization), we adopt the Eastman-Stykolt (1960) approach (see Warren (2000) and 
Konan et al (2002)). In fact the former approach, developed in Rutherford et al (2005) 
                                                 
79
 These include notably the gain of rationalization, where trade shift production to more efficient firms within an 
industry and the technical progress that may induce firms to move down their average cost curves. 
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assumes a market structure characterized by the Chamberlain "monopolistic competition" 
before and after liberalization. Such approach relies on the assumption of free entry and exit 
of firms, which seem particularly inappropriate for telecommunications services, where 
liberalization always consisted either of the transformation of public capital into private 
capital, or of the introduction of competition by allowing limited licenses (Konan et al, 2006). 
The Eastman-Stykolt approach consists for producer, to impose a surplus (representing the 
markup rate) over the average cost. The markup has been estimated in an econometric model, 
allowing to determine the market power and its elasticity with respect to the service 
liberalization indicator (number of operators).  
 
Third, contrary to the studies discussed above, we follow Verikios et al (2002) in assuming 
the non substitutability of domestic and imported services, for finances and 
telecommunications sectors. In fact, the domestic suppliers of these services do not directly 
compete with Foreign Service suppliers in cross-border trade. The cross-border 
telecommunication services, for instance, cannot be directly consumed by domestic users. 
They rather, constitute complementary services to domestic telecommunication operators to 
provide international telephone calls, which is the service that final users actually purchase. 
 
Our results show that the liberalization is successful in reducing poverty. The attribution of a 
supplementary license in the mobile segment of telecommunications would lead to a decrease 
of poverty incidence by 2% on average. It appears, as in Rutherford et al (2005) and Konan et 
al (2006), that the main gain procured by services liberalization are generated by productivity 
effects, even if the markup effect remain positive.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows: the next section presents the place of telecommunication 
and the development of its trade policy in Cameroon. Section III proceeds to review of 
literature analyzing the poverty effects of liberalization of trade in services. Section IV 
presents the empirical model to analyze the effects of liberalization of trade in services. The 
model consists in two steps: first, we use the Cameroonian SAM (social accounting matrix) 
for 2001 to simulate in a Computable general equilibrium model (CGE) the impact of policy 
changes on macroeconomic indicators. The second step, relying on the database of 
households income survey for Cameroon in 2001 (ECAMII), use the output of CGE model to 
estimate the impact of policy changes at individual level. This step follows the accounting 
macro-micro simulation approach developed in Chen and Ravallion (2003). Section V 
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proceeds to the calibration of the model while, section VI presents the simulations scenarios 
and results. The last section provides the conclusions and main recommendations of the study. 
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2 Telecommunications activities and policies in Cameroon 
 
Like in most of African countries, Cameroonian telecommunications sector has benefited 
from a spectacular development since the year 2000. The contribution of telecommunications 
to the added value has grown from 2% in 2001 to 3.5% in 2006. In its 2003 economic report, 
the BEAC (central bank of Cameroon) attributed more than 2% of Cameroonian growth in 
2003 to the development of telecommunications services. The services of mobile telephony 
were the most dynamic (see BEAC, 2003). In fact, the number of subscribers to mobile 
telephony has been multiplied by 20 in just seven years, moving from 200000 in 2000 to 2 
million in 2004 and 3 million in 2008. This represents a change in mobile penetration rate 
from less than 1% of population in year 2000, to 15% in 2004 (see figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Evolution of penetration in Cameroon  
 
Source: author construction 
 
The development of Internet services has also been substantial, despite the constraints related 
to access to computers and the mediocrity of the fixed telephone network. While the first 
Internet connection in the country is very recent (since 1997), there were more than 1 million 
Internet users in 2006, including 10000 subscribers 80. This sector has a great potential for jobs 
both for highly skilled people and for young qualified medium people through Internet cafés 
(estimated at more than 400 in 2006) that offer a range of services including messaging, 
information searches , consultations databases, the Net phone, the webcam and other services.  
 
                                                 
80
 Figures are provided by the « Mission Economique française »  in Yaoundé 
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With only 115000 subscribers in 2004, fixed telephony segment remains the weakest link in 
the chain of Cameroonian telecommunication and shows modest results despite 40 years of 
public monopoly on all segments of telecommunications (fixed, mobile, fax, telegram). On 
the eve of liberalization and the introduction of mobile telephony in 1997, the IMF painted a 
grim situation of fixed sector: only 0.5% of the population had access to telephone lines, only 
43% lines installed were in service due to technical problems, the waiting list represented 
twice the number of lines connected, and the average waiting time to install a new line was 
five and a half years. This provision has not changed substantially although the competition of 
mobile segment. Thus, the fix penetration remained under 1% of population between 2001 
and 2004 (see figure 1). 
 
2.1 Evolution of the legal framework  
 
Telecommunications were long considered in Cameroon as a public service area, separated 
from the commercial sphere. Thus the sector remained until 1998 a public monopoly, on the 
one hand provided by the International Telecommunication Company of Cameroon 
(INTELCAM), which was in charge of international telecommunications network, and on 
other hand by the Department of Telecommunications of the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications, which had responsibility for the national network. 
 
The diagnostic of deficiencies in public management (as noted above) and ambition to benefit 
from the development of new technology in the field of telecommunications at the 
international level have spurred a broad sector reform in the context of structural adjustment 
plans. The reform, brought by the law of July 1998, aimed primarily at liberalizing the sector 
through privatization of the public entity and the opening to competition. It also helped on the 
one hand to merge activities of international and domestic telecommunications within a new 
structure, CAMTEL, and on other hand to the establishment of a regulatory body, the Agency 
for Telecommunications Regulatory Board (ART) to ensure the proper functioning of the 
sector and competition among operators.  
 
Although the company of fixed telephony, CAMTEL, has still not found a taker, liberalization 
has nevertheless allowed the entry of two private mobile phone companies: Mobile Telecom 
Cameroon (MTN), subsidiary of the South African of the same name (license obtained in 
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January 2000), and Cameroon Orange, a subsidiary of France Telecom / Orange (license 
obtained in June 1999).  
 
While telephony field seems a little competitive with a public monopoly (CAMTEL 
company) on the network of fixed and duopoly on the Mobile Network (MTN and Orange 
companies), the opposite is true for the distribution segment of the Internet, which is very 
competitive with more than 400 Internet cafés mainly in the cities of Yaoundé and Douala 
(but rising sharply in other provincial cities). 
 
However, the privatization of CAMTEL and the granting of a new license in mobile 
telephony announced by the government may improve competitiveness in the telephone 
market and above all improve national coverage. In 2008, the operators were covering only 
nearly 3 million subscribers (fixed and mobile) in a total potential estimated at 5 million in the 
mobile market alone81. 
 
Like in most African countries, the development of telecommunications policies in Cameroon 
traditionally takes place away from the sphere of multilateralism of GATS; international 
aspects of the regulations in the domestic telecommunications services (interconnection issues 
of standards, and Tariff) being discussed under an international advisory committees of the 
ITU or bilateral agreements between international service providers (Doumbouya, 2004). 
Thus, the country has not commitment in the framework of GATS to date. However, a 
“proposal of offer” (or pre-commitment) has been submitted at WTO in 2004, in the 
perspective of an agreement on Doha round negotiations. 
 
Despite liberalization, the State is still very present in the area, maintaining a monopoly on 
fixed telephony and especially retaining the prerogative policy guidance and regulation of the 
sector, through the regulatory body (ART) on which he has total control. 
 
 
3 Survey of literature estimating the impact of trade in 
services on poverty 
 
                                                 
81
 These figures are from the «  Mission Economique française »  
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Our analysis relies on two domains of literature: the literature of trade in services 
liberalization modeling in CGE and the literature of impact analysis in poverty. 
 
3.1  CGE and analysis of Trade services impact 
 
The literature on trade in services liberalization can be differentiated by (i) the type of trade 
restriction considered; (ii) the number of countries considered; (iii) and the way to introduce 
the assumptions of imperfect competition into the CGE model. 
 
As mentioned above, the GATS distinguish four modes of supply of services. For each mode, 
it distinguishes between two types of trade barriers: market access and national treatment. 
There are therefore eight types of protections possible for each service. However, most CGE 
models study liberalization of services, either through mode 1 (cross-border trade) or solely 
through the mode 3 (commercial presence: FDIs) or mode 4 (temporary movement of natural 
persons). 
 
The pioneering study by Brown et al. (1996) adopts a multi-regional approach, which allows 
to account for the interaction among regions and countries. Based on the Michigan data base, 
these authors simulate the effects of a 25% reduction in ad valorem tariff equivalent of trade 
barriers on cross-border trade (mode1). They conclude that liberalization promotes trade for 
all countries. This approach, also used by Hertel (1999), focuses on cross-border trade and 
does not account for FDI in services (mode 3) which is one of the key vehicles by which 
services are traded internationally82.  
 
Dee and Hanslow (2000) addressed this shortcoming by assessing separately the cross-border 
trade (mode 1) and the investments flows mode (3) 83. They also modeled the effects of 
product variety, expressing consumer welfare as a positive function of services varieties. 
Therefore, the global gains from removing barriers to trade in services come from four 
sources: improvements in the allocation of resources, increased returns to the world stock of 
                                                 
82
 Other studies focusing only on mode 1 are from Chadha (2000), Chadha et al. (2001), Benjamin et Diao 
(2000), The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs (1999) and Robinson et al. (1999)  
83
 Other studies modelling the mode 3 are from Brown and Stern (2001), Konan and Maskus (2002), Tarr, 
Markusen (2002) and Jensen et al (2004 and 2005). 
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capital, increased product variety, and terms of trade variation. However, their models 
containing only three sectors, including a single aggregate service sector, are rather stylized. 
 
Verikios and Zhang (2001) extend Dee and Hanslow (2000) model to focus on two individual 
sectors: telecommunications and financial services. Trade liberalizing in telecommunications 
is estimated to increase world GNP by 0.1 per cent (roughly $US 24 billion)84.  
 
Recent studies provide a more detailed model at the level of single countries to assess the 
impact of trade in services liberalization. The more representative are from Jensen et al, 
(2002, 2004), Rutherford et al (2005) based on Russia, and Konan et al (2006) based on 
Tunisia. Like Verikios and Zhang (2001), Rutherford et al (2005) modeled separately mode 1 
and mode 3, and then introduce the gains of varieties. However, their variety gains following 
Dixit-Stiglitz is modeled through a production function, rather than consumer’s welfare. The 
authors assumed that openness to FDIs in services sector increased the varieties of services, 
which in turn enhanced the productivity in sectors using business services as input. In the case 
of Russia, they find that the main gain is provided by the productivity effect allowed by the 
FDI liberalization. The mean welfare gain to Russia from its WTO accession, averaged over 
all households amounts to 7.3 percent of Russian consumption when the productivity effect is 
included, and would be only about 1.2 percent otherwise. 
 
But this approach limits the productivity gains occurring from liberalization to the gain of 
variety, ignoring other productivity sources such as rationalization gains, where trade shift 
production to more efficient firms within an industry and the technical progress that may 
induce firms to move down their average cost curves. In this study, we try to account for the 
full productivity gain by estimating it from an econometric model. The model is explained in 
the next section. 
 
Other limitation of Rutherford et al (2005) study is that their model adopted a pricing 
approach assuming the Chamberlain "monopolistic competition" before and after 
liberalization85. This approach relies on the assumption of free entry and exit of firms, which 
                                                 
84
 The above studies relying in multi-regional CGE have many inconvenient. The quality of data at worldwide 
could be doubtful, particularly for developing countries. In addition, the worldwide framework imposes the same 
assumptions to all countries in market structure (see Hertel, 1999). 
85
 They model a situation where each company within an industry is supposed to offer a differentiated product 
from those of rivals, and where no company have enough power to be able to control the prices of others. In this 
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seem particularly inappropriate for telecommunications services, where liberalization always 
consisted either of the transformation of public capital into private capital, or of the 
introduction of competition by allowing limited licenses (Konan et al, 2006).86  
 
Konan et al (2006) circumvent this limitation in the case of Tunisia and derived the Lener 
markup condition by considering alternative market structures (monopoly, oligopoly, cartel 
and monopolistic competition) in order to determine the impact of telecommunications 
liberalization under each market structure. The consideration of alternative market structures 
allows the authors to highlight the role of regulation on the impact of telecommunications 
liberalization in Tunisia. The Tunisia gain from the attribution of a supplementary license in 
telecommunication would be 0.65 per cent of welfare gain if there is a strong pro-competitive 
environment that permits the constitution of a Cournot duopoly. Otherwise, the two firms 
would collude (yielding to a cartel) and the economy would face a loss of 0.25 per cent of 
welfare. However, Konan et al’s results suffer an important drawback, as the level of initial 
markup, which deeply influences the amplitude of effects in this kind of model (see Reimer 
2002), is assumed subjectively. Our study corrects this shortcoming by estimating the markup 
through an econometric model. 
 
Alongside the choice of an appropriate market structure, the maximization approach also 
suffers from the complexity of computing income elasticity for consumers and sectors using 
goods as an indicator of intermediate consumption. Therefore, many studies prefer a more 
practical approach known as Eastman-Stykolt (1960) (see Warren (2000) and Konan et al 
(2002)). It consists of imposing an extra price (markup) over the average cost. The surplus is 
determined outside the model. This margin may represent the difference between the domestic 
price and the international price of the service; it may also be estimated through econometric 
techniques, giving price elasticities over trade policy. This approach is the one used in the 
present study. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
context, firms characterized by increasing returns to scale will maximize their profits by equalizing the 
marginal revenue and the marginal income, while considering the assumption of zero profit 
86
 The choice of monopolistic competition relies much more on ease of modeling than on its realism (see 
Krugman and Obstfield, 2003). Indeed, the assumption of zero profit exonerates from having to derive the 
elasticities, a necessity to determine the level of markup associated (under alternative market structure). 
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3.2 CGE and poverty: microsimulation studies 
 
In the perspective of poverty analysis, the conventional Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) model is not sufficient. It only provides the income effect for the representative 
households group specified in the SAM. To circumvent this limitation, the CGE pioneering 
studies assumed a functional form of the distribution of revenue for each category of 
household specified in the model (see De Melo and Robinson (1982); De Janvry et al (1991); 
and Decaluwé et al (1999). The reliability of this approach, however, is based on the type of 
distribution function considered even though the literature does not relieve the indisputable 
selection criteria (see Reimer, 2002; Boccanfuso et al, 2003). Furthermore as highlighted by 
Cockburn (2001), regardless of the functional form used, this approach follows the 
assumption that the first time is fixed and not affected by the impact analyzed, an unrealistic 
assumption given the heterogeneity of households in terms of resource endowments and 
consumption habits.  
 
Therefore, it is necessary to model directly the impact of a macroeconomic shock at individual 
household’s level. This approach is called macro-micro simulation. The only study analyzing 
the impact of trade liberalization in services on poverty through the micro-simulation is that of 
Rutherford et al (2005) studying the impact of Russia's entry to WTO. Rather than 
considering the representative household groups as in the standard CGE models, the authors 
incorporate all 55,000 households from the Russian Household Budget Survey (HBS) as 
“real” households in the model. The poverty indicators are directly computed from the change 
in welfare of individual households observed in the CGE model. This approach of macro-
micro simulation is say “integrated"87.  
 
The main limitation of integrated macro-micro simulation is the difficulty in the 
implementation, as stressed Boccanfuso and Savard (2006). The problem resides on the 
establishment of a correspondence between the aggregated accounts of the SAM and the 
                                                 
87
 An application of this method on Cameroon is provided by the study of Emini et al (2005), who estimated the 
impact of the potential agreements from the Doha negotiations on poverty. They used the 2001 Cameroonian 
SAM , to which they add the 52000 households of the ECAMII. Their result shows a positive contribution to 
poverty reduction  of 1.5% on average. However, their study does not integrate any scenario on services 
liberalization. Other applications of integrated micro-simulation are provided by Annabi et al. (2005) based on 
Senegal and Cockburn  et al (2004) on Nepal. 
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survey data at the level of individual households, but also on the numerical resolution of the 
model (see Chen and Ravallion 2003.).  
 
A more practical approach of macro-micro simulation say "sequential" is provided by the 
study of Chen and Ravallion (2003) assessing the household welfare impacts of China’s 
accession to WTO. It is a two-step analysis. As a first step, the GTAP (Global trade analysis 
program) model is used to estimate changes in the prices and wages due to WTO accession. 
Then the changes in prices and wages are passed on survey data from the 1999 Urban 
Household Survey (67900 households) and the 1999 Rural Household Survey (16900 
households) to estimate corresponding changes in income and consumption88. Finally the FGT 
(Foster, Greer and Thorbecke) indexes are calculated at individual level to analyze poverty. 
This approach of macro-micro simulation say "accounting" has the disadvantage, however, of 
not taking household behavior at micro level into account. As highlighted by Cogneau, et al 
(2003), this approach assumes that the households do not respond to changes in the pricing 
system, and therefore considers that households’ shares of factors are fixed and that only 
profitability could change. For the sake of simplification of the resolution, we choose in this 
study to follow the approach of Chen and Ravallion (2003). 89. 
 
 
4 Model analyzing poverty impact of telecommunications 
liberalization in Cameroon 
 
4.1 CGE module 
 
Under the framework of trade in goods analysis, the modeling of a liberalization policy 
generally consists of increasing the prices of imported goods by the tariff to customs or the 
tariff equivalent of a non-tariff protection (See De Melo and Tarr, 1992 and Löfgren, 1999).  
 
This approach based on the neo-classical framework (constant returns to scale and perfect 
competition) is inadequate for the analysis of trade in services, as highlighted by the following 
                                                 
88
 This approach excludes de facto any feedback effect of income distribution among households on the 
macroeconomic model (CGE). 
89
 The only application to an African country is that of Boccanfuso and L. Savard (2006), which is based on 
Malian households’ expenditure survey (2001) to study the impact of cotton subsidies on poverty.  
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facts.  First, unlike trade in goods, which is essentially cross-border, the GATS distinguish 
four modes of supply for services90. In addition, trade restrictions on goods targeted primarily 
foreign producers, while barriers on trade in services could include both foreign and local 
firms. For each mode of service, there are two types of restrictions: barriers to market access 
which restrict the establishment and ongoing operations of all firms in a sector, and 
limitations on national treatment (discriminatory barrier) which hamper the establishment and 
ongoing operations of foreign firms in a sector. Finally, while the use of imperfect 
competition has always been an exception in the models of goods liberalization, it becomes 
the rule in the case of services because services production is characterized by low 
competitive structure while facing increasing economies of scale, especially in small 
economies.  
 
These peculiarities of trade in services involved additional effects, compared to the classic 
liberalization of goods, which is explicitly modeled in this study. These include, on the one 
hand productivity gains related to the entry of FDIs, economies of scale and increased variety 
of services, and on the other hand, the pro-competitive gains arising from the decrease in 
prices as a result of competition.  
 
The CGE model used in this analysis is based mainly on the structure and assumptions of 
standard CGE models (see De Melo and Tarr, 1992; Löfgren et al, 2001; and Decaluwé and 
Savard, 1999). Our main contribution to the model is based on the introduction of productivity 
effects and markup as explained in what follows.  
 
The Productivity effect is captured in the CGE model by introducing the level of penetration, 
as input of global productivity of factors (GPF). The penetration is based itself on the level of 
liberalization, expressed here by the number of operators. The two elasticities characterizing 
these relationships have been estimated in the Chapter 2 using a model of simultaneous 
equations, estimating on the one hand, the effects of penetration on growth and on the other 
hand, the effects of liberalization on the penetration91.  
 
                                                 
90
 The mode 1 is the cross-border delivering, the mode 2 is the consumption abroad, the mode 3 is the 
commercial presence (FDI), and the mode 4 is the presence of natural person. A detailed definition of the four 
modes is provided in introductive chapter o this thesis 
91
 An extensive literature survey on the relationship between the GDP growth and the penetration has also been 
exposed in the chapter 2. 
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The Pro-competitive effects arise from the introduction of imperfect competition effect in 
the services sector. It will be modeled by assuming that consumer price is equal to the average 
cost plus a markup. The markup is ultimately modeled as a function of the level of 
liberalization. The level of markup and its elasticity with respect to the level of liberalization 
(number of operators) have been estimated in chapter 1, through a market power model. 
 
While the first effect is modeled through the production function, the second is captured via 
the pricing equation.  
 
4.1.1 Production technology:  
 
The model covers an economy with 7 branches. All sectors have a branch in formal and 
informal sectors except telecommunications and finance, which have only the formal 
component92. 
 
All sectors, except those of the telecommunications and finances, are assumed to produce 
produced under conditions of constants returns to scale and perfect competition, implying that 
prices equal marginal cost of output. The telecommunications and finances are characterized 
by increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition. Although we have no study that 
shows the formal existence of economies of scale in these areas, this hypothesis considered in 
almost every study modeling the impact of trade in services (see. Jensen et al, 2004 and 
Konan et al, 2006) seems particularly appropriate given the low size of Cameroonian market. 
The producers maximize their profits by minimizing their cost under the constraint of a multi-
level production function, whose structure is given in Figure.2 below.  
 
At the first step, the production function, in each sub-sector (formal and informal), is a 
combination (fixed coefficients, or "Leontief function") of added value and intermediate 
consumption. Then, the added value is approximated with Constant elasticity Function (CES), 
using the capital and the aggregated labor. The aggregated labor is approximated with a CES 
technology, using skilled and unskilled workers. At the last stage, the demand for skilled labor 
or unskilled labor is operated by arbitrating between rural and urban workers with a CES 
function. The model distinguishes therefore 8 segments of labor. 
                                                 
92
 The absence of decomposition in telecommunications and finances sectors is only motivated by the absence of 
information concerning the shares of informal activities within these sectors. 
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Figure 2. Multi-level production function 
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4.1.2 Mathematical formalization  
 
 Production function 
For all sectors, production QA
a
 is defined as follow:  
QVAaQA
a
aµ
=          a A∈          (23) 
.QAQCI aa aθ=            a A∈          (24) 
Where: (A) is the set of activities branches 
aµ  and aθ are constants indicating the Leontief coefficients relating the production to the 
added value and aggregate intermediate consumptions respectively. 
 
QCI a  is the aggregate intermediate consumption of activity (a) and is defined as a Leontief 
function of disaggregated inputs ( QCI
ca
). Thus QCI
ca
, is formulated as follows:  
.QCIQCI ci aca ca=       ,c C a A∈ ∈         (25) 
Where: (C) is the set of traded product from the activities from A. as all products in this 
model is traded, (C) is equal to (A).  
ci
ca
 is the technique coefficient, representing the share of intermediate consumption from (C) 
in the production of (A). 
 
 Added value 
The value added is a CES function combining the global capital (KT) and global labor (LT). 
We also integrate the quality of services ( QS
a
) in order to model the productivity effect. The 
value added is then given by: 
( ) 1. 1a aQS BQVA K LT aa aa aa a a
ρ ρ ρδ δ  = + −    
     (26) 
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Where:
1
a
a
aρ
τ
τ
−
=   with 0
aτ > , the constant elasticity of substitution. 
aδ is the share of capital in total added value. 
Ba is the exogenous component of the global productivity of factors of the branch (a).  
QS
a
 represents the supplementary productive efficiency of the activity (a) generated by the 
liberalization of services. It is defined as the level of telecommunications services 
accessibility ( IS ) raised to the power of the elasticity of GDP growth with respect to the 
penetration (γ ). The formulation is as follow: 
( )QS IS
a
γ
=             a A∈          (27) 
IS  in turn is a function of the number of operators (N).  They are linked by an elasticity 
determined in the structural model in chapter 2. It is defined as follows: 
.
ELASTaccesIS Nβ=           (28) 
Where, β  indicates a constant, and ELASTacces , the elasticity of penetration with respect to 
the number of operator. 
 
4.1.3 Imperfect competition and price setting: pro-competitive effect 
 
The CGE literature does not relieve on any unanimous method of modeling the behavior of 
firms in imperfect competition with increasing returns to scale. The main difference resides on 
the choice of the rule of pricing in perfect competition to replace the marginal cost pricing 
rule (used in perfect competition). Numerous studies adopted the profit-maximizing approach, 
allowing expressing the Lener relationship as follow:  
v
v
v v
vN
P
P
Cm
ε
− Ω
=           (29) 
 
vΩ  is the conjecture with respect to the change in industry output. Its represents the change in 
industry output as the result of the change of one unit in output of the variety (v). 
vε is the elasticity of demand. 
 N is the number of firms. 
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vP  is the price of a variety (v) 
vCm  indicates the marginal cost 
1
1
v v
v
vN
P Cm
ε
=
 Ω
− 
 
         (30) 
11 1
1
v v
v
vN
P Cm
ε
  
  
  
= + −
   Ω
−        
        (31) 
 
( )1v vvCmP r= +           (32) 
( )1v
v
v CmP r= +           (33) 
 
rv is equal to zero in the case of perfect competition.  
We define 1 1
1
v
v
vN
r
ε
 
 
 
= −
  Ω
−   
  
 as the percentage markup of price over marginal cost. 
This expression rise additional issues about the determination of the conjectures and the 
elasticity of demand: Firstly, the selection of the conjecture is arbitrary93; secondly this 
approach suffers from the complexity of computing the demand elasticity ( vε ) for consumers 
and sectors using the good as intermediate consumption.  
 
We have avoided these issues by estimating the markup (
vr ) through an econometric model 
in chapter 1. This is on line with the so-call “Eastman-Stykolt (1960) approach”94. However, 
in opposite of the studies following this approach (see Warren (2000) and Konan et al (2002)), 
we consider the markup (
vr ) in our model as an endogenous variable. Relying on the 
                                                 
93
 See De Melo and Tar (1992) for a comprehensive analysis of alternatives assumptions about the conjecture. 
94
 It consists to impose an extra price (markup) over the average cost. The surplus is determined outside the 
model. This margin may represent the difference between the domestic price and the international price of the 
service, or be estimated through econometric techniques. 
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elasticity determined in the econometric model, we express the markup as a linear function of 
the number of operators (N). The formulation is given below: 
0 0
0 0
.ELAST N Nr r
Nr
 
−−
= −   
 
        (34) 
Where 0r  indicates the initial markup. 
In our model, the simulation of the liberalization will consist in changing the number of 
operators (N).  
ELAST is the elasticity of markup with respect to the number of operators. 
 
4.1.4 Other equations of the model  
 
After defining the two effects of liberalization, we will introduce them in a general 
equilibrium model, considering successively the factor market, the foreign market and major 
macro-economic closures. The equations in the following paragraphs are common to all 
standard CGE models.  
 
4.1.4.1 Factors’ market  
The factors’ markets are supposed to be in perfect competition. For each segment, the labor is 
supposed mobile between the different sectors of production, which involves a uniform salary 
across all sectors. The wage is flexible to allow equality between the supply and demand of 
labor in each segment.  
 
The capital factor is fixed for each sector, and its remuneration is specific for each sector.  
 
4.1.4.2 External trade  
 
For all sectors of goods and services, other than the telecommunications and finances, the 
allocation of domestic consumption follows the Armington (1969) approach assuming an 
imperfect substitutability between domestic goods and those imported (through a constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) function). 
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Aggregated domestic output is allocated between exports and domestic sales on the 
assumption that suppliers maximize sales revenue for any given aggregate output level, 
subject to imperfect transformability between exports and domestic sales, expressed by a 
constant-elasticity-of-transformation (CET) function. 
 
For finances and telecommunications, we assume the non substitutability of domestic and 
imported services, as the domestic suppliers of these services do not directly compete with 
foreign services suppliers in cross-border trade. This assumption is developed in Verikios et al 
(2002), who point to the fact that the cross-border telecommunication services, for instance, 
cannot be directly consumed by domestic users. They rather, constitute complementary 
services to domestic telecommunication services to provide international telephone calls, 
which is the service that final users actually purchase. The equations of external trade are 
presented in annex IV from equation (A22) to (A26). 
 
4.1.4.3 Households incomes, savings and consumption 
 
Households receive incomes and transfers from other institutions, including the profits made 
by companies in which they control a share of the capital. The transfers from the rest of the 
world are fixed in foreign currency. Households use their earnings for direct taxes, 
consumption, savings and transfers to other institutions. The direct tax and the share of 
savings are constant shares of household income.  
 
The consumption of product (c) by a household (h), CM hc , is determined by the utility 
function of linear expenditures system (LES) of Stone and Geary (1954). This function allows 
expressing the consumption of a given product in two components: incompressible 
consumptions and discretionary consumption. Its formula is given by: 
. . .
' '
'
mPQ PQ CM PQCM hc c c hc hc h hc c
c
pi χ pi
 
= + ∑  −
 
;h H c C∈ ∈     (35) 
Where: hcpi  is the share of subsistence consumption of product (c) by the household (h). 
m
hcχ  is the marginal share of consumption of product (c) by the household (h). PQc  is the 
composite price of the product (c). 
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 The product .PQ
c hcpi  represents the incompressible consumption of the product ( c) for the 
household (h). The equations related to households incomes, savings and consumption 
are presented in annex IV from equation (A34) to (A38). 
 
4.1.4.4 Macroeconomic and closures relations  
 
In the standard CGE model, the macroeconomic closures describe how equilibrium is 
achieved in the balances for the government, the rest of the world, and the savings-investment 
account. We consider three standard closures: saving-investments balance, fixed current 
account balance and the government balance.  
 
For the government balance, the closure is that government consumptions and all tax rates are 
fixed. This implies that government savings is a flexible.  
 
For the savings-investment balance, we assume a savings-driven closure: this implies that all 
nongovernment institutions (households and firms) savings rates are fixed, whereas the 
investment is flexible so as to assure that the investment cost will be equal to the savings 
value.  
.  
For the external balance, the closure is that the real exchange rate is flexible, while foreign 
savings (the current account deficit) is fixed. In fact to maintain the current account constant, 
while maintaining the international price fixed, the real exchange rate variation adjusts the 
domestic prices, so as to generate appropriate change in volumes of imports and exports.  
The equations describing the macroeconomic equilibriums and closures are presented in 
annex IV from equation (A41) to (A46). 
 
4.2 Poverty module 
Poverty status in a given society characterizes the situation of households or individuals who 
are unable to acquire a living standard equivalent to a minimum acceptable by the society 
norms, called poverty line.  
 
The literature distinguishes monetary poverty (or material) and non-monetary poverty. The 
latter is linked to aspects of social deprivation such as social exclusion or political rights 
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abuse. Without underestimating the non-monetary component, we will deal in this work with 
the monetary aspect of poverty, which is more accessible to the economic analysis (notably 
due to data availability). The welfare indicator widely used in this context is household 
expenditure. It is generally perceived by the consumption of private and public, the income 
only being used as a proxy for consumption (Lachaud, 2000).  
 
4.2.1 Measurement of poverty  
 
To measure poverty, we opt for the indexes proposed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, (1984) 
said FGT index. It is expressed as the sum of individual differences between the poverty line 
and the income of those below it raised to the power of the degree of sensitivity ( α ), then this 
sum is expressed as a fraction of poverty line itself. 
 
1 SP YMh hP
n SPmh h
α
α
− 
=  ∑
 
 
          (36) 
Where: hm  is the number of people from the category of households (h), below the poverty 
line 
hn  is the total number of individuals in the category of households (h)  
YM h  is the income of a household from category (h). 
SP  is the poverty line ; 
α  is the coefficient of sensitivity or aversion to poverty ( α  >0) ; 
hPα   is the FGT index corresponding to the class of poverty aversion ( α ) ,for the households 
from the category (h) 
For 0α =  , hPα   represents the index of poverty incidence (or poverty rate). Its primary utility is 
counting people, which are located under a poverty line. 
For 1α = , hPα  represents the index of poverty depth, and estimate the average gap between the 
poor and the poverty line. 
for 2α = , hPα   represents the severity of poverty. It takes into account both the distance to the 
poverty line and the degree of inequality among the poor 
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4.2.2 Poverty line 
 
The choice of the poverty line is crucial to determine the level of poverty indexes. We rely in 
this study on the official poverty line of Cameroon, estimated at 255000FCFA. However, we 
will assume that this threshold is endogenous and depends on the general trend of consumer 
prices95.  
So ( ). 1 ( )SP SP IPCo= +∆           (37) 
 
4.2.3 Sequential macro-micro simulation  
 
As noted above, our micro module is a reduced form of macro-micro simulation presented in 
Chen and Ravallion (2003). called "accounting micro simulation”. Unlike the most advanced 
sequential micro simulation (see Robillard and Bourguignon, 2004), the accounting approach 
does not endogenize the allocation of factors, or the consumer at the micro level. Only prices 
and wages are expected to vary depending on the output of the CGE model. The impact on the 
welfare of a given household is then measured by a simple accounting relation, expressing the 
difference between income, earned from its offer of factors (labor and capital), and its 
expenditures.  
( ) ( ) ( )h h hh LS K QDg w r PDw r PDc cc c cc c cc
c c c
= + −∑ ∑ ∑∆ ∆ ∆     (38) 
Where: h  indicates the households and c  the product of consumption.  
hLSc , hKc  and hQDc  indicate, the labor supply, the supply of capital and the consumption of 
household h of a product (c), respectively. 
wc∆ , rc∆ and PDc∆  indicate the percentage of variation in wages, return on capital and the 
price, Respectively 
The post-simulation poverty indicators are computed by adding the change in the welfare ( hg ) 
of the previous formula to the initial income of households. 
 
 
                                                 
95
 This definition has the disadvantage of confusing the evolution of prices in the official minimum basket, to the 
general price level (global basket).  
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5 Calibration and simulations results 
 
This section presents the data and parameters used in our CGE model. 
 
5.1 Presentation of the social accounting matrix (SAM) 
 
The SAM used in this study represents the Cameroonian economy of 2000/2001 fiscal year. It 
is adapted from a SAM built by a World Bank team and Emini (2004). The authors used the 
input output matrix of Cameroon for fiscal year 2000/2001 and the Cameroonian households’ 
survey of 2001 (ECAMII). To adapt this original SAM to our analysis, we have made some 
changes, using the Cameroonian household survey of 2001 (ECAMII). The main changes are 
described as follow: 
 
 The initial 42 branches were aggregated into 8 new branches; 6 out to 8 branches were 
further divided into informal and formal sub-branches96.  
 Using the households’ survey, the two original categories of labors (skilled and 
unskilled) in the original SAM were separated according to geography (urban and 
rural) and status of the activity (formal and informal) criteria. 
 The rebalancing of the matrix was made by the entropy method, developed in Robinson 
et al (2000). This consisted of solving a program minimizing the sum of the squares of 
the differences between the new values and the former values of the SAM (LSO 
principle), under the constraints of balancing between the expenditures and the 
resources. The final SAM is presented in annex II; Table.AII-3.  
 
5.2 Household database and consistency with the CGE model sectors  
 
                                                 
96
 The separation of the branches into formal and informal sub-branches has been operated from the original 
SAM following the next steps: (1) To share factors remunerations between formal and informal components, the 
Cameroonian input-output matrix of 2001 provides for each of the 42 initial branches, the distinction between the 
formal activities’ value added and informal activities;(2) In addition The DSF (“déclarations statistiques et 
fiscales”) give exactly the payroll for each formal sub-branch, which allows to determine the shares of labor and 
capital in the formal sub-branch; (3) The corresponding shares in the informal sub-branch are determined 
according to that obtained in the formal sub-branch. To do this, we follow the Cameroon's accounting system 
which assumes that the share of the remuneration of labor in the informal sector equals that in the corresponding 
formal, increased by 50% of the share of capital in formal value added. This increase of 50% is subjective, and 
attempts to take into consideration the fact that informal activities are more labor-intensive compared to the 
formal activities (see Emini, 2004). 
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The SAM and the households’ survey database used in this study have many convergence 
points, as the former has been build on the basis of the latter. This link is indispensable to 
translate the variation in price and wages of the CGE model to individual households. 
TableAII-4 and Table AII-5 in annex II, show the correspondence between the 8 sectors of the 
SAM and the 37 sectors of the ECAM II in production and expenditures sides respectively. 
 
5.2.1 Treatment of households income  
 
To introduce the wage effect into the households’ database, there is clearly a need that each 
individual in ECAM II declared his income. However, ECAM II Database provides exact 
information on income for only 41% of workers surveyed. The remaining workers surveyed 
are people who have either reported incomes in a given interval (56%), or declared a wage 
equal to zero (3%).  
 
To determine the initial wage for the whole sample, the following procedure has been opted: 
(i) individuals who reported not to be working in ECAM II (54% of the population) have no 
benefited from any change in their income. Their incomes are set to zero; (ii) for those who 
declared working (46%), their initial income is estimated through econometric techniques. 
This consists in a first step of estimating a model of wage relying on the sample of individuals 
who have correctly declared their income (i.e. declaration of precise figures). The model 
estimation, in turn, has been used to predict the income of people who have not declared their 
income correctly (i.e. those who declare revenue in a given interval, or the figure zero). By 
concerns of consistency between our micro module and the SAM, we estimate the workers 
revenues by replicating the same method (Heckman model) and specifications (same controls 
variables) used by the World Bank team and Emini (2004) to build wages in the original 
SAM97. The TableAII-1 in Annex II shows the results of estimations that allow the prediction 
of workers revenues. 
 
5.2.2 Adjustment of ECAMII data to those of the SAM  
 
There is a major source of inconsistency between the SAM and the base ECAM II, related to 
the fact that the amounts of totals revenue and expenditure in the SAM 2001 have been 
                                                 
97
 A brief description of this approach is provided in the box 1 in annex II. 
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collected from macroeconomic sources (TEE, 2001), whereas the source is micro data for 
ECAMII.  
 
We proceed to a readjustment in order to allow each source of welfare (salary, capital and 
consumptions) in households’ database to have the same total as in the SAM. The new values 
at individual level are obtained by correcting each variable of interest (salary, capital and 
consumptions), proportionally to its initial level (i.e. value declared). 
0
,
10992, 0
,
1
a ECAM h
ECAM h SAM
ECAM h
h
VALVAL VALTOT
VAL
=
 
 
 = ×
 
 
 
∑
     (39) 
Where, 0
,ECAM hVAL , indicates the value declared by the respondent in the ECAMII database. 
It refers to the wages, capital or consumption of a household. 
,
a
ECAM hVAL , indicates the value after adjustment; and  
 SAMVALTOT indicates the total amount for the variable in the SAM. For example in the 
case of wages, this value indicates the total payroll in the SAM. 
 
5.3 Estimation of the CGE model parameters  
 
5.3.1 Determination of the markup level, and its elasticity with respect to the number of firms  
As mentioned above, the markup amplitude,r , and markup elasticity, ELAST , with respect 
to the number of firms is determined in Chapter I using a model of market power.  
 
Figure 3. Evolution of market power in Cameroon 
 
Source: Author’s construction  
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Using the estimates of chapter I, the figure 3 provide the prediction of the Cameroonian 
market power from the 1996 to 2003. In 2001, the size of initial market power predicted in 
Cameroon is 0 30%r =  of telecommunications producer price.  
 
Concerning of market power with respect to the number of operator, its value is 
0.15ELAST = .  
 
5.3.2 Determination of parameters related to the productivity effect: indicator of 
telecommunications access and its elasticity with respect to growth.   
 
The productivity effect is based on three parameters:  
- IS , the level of telecommunications services access (penetration), provided by the 
ITU database which stands at about 4%IS =  for 2001. 
- ELASTacces , the elasticity of penetration with respect to the number of operators 
which is estimated in the structural model of chapter II determining simultaneously the 
growth and penetration. Its value is 1.2ELASTacces = . A 1% change in the number of 
operators leads to the improvement of 1.2% in the level of penetration of 
telecommunications in our model. 
- γ , the elasticity of production with respect to the penetration. It is also estimated in 
the structural model of chapter II, determining simultaneously the growth and 
penetration. Its value is 0.12γ = . 
 
5.3.3 Elasticities of behavior functions  
 Income elasticity for the consumption function  
 
Income elasticities are estimated econometrically using data of successive Cameroonian 
input- output matrix from 1994 to 2005.98. The results are reported in the table 1. Giving the 
low number of observations used in the regression (only 15), a sensitivity analysis would be 
made on the values of these parameters while interpreting our results.  
 
                                                 
98
 The regression is performed for each of the 42 sectors constituting the original SAM. The dependant variable 
is the logarithmic of consumption and the independent variable is the log of household income (allocated to the 
total consumption).  
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Table 1. Income elasticity  
 Sectors 
  
Income 
Elasticity  
Other business Services  0.78 
Food Agriculture  0.23  
Agriculture of exportations 0.4  
Industry 1.51  
Publics and social services 0.43  
Transportations 0.78  
Telecommunications 1.18  
Finances 1.29  
Source: author’s estimation 
 
 Elasticities of production and trade behavior  
 
The elasticities of CES functions of value added, the allocation of labor, the allocation of 
consumption and CET allocation function of local production are provided by the study of 
Devarajan and Rodrik (1989) in Cameroon. However, we need to perform a sensitivity 
analysis on these parameters. 
 
 
6 Simulations and results 
 
This section present results, their interpretations and discuss about their validity (thought the 
consideration of alternatives model assumptions, parameters and closures) 
 
6.1 Specification of scenarios 
 
We examine the potential impact of the increase in number of telecommunications operators 
in Cameroon. All simulations are based on the scenario of the attribution of one license for a 
mobile telecommunications operator. This constitutes the policy more likely to be followed by the 
Cameroonian government in the next step of telecommunications reforms. 
 
Since liberalization is modeled through the productivity and mark-up effects, our simulations are 
built to distinguish the main gains occurring from each of these channels: 
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- the central scenario includes the both productivity and markup effects, and relies on the 
regulation policy of an archetype African country.  
- the second simulation performs the liberalization effect only through the markup effect.  
- the third simulation assumes the absence of a pro-competitive regulation, and therefore a 
total collusion among the operators. Hence the liberalization effect is reduced to the 
productivity effect.  
- An important parameter of our model is the elasticity of market power (markup) in respect 
to the number of operator. It represents the extent of the sensitivity of market power to the 
liberalization in a given market. The value of elasticity (-0.15) used in the first three 
scenarios presented above, has been determined in an econometric estimation based on a 
sample of African countries, representing therefore the situation of an archetype African 
country. In order to examine the role of a strong pro-competitive regulation on 
liberalization effects, we consider in the fourth scenario elasticity equal to -100%. This 
represents the best pro-competitive policy allowing the total cancelling of market power 
(markup). The both productivity and markup effects are considered in this scenario. 
 
Our analysis will focus on the first simulation, before making the comparison with others. 
Moreover, before presenting the poverty impact, we focus first on the macroeconomic and 
sectoral effects, particularly on variables used as input in the household module of our model. 
  
6.2 Macro economics results 
 
Macroeconomics variables considered here are households’ revenue and others including: 
government and firms’ revenue, investment and GDP. 
 
6.2.1 Households’ revenue 
 
The table.2 below, presents the macroeconomic effects resulting from liberalization of 
telecommunications for all scenarios. The first scenario (see Simulation 1) reveals an increase 
of household’s revenue of around 3.2%. This increase is attributable to a combination of 
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rising in wages and the return on capital, in all sectors99. As far as others simulations are 
concerned, the simulation 2 (see Simulation 2) and 3 (see Simulation 3) also show the 
increase in households revenue of 0.22% and 3.01%, respectively. It appears therefore that the 
main gain for households occur from the productivity effect captured in the third scenario, the 
markup channel showing relatively slight effect.  
 
Table 2. Macroeconomic indicators  
    
  
Productivity 
+Markup Markup Productivity 
Productivity +Markup 
with strong regulation 
Indicators Baseline Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3  Simulation 4 
            
Household  income 5241688.79 3.21 0.22 3.01 4.03 
Enterprise saving 560380.00 3.51 -0.15 3.67 2.65 
Government saving 243372.00 22.45 -0.36 22.82 20.40 
Enterprise revenue 1946772.00 3.51 -0.15 3.67 2.65 
Government revenue 1509982.00 3.62 -0.06 3.68 3.29 
IPC 1.03 0.12 -0.06 0.18 -0.15 
GDP 6349348.10 3.02 0.00 3.02 2.90 
Investments 1110701.00 7.69 -0.14 7.84 6.86 
RECETTE 528146.00 3.77 -0.04 3.81 3.56 
Source: Author’s construction  
 
Considering now the simulation 4 (see Simulation 4), which represents the situation where the 
liberalization is accomplished beside a strong pro-competitive regulation (elasticity of markup 
equal to -100%), i.e. policy allowing a full competition (with the cancellation of the all 
markup): the gain of households would change slightly from 3.21% (first scenario) to 4.03%. 
This result seems to suggest that, there is a very low potential gain to be expected from a pro-
competitive effect. However, the implications of this result should be relativized, as the pro-
competitive effect is unambiguously underestimated in our model, due to the very low level of 
telecommunication weight in the consumer’s expenses in 2001 (the reference year of our 
analysis). The boom of telecommunication which took place since that date, has moved the 
telecommunication from a luscious product (190.000 consumers in 2000), to a product of 
mass consumptions nowadays (3 million of consumers in 2008)100. The introduction of a new 
                                                 
99
 The factors remunerations will be analyzed below. 
100
 The computation of a new CPI combining the consumptions prices of our model with the expenditures 
weighting of the Cameroonian input-output matrix of 2005, gives a result which is five time more important than 
that our model (-0.3% against -0.06% in this model). 
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telecommunication operator, leading the price reduction in the current context, would 
therefore have a higher impact than in our model 
 
6.2.2 Others macroeconomic indicators 
 
The Table 2 above, also reports the evolution of government and firms revenues, as well as 
investment and GDP for all scenarios. For the scenario 1, it appears that the increase in 
productivity generates a GDP growth of 3.02%. This engenders government and firms’ 
income grows in the same way as those of households. This increase in income is reflected in 
government and firms’ savings, which increase up to 22.45% and 3.51% respectively, leading 
to a raise in investments by nearly 8%.  
 
When observing other simulations, it appears that the change in GDP induced by the markup 
effect is zero (simulation 2). Indeed, under the assumption of the fixity of factors supply 
(labor and capital), a change of GDP growth in our model can only be the result of a change in 
productivity.  
 
6.3 Sectoral effect 
 
In this section we analyze some interesting sectoral variables, in view of the following 
poverty analysis. Four variables are considered here: production, market prices, wages, and 
rental rate of capital. The last three variables constitute the key variables affecting 
households’ welfare. 
 
6.3.1 Production effects  
 
Table 3 below presents the changes in production resulting from the liberalization of 
telecommunications for all our scenarios.  
 
The first scenario shows that liberalization contributes to an increase in production for all 
sectors. This increase ranges from 2.8% in food and agriculture sector to 5.04% in 
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telecommunications sector. As underlined before, the change in production is the result of two 
factors: the productivity effect (see Simulation 3) and the markup effect (see Simulation 2).  
 
Table 3. Production effect 
    
  
productivity 
+markup markup productivity 
productivity 
+markup with 
strong regulator 
Sectors Baseline.  Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3    Simulation 4 
Other business Services  3139768.00 4.14 0.00 4.14 4.12 
Food Agriculture  2934049.00 2.82 -0.04 2.86 2.63 
Agriculture of exportations 463327.00 3.63 -0.03 3.66 3.45 
Industry 3915240.00 3.45 -0.03 3.48 3.29 
Publics and social services 906059.00 2.90 -0.04 2.63 2.38 
Transportations 572331.00 2.92 0.07 2.85 3.27 
Telecommunications 103020.09 5.04 1.81 3.21 15.17 
Finances 114205.58 4.73 0.07 4.65 5.03 
Source: Author’s construction 
 
The markup effect (Simulation 2) is the result of the decrease in telecommunication price. It 
encourages the demand for telecommunications and the production of goods and services 
using them intensively as inputs. It is the case for finance, transportations and social services. 
Moreover, given that the labor supply is fixed in the model, the supplementary labor needed 
for this change in production is provided by others sectors which could experience a fall in 
their production. This is the case for food agriculture. However, except the telecommunication 
sector, the markup effect on production is not significant for any other sectors, as it ranges 
from -0.04% in food Agriculture to 0.07% in financial sector (change in telecommunication is 
1.8%). 
The change in production is therefore mainly occurring from productivity effect (Simulation 
3), which allows a better production with the same amount of inputs. In fact, the productivity 
effect is introduced uniformly in all sectors of our model, through the efficiency coefficient of 
the production function. The difference in magnitude of its effects among sectors is therefore 
due to the second round effect. This can happen notably through the increase in final demand, 
resulting from the raise in household’s revenue, which is determined by the income elasticity 
of each good or service. Hence finance and other business services that have the most 
important production effects turn out to be the sectors with the most important income 
elasticity. On the contrary, the food agriculture sector that has the least important elasticity in 
our model is also the sector where the output grows the least. 
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Concerning the fourth simulation (where the markup effect is maximum), the main 
observation is the important change in telecommunications production compared to other 
sectors. In fact, the production of others sectors remains relatively stable compared to 
simulation 1. This confirms the lack of influence of change in telecommunications price 
(markup effect) on the whole economy. The main reason is the relatively low size of this 
sector in Cameroonian economy in 2001, where it represented only 2.9% of the GDP. 
Therefore, the main telecommunications effects on economy rely on the qualitative effect 
(increase of productivity) rather than on price effect. 
 
6.3.2 Prices effect 
 
In Table.4 below, we present the changes in consumer prices index and price trends in each 
sector for the four simulations. In the central scenario (Simulation 1), liberalization leads to an 
overall increase in prices, consumer price index rising by 0.12%. If the markup effect 
(simulation 2) contributes to a decrease by 0.08%, the productivity effect rather contributes to 
an increase by 0.19%.  
 
Table 4. Final consumptions price effect101 
    
  
Productivity 
+Markup Markup Productivity 
productivity 
+markup with 
strong 
regulator 
Sectors   Baseline  Simulation 1   Simulation 2.    Simulation 3    Simulation 4 
Other business Services  1.01 0.36 -0.01 0.37 0.33 
Food Agriculture  1.01 0.13 0.02 0.12 0.21 
Agriculture of exportations 1.01 0.55 -0.02 0.57 0.43 
Industry 1.06 0.26 0.01 0.26 0.30 
Publics and social services 1.01 -0.04 0.04 -0.09 0.22 
Transportations 1.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
Telecommunications 1.44 -3.01 -2.95 -0.05 -16.52 
Finances 1.14 -0.03 -0.14 0.11 -0.63 
IPC 1.03 0.12 -0.08 0.19 -0.15 
Source: author’s construction 
 
                                                 
101
 theTable AI-1 in annex I presents, the final consumptions prices besides the Investments and intermediates 
consumptions. 
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At the sectoral level, price effects are mixed. The results in the Table 4 show for the first 
scenario that the price has increased in four out of eight sectors. In fact, two opposite 
movements influence the evolution of prices in our model. First, the increase in final demand 
and investment, outlined above, which contribute to the increase in price. Secondly, the 
lowering of input prices caused by the lower prices of telecommunications, which contributes 
to the decline in prices. It is therefore consistent to notice that the results for the first scenario 
point to the decline in prices for sectors consuming intensively telecommunications (financial 
services, transportation and social services) and the increase for others (industry, food 
agriculture and agriculture of exportations). 
 
6.3.3 Wages and capital return 
 
The wages and return on capital are key inputs for the household module of our model. In 
fact, the CGE model assumes a neoclassical closure of the labor market where labor supply is 
fixed for each of the eight segments considered. Similarly, as the model is in comparative 
static, it is assumed that capital is fixed within each sector, with the variation in return 
allowing adjustments. Hence, household’s income is mainly determined by the return on 
capital and wages, which in turn follows the evolution of production.  
 
Table 5 below, shows the evolution of the remuneration of factors in each sector and for all of 
our simulations.  
 
The scenario 1 (Simulation 1) points to increase of wages and returns of capital in all sectors. 
This trend is consistent since the prices of factors are increasing functions of production. Thus 
regarding the capital factor, the sectors which have seen their production increased the most 
are also those with the best raise in return on capital. This is the case for telecommunications 
services, finances, and other business services. 
 
As far as the wages are concerned, the labor segments in which wages are growing the most 
are those used intensively in the sectors growing the most. Thus, the formal sectors 
(telecommunications, business services and finance), where production has increased the 
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most, explained the highest change in wage observed in formal labor segments (whether the 
location or the qualification considered)102. 
 
Table 5. Factors’ remunerations 
  
  
 
   
  
Productivity 
+Markup Markup Productivity 
Productivity 
+Markup with 
strong 
regulator 
Factors  Baseline. Simulation 1   Simulation 2.   Simulation 3  Simulation 4 
Formal capital 
Other business Services  4.00 4.45 0.10 4.34 4.95 
Food Agriculture  4.00 3.11 0.04 3.06 3.31 
Agriculture of exportations 4.00 3.98 0.03 3.95 4.08 
Industry 4.00 3.67 0.02 3.65 3.76 
Publics and social services 4.00 2.90 0.12 2.78 3.52 
Transportations 4.00 3.06 0.18 2.88 3.97 
Telecommunications 4.00 6.24 3.19 3.00 23.72 
Finances 4.00 4.19 0.19 3.99 5.14 
Informal capital 
Other business Services  3.00 4.30 0.05 4.25 4.53 
Food Agriculture  3.00 3.22 0.02 3.20 3.27 
Agriculture of exportations 3.00 3.90 0.02 3.89 3.94 
Industry 3.00 3.67 0.02 3.65 3.74 
Publics and social services 3.00 2.98 0.09 2.89 3.43 
Transportations 3.00 3.17 0.13 3.03 3.86 
Telecommunications 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Finances 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Formal labor 
Rural not qualified formal  1.80 3.62 0.15 3.37 4.41 
Rural  qualified formal 1.83 3.51 0.15 3.35 4.30 
Urban not qualified formal  2.35 3.62 0.15 3.47 4.41 
Urban  qualified formal 3.16 3.67 0.15 3.63 4.30 
Informal labor 
Rural not qualified informal 0.50 2.07 0.03 2.63 2.81 
Rural qualified informal 1.25 3.07 0.03 3.02 3.81 
urban not qualified informal 1.50 2.67 0.03 2.63 2.81 
Urban qualified informal 2.50 3.51 0.03 3.35 3.81 
Source: author’s construction 
 
6.4 Poverty effect   
We consider successively the analysis at national and individuals’ level. 
6.4.1 Poverty effect at national level 
This sub-section performs the poverty impact analysis at the national level and on population 
sub-groups by comparing the results of the four simulations. The impact analysis on poverty 
                                                 
102
 Finance and telecommunication’s services branches are assumed to be exclusively formal in this study.  
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is based on the household survey of ECAM II. It covers 10952 households and 54821 
individuals representative of Cameroonian’s total population.  
 
As underlined in introduction, in 2001, 41% of the population lived below the poverty line in 
Cameroon. However, the situation of poverty in Cameroon is characterized by several 
disparities, related notably to education level and residential area. While more than 50% of the 
non-educated are poor, only 13% of people with upper secondary education and 6.2% of those 
who have tertiary education share the same fate. In rural areas, the incidence of poverty is 
52% (representing 84% of the total poor in the country). The figure in urban areas is only 
18%. Poverty in Cameroon is also linked to the status of the activity. Thus the incidence of 
poor is 25% among those who practice an activity in the formal sector, whereas it represents 
54% in the informal activity.  
 
Table 6 below gives the poverty impact of telecommunications’ liberalization at the national 
level. Poverty impact is analyzed through the indicators, FGT-0, FGT-1 and FGT-2, 
describing the indexes of FGT (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984)) when α takes the values 
0, 1 and 2, respectively.  
 
Regarding the incidence of poverty, FGT-0, scenario 1 shows that liberalization has 
contributed to a decline of 1.76% in poverty at national level. This decline is essentially due to 
the productivity effect (Simulation 3) which generates a decline of 1.72% of poverty. The 
markup effect (Simulation 2) has not showed a significant change (0.06%). However, it 
should be noted that liberalization accompanied by strong pro-competitive regulation, that 
would allow the total cancellation of markup (simulation 4), generates a supplementary point 
of decline in poverty, the total decline in poverty incidence moving from 1.76% in first 
scenario to 2.83%. 103 
 
It is also interesting to analyze poverty depth and severity, which generally grant more 
importance to the poorest. In term of poverty depth (FGT-1), the effect of liberalization is 
more important than the incidence as far as the scenario 1 is concerned; FGT-1 index 
declining by nearly 5.6% nationally. Similarly, in terms of severity, the impact of 
liberalization is more important, compared to the indicator of incidence; FGT-2 index 
                                                 
103
 As underlined above, the gains related to markup are underestimated in this model, given the low level of 
telecommunications penetration at the beginning of our period of study (2000).  
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decreasing by 6.5%. These results suggest that liberalization allows a decrease of the gap 
between the poor’s incomes and the poverty line, as well as a decline in inequality among the 
poor. 
 
Table 6. Poverty effect at national level 
 Indicators 
 Status 
  
Markup Productivity 
Productivity 
+Markup with 
strong 
regulator 
Productivity 
+Markup 
  
  Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 Simulation 4 
FGT-0 Baseline 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 
Change 1.76 0.06 1.72 2.83 
FGT-1 Baseline 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Change 5.62 0.23 5.46 6.38 
FGT-2 Baseline 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Change 6.50 0.17 6.17 7.33 
Source: author’s construction 
 
6.4.2 Poverty by category of households 
 
Given the distribution of poverty sets described in the previous paragraph, our analysis is 
based on the following 10 categories of households (distinguished by the criteria of 
qualification, location and level of activity): urban unskilled in formal sector, rural qualified in 
formal sector, urban qualified in formal sector, rural non qualified in formal sector, urban 
unskilled in informal, rural qualifies in informal sector, urban qualifies in informal, rural non 
qualifies in informal sector, rural inactive and urban inactive.  
 
Table 7 presents the effects of the central scenario (simulation 1) on poverty incidence for 
each category of households104. As above, poverty is measured by the variations of FGT 
indexes, for α = 0, 1 and 2 respectively. In the baseline scenario reported in column (1), the 
incidence of poverty (FGT-0) indicates that the poorest category is that of rural unskilled and 
occupied in the informal sector, with a poverty rate of 60%, while the richest category is the 
urban skilled engaged in the formal sector with a poverty rate of only 7%. 
 
Column (2), which reports the poverty incidence effect of liberalization, reveals that all 
households groups experience a decrease in poverty. However, the magnitude of this effect is 
                                                 
104
  The Table AI-2 in annex I presents the results for the three others scenarios. 
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differentiated for the specific categories of households because of their heterogeneous factors 
endowment, the structure of their expenditures, and the differentiated initial level of poverty 
between households groups. 
Hence, the group gaining the most in terms of poverty incidence is urban unskilled labor 
operating in the informal sector, which benefits from a decrease of 2.9 point in poverty. This 
decrease can be explained by the fact that products benefiting the most from lower prices are 
those consumed more intensively in urban areas (telecommunications services finance and 
utilities). Furthermore this category of households has the highest initial poverty rate among 
urban groups.  
 
Table 7. Poverty indicator per households category(central scenario only) 
    Households categories FGT-0 FGT-1 FGT-2 
  (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Simulation 1     Baseline Change  Baseline Change  Baseline Change 
Formal Rural not qualified formal 0.40 2.63 0.16 5.00 0.08 5.25 
Urban  not qualified formal 0.28 1.89 0.08 10.25 0.03 12.67 
rural qualified formal 0.22 1.74 0.06 6.83 0.02 8.50 
Urban qualified formal 0.07 1.48 0.01 19.00 0.00 0.05 
Informal Rural not qualified informal 0.60 2.07 0.20 5.35 0.09 6.67 
Urban not qualified informal 0.37 2.92 0.10 12.40 0.04 16.00 
rural qualified informal 0.51 1.35 0.17 3.76 0.08 4.63 
Urban qualified informal 0.17 1.96 0.04 13.00 0.01 20.00 
Inactive Rural inactive 0.51 1.95 0.17 2.94 0.08 3.25 
Urban inactive 0.21 0.07 0.05 4.60 0.02 5.00 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Except the group of inactive, the group gaining the least in terms of the poverty incidence is 
the rural qualified and occupied in informal sector. This gain is justified by the fact that the 
prices of factors in the informal segments have progressed less than those in the formal 
segments (see Table 5 on factor remunerations).  
Generally, it might be expected that the formal groups benefit the most in term of poverty 
decline - as wages in formal factors have increased the most -, and that the products whose 
price declined the most are those intensively consumed by households working in formal 
sectors (telecommunications finance and social services). This is the case for households in 
rural areas, where for equivalent qualifications, households benefiting the most from 
liberalization are those whose activities are in the formal sector. However, the opposite pattern is 
observed in urban households; for equivalent qualifications, the groups of households benefiting the 
most from liberalization are those whose activities are in the informal sector. This result is explained, 
at least partly by the fact that informal households have an initial level of poverty higher than 
households from the formal sector.  
  170
 
The analysis of poverty depth should be more informative as it is more sensitive than the 
poverty incidence (Boccanfuso and Savard, 2006). The depth of poverty (FGT-1), reported in 
Column 4 confirms the downward trend observed in incidence, but reveals more disparity in 
the amplitudes throughout household groups. Hence it clearly appears that urban groups are 
those benefiting the most; for the same qualification and the same status of activity (formal or 
informal), the groups residing in urban area have better gains in terms of reduced poor’s 
income gap with the poverty line. This result suggests that the poorest people in urban areas 
benefit more from liberalization than their counterparts in rural areas.  
 
The index of poverty severity (Column 6) reveals exactly the same trend as the depth. All the 
effects are positive and urban households enjoy better gains than their rural counterparts. This 
result suggests that beyond the decline in the average income gap with the poverty line, 
telecommunications liberalization contribute to reduce inequality among the poor, in each of 
the ten categories of households considered. However, the groups of urban households seem 
to benefit the most from this trend compared to rural households. 
 
6.5 Results and discussion  
 
To test the validity of our results, we consider now alternatives model assumptions, 
parameters and macroeconomics closures. 
 
6.5.1 Alternative model: modelling the productivity effect through the pro-variety effect of 
telecommunications  
 
One of the main limitations of our model is related to the uniform introduction of productivity 
effect in the different sectors. If this does not affect our results on average, as the elasticities 
used are those estimated on the economy on average, it could dissimulate the distribution 
effects of liberalization. As underlined above, the recent literature modeling the impact of 
trade in services has used to proxy the productivity gain, by pro-variety effects (Jensen et al, 
(2002, 2004) and Rutherford et al (2005)). If this approach ignore others components of 
productivity gains, its main advantage compared to the model developed above is that 
productivity gains are introduced in the sectors with respect to the weight of 
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telecommunications in the total intermediate consumptions of the considered sector. The 
approach therefore takes better consideration of the distributive effect of telecommunications 
liberalization. 
 
As a robustness test of the distributive effect of our model, we perform our central scenario 
using the pro-variety effect as a proxy of productivity effects105. Following the recent 
literature (Jensen et al, (2002, 2004), Rutherford et al (2005)), we consider the effects of 
varieties relying on the Dixit- Stiglitz’s model. This model assumes that the firms in the 
services sector to be liberalized produce differentiated services, and that, consumers and other 
sectors using these services have a preference for products variety. The main changes in the 
model remain on two points: first, the production function of the services branch is a constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) function of different varieties: 
1
1
N
az v
v
Y z
ϕϕ
=
 
  
 
= ∑           (40) 
Where 
vz  indicates the production of the variety v.  
As for the other sectors, the production function of a service variety is approximated by a 
Leontief function of total value added and composite intermediate consumption. 
The elasticity of substitution between each variety is 1
1
σ ϕ= −  
As the second change in the model, the services producing differentiated varieties are 
assumed to impact positively the production function of sectors using them as intermediate 
good. This is modeled by assuming that telecommunications is an imperfect substitute to 
value added in the sector using them as input: 
( ) 11a aQVATOT QVA aY zaa aa aλ λ λθ θ   = + −           (41) 
Where: QVAa  is the ordinary added value (function of labor and capital) 
                                                 
105
 This assumption is relevant to a large extent in the case of Cameroon where liberalization has been 
characterized by an impressive increase of services varieties. The table AII-2 in annex II shows the evolution of 
new telecommunications products in Cameroonian market between 1999, the year of the first liberalization, and 
2007. During this period, the two liberalized segments, internet and mobile telephone, have benefited from the 
introduction of 16 and 14 new services or technology innovations respectively. The fixed segment, still under the 
public monopoly, has only benefited from one major technological innovation with the introduction of CDMA 
technology in 2005. 
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QVATOT a is the new added value,  
aθ  is the share of telecommunications in the new added value 
1
1a aλ
ε =
−
 is the constant elasticity of substitution between the added value and the 
producer services (telecommunications). 
 
Table AI-3 in annex I presents the macroeconomic impact of liberalization. Under our first 
scenario, including the productivity and the markup effect, the results point to an increase of 
0.67% in households’ income. This result is close to the 0.79 % of Konan et al (2006) who 
used the same approach in the case of Tunisia. However, this result represent an important gap 
with the outcome of the main model (including all productivity effects), as it represents less 
than the half of its impact (1.4%). The importance of this gap has no consequence for our 
macroeconomic finding in main model, as the variety effect is only a part of the productivity 
effect captured in our model.  
 
More interesting is the impact of this distribution effect throughout our ten households’ 
categories. Table 8 below presents the results of the poverty effect for each households group. 
On average the poverty incidence decrease by 0.55%. The decline in the incidence of poverty 
(Column 2) ranks from 0 to 0.86% and the changes in FGT-1 (Column 4) and FGT-2 
(Column 6) are all positives. This is a support to our previous finding, that all of the 
households groups are to be benefiting from the liberalization, whatever the poverty indicator 
considered.  
 
Table 8. Poverty indicator per households category (central scenario only) 
 
 
 Households categories FGT-0  FGT-1  FGT-2  
  
 Reference change  Reference change  Reference change 
 
 (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Formal Rural not qualified formal 0.40 0.38 0.163 1.15 0.082 1.19 
Urban not qualified formal 0.28 0.00 0.076 1.96 0.028 2.74 
rural qualified formal 0.22 0.09 0.060 1.83 0.023 1.76 
Urban qualified formal 0.07 0.39 0.012 4.89 0.003 4.41 
Informal Rural not qualified informal 0.60 0.51 0.203 1.68 0.090 2.22 
Urban not qualified informal 0.37 0.85 0.102 3.97 0.041 5.11 
rural qualified informal 0.51 0.86 0.167 1.37 0.075 1.75 
Urban qualified informal 0.17 0.86 0.035 5.07 0.012 6.03 
Inactive Rural inactive 0.51 0.63 0.170 1.24 0.077 1.51 
Urban inactive 0.21 0.03 0.053 1.88 0.021 2.06 
Total Total 0.41 0.55 0.131 1.81 0.057 2.25 
               Source: Author calculation 
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6.5.2 Macroeconomic and factors closures rule106  
 
The results of CGE simulations are dependent to the parameters values and to macroeconomic 
and factors closures rules.  
 
Table 9 below presents the effects of the central scenario (i.e. productivity and markup effect), 
on macroeconomic indicators for alternatives macroeconomic closures107. 
 
This chapter adopted the neoclassic closure approach which supposes endogenous 
investments. This implies that investment is adjusted endogenously to be equal to the sum of 
savings of all economic institutions (households, firms, government and the rest of the world). 
But this assumption is not always realistic in developing countries, where the objectives of 
investments are more likely to be fixed by government (Decaluwe et al, 2001), instead of 
being determined by the market.  
 
Thus we will consider as alternative a so-call “Johanson economy” that assumes fixed 
investments. This implies that savings of domestic institutions adjust endogenously to balance 
the exogenous investments. Two cases are considered here: (i) the adjustment is operated 
through government savings, implying that the government consumption become flexible to 
allow the necessary adjustment of government savings (see Table.9 Column 2)108; (ii) the 
adjustment is operated through foreign aid, implying that foreign savings adjust endogenously 
to balance the exogenous investments (Column 3). The latter case is more relevant to the 
Cameroonian context, where the government massively receives international aid under the 
HIPIC initiative. 
 
                                                 
106
 Decaluwe et al (2001), and Harris and Robinson (2002) offer a complete overview of macroeconomic 
closures for a CGE model. 
107
 The Table AI-4 in annex I, presents the results for others indicators including prices and wages. 
108This closure would allow accounting for a potential important channel of liberalization effect transmission to 
poor. In fact the government could use the supplementary resources generated by liberalization to undertake pro- 
poor policy. However, the actual effect of such resources on poverty is quite complex. It depends entirely on the 
willingness and ability of the state to conduct a genuine policy for the poor, and to compensate losers of the 
liberalization policy including victims of the removal of subsidies for employment and consumption. However, 
in the African context, where states have severe fiscal constraints and where the power of civil society remains 
very low (non-independent unions), it is feared that additional resources generated by the liberalization would 
not be systematically used in the direction most favorable to the poor. 
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As far as labor market is concerned, the neoclassic closure assumes that labor supply is fixed, 
implying that wages adjust endogenously to allow the equality between the demand and the 
exogenous offer of labor in each segment. We will consider as alternative a more realistic 
economy with unemployment, where there is no restriction on labor supply (Column 4).  
 
Concerning the capital, the model assumes a fixed and specific capital for each sector. We 
consider as alternative a flexible and unrestricted capital in the economy (Column 5).  
 
Finally, many authors have pointed out the sensitivity of CGE model to the choice of 
numeraire (Hoffmann, 1999; Löfgren, 1999). The numeraire in the main model is exchange 
rate; we consider as alternative the consumer price index (Column 6). 
 
Table 9. Closures rule sensitivity 
  Baseline 
Current 
Account  
endogenous 
and  
investment 
exogenous 
Government  
Consumption  
endogenous  
and  
government 
saving 
exogenous 
Labor supply 
endogenous 
and 
 wage 
exogenous 
Capital 
endogenous 
 and  
capital price 
 exogenous 
IPC 
exogenous 
and  
TCN 
endogenous 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Government 
consumption 660749 0.0 8.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Household income 5237311 3.3 3.3 5.8 9.1 3.2 
Current account -23037 213.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
CPI 1 -1.5 0.4 -0.7 1.7 0.0 
GDP 6345194 3.4 3.4 6.2 10.1 3.4 
Source : Author’s construction 
 
Two observations emerge from the results of sensitivity simulations. First, the closures 
considering the fixation of the number of quantity of factors (closure2, closure3 and closure6) 
produces quite the same amplitude of gains as the reference scenario (closure1), in terms of 
households’ incomes, as well as in terms of GDP growth.  
 
As the second observation, the scenario allowing the flexibility of factors supply produce, as 
expected significantly more important output in terms of household income and GDP change; 
the more profitable scenario being the one allowing the flexibility of the stock of capital. The 
two observations suggest that our results, which rely on fixed supply closures are globally 
stable and constitute the low bound effects result. 
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6.5.3 Sensitivity to the parameters 
 
The behavior functions parameters (production and trade functions) used in this chapter have 
been adopted from the CGE model of Devaradjan for Cameroon in 1988, instead of relying on 
econometric estimates. We suppose here alternatives values for each parameter of trade and 
production functions in the interval [0.01, 4], which is the interval of parameters estimated in 
GTAP model (See Koffi et al 2005). Using the Monte Carlo approach, we have introduced 
200 random sets of parameters in the model in order to simulate our central scenario109. The 
results of simulations performed for 200 set of parameters, are presented in the following 
Figure focusing on the value of households income. 
 
Figure 4. Sensitivity of households income in respect to the parameters values 
 
Source: Author construction 
 
It appears from Figure 4 that the values of households’ income are concentrated in the interval 
[3.08 to 3.35%] with an average to 3.22%. This output strongly supports the high stability of 
our results with respect to the behavioral parameters. 
 
 
                                                 
109
 This implies a random choice of: (1) 4*(200*8) values for production function of informal sectors; (2) 
+3*(200*6) parameters values for production function of formal sector; (3) +(200*7) parameters values for 
imports functions ; (4) +(200*7) parameters values for exports functions 
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7 Conclusion 
 
This study’s aim was to analyze the impact of telecommunications liberalization on poverty in 
Cameroon, using the macro-micro simulation approach, linking the output of CGE model 
simulations to household database, in order to compute poverty indicators. Our CGE model, 
build on imperfect competition assumptions, considers two channels of liberalization effects: 
the productivity effect and the markup effect. The two effects are introduced in the CGE 
model using elasticities estimated in the econometric analyses of chapter 1 and 2 respectively. 
The micro module of the analysis use the Cameroonian households income survey data of 
2001 (ECAM II), and is based on the accounting micro simulation approach developed in 
Chen and Ravallion (2003). 
 
Our results show that liberalization contributes to reduce poverty in Cameroon. The 
attribution of a supplementary license in the mobile segment of telecommunications would 
lead to a decrease of poverty incidence by 1.76% on average. It appears, as in Rutherford et al 
(2005) and Konan et al (2006), that the main gain procured by services liberalization are 
generated by productivity effects, even if the markup effect remain positive.  
 
Our study suffers from some limitations: first our basis of analysis is the social accounting 
matrix of 2001. This period has the advantage to be the starting point of the liberalization 
process, then offering a credible counterfactual. However given the important increase in the 
number of telecommunications users since 2001 (200.000 compared to 3 million in 2008), it is 
obvious that the consideration of a more recent data would have allowed to find a more 
significant markup effect on households welfare. The second limitation of this study is the 
uniform introduction of productivity effect throughout all the sectors of the model. An 
estimation of the differentiated productivities elasticities for each main sector would allow to 
better capture the distributive effect linked to services liberalization. 
 
Despite these weaknesses, some interesting policy recommendations can be drawn from our 
study. More specifically, reforms in telecommunications sector should be a full part of a 
national strategy of fight against poverty. Our results advocate for the attribution of a third 
mobile license in Cameroonian telecommunications market. A strong pro-competitive 
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telecommunications regulation will be in the long term the main means to realize 
supplementary gains from telecommunications. This advocates for the strengthening of 
national regulatory operator in order to follow the best regulatory practice at international 
level. 
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ANNEXES 
Annex. I CGE and households model results of main model 
 
Table AI-1. Final consumption, investment and intermediate consumptions prices 
     Base line 
Markup  
effect: 
(elast 15) 
Productivit
y  
effect: 
 (elast 15) 
Productivity  
+ markup  
effect: 
 
elast 15 
Markup  
effetct 
 (elast 
100) 
productivity  
+ markup  
effect 
(elast 100) 
Sectors  
categories sectors Base line change 
change change change change 
Formal sector  
Intermediate 
prices 
Other business Services  1.06 -0.14 0.21 0.07 -0.76 -0.55 
Food Agriculture  1.02 -0.01 0.22 0.21 -0.02 0.20 
Agriculture of exportations 1.04 -0.06 0.34 0.28 -0.31 0.03 
Industry 1.04 -0.01 0.28 0.27 -0.07 0.22 
Publics and social services 1.06 -0.16 0.25 0.09 -0.88 -0.63 
Transportations 1.07 -0.20 0.23 0.03 -1.11 -0.89 
Telecommunications 1.07 -0.36 0.28 -0.08 -1.97 -1.70 
Finances 1.11 -0.26 0.17 -0.09 -1.42 -1.25 
Informal sector  
Intermediate 
prices 
Other business Services  1.05 -0.14 0.20 0.06 -0.79 -0.59 
Food Agriculture  1.02 -0.01 0.22 0.21 -0.02 0.20 
Agriculture of exportations 1.04 -0.06 0.34 0.28 -0.31 0.03 
Industry 1.03 -0.01 0.29 0.28 -0.06 0.23 
Publics and social services 1.06 -0.16 0.25 0.09 -0.88 -0.63 
Transportations 1.07 -0.20 0.23 0.03 -1.11 -0.89 
Telecommunications 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Finances 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Investments 
Other business Services  343711.00 -0.14 7.84 7.69 -0.94 6.86 
Food Agriculture  479598.00 -0.14 7.84 7.69 -0.94 6.86 
Agriculture of exportations 73365.00 -0.14 7.84 7.69 -0.94 6.86 
Industry 597833.00 -0.14 7.84 7.69 -0.94 6.86 
Publics and social services -145333.00 -0.14 7.84 7.69 -0.94 6.86 
Transportations -219757.00 -0.14 7.84 7.69 -0.94 6.86 
Telecommunications -46898.00 -0.14 7.84 7.69 -0.94 6.86 
Finances 28182.00 -0.14 7.84 7.69 -0.94 6.86 
Final  
consumption 
Other business Services  1000544.85 0.04 4.59 4.63 0.21 4.82 
Food Agriculture  1608992.91 0.00 1.13 1.13 0.00 1.13 
Agriculture of exportations 54728.81 0.02 1.06 1.07 0.09 1.15 
Industry 1286060.96 0.01 2.06 2.06 0.04 2.09 
Publics and social services 376334.50 -0.08 9.07 8.99 -0.57 8.49 
Transportations 381768.01 0.04 5.24 5.28 0.16 5.41 
Telecommunications 56315.54 4.82 5.27 10.29 31.20 37.72 
Finances 5249.51 0.24 5.02 5.28 1.30 6.38 
Source: Author estimations 
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Table AI-2. Poverty indicator by category of households 
     FGT-0 FGT-1 FGT-2 
  (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Simulation 1 
    Reference change  Reference change  Reference change 
Formal Rural not qualified formal 0.40 2.63 0.16 5.00 0.08 5.25 
Urban  not qualified formal 0.28 1.89 0.08 10.25 0.03 12.67 
rural qualified formal 0.22 1.74 0.06 6.83 0.02 8.50 
Urban qualified formal 0.07 1.48 0.01 19.00 0.00 0.05 
Informal Rural not qualified informal 0.60 2.07 0.20 5.35 0.09 6.67 
Urban not qualified informal 0.37 2.92 0.10 12.40 0.04 16.00 
rural qualified informal 0.51 1.35 0.17 3.76 0.08 4.63 
Urban qualified informal 0.17 1.96 0.04 13.00 0.01 20.00 
Inactive Rural inactive 0.51 1.95 0.17 2.94 0.08 3.25 
Urban inactive 0.21 0.07 0.05 4.60 0.02 5.00 
  
               
Simulation 2 
Formal Rural not qualified formal 0.40 0.19 0.16 0.38 0.08 0.38 
Urban  not qualified formal 0.28 0.00 0.08 0.50 0.03 0.67 
rural qualified formal 0.22 0.00 0.06 0.50 0.02 0.50 
Urban qualified formal 0.07 0.16 0.01 2.00 0.00 0.01 
Informal Rural not qualified informal 0.60 0.06 0.20 0.20 0.09 0.22 
Urban not qualified informal 0.37 0.02 0.10 0.30 0.04 0.50 
rural qualified informal 0.51 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.08 0.13 
Urban qualified informal 0.17 0.00 0.04 0.50 0.01 1.00 
Inactive Rural inactive 0.51 0.00 0.17 0.18 0.08 0.25 
Urban inactive 0.21 0.00 0.05 0.20 0.02 0.50 
  
               
Simulation 3 
Formal Rural not qualified formal 0.40 2.63 0.16 4.81 0.08 5.00 
Urban  not qualified formal 0.28 1.89 0.08 9.75 0.03 12.00 
rural qualified formal 0.22 1.74 0.06 6.50 0.02 8.50 
Urban qualified formal 0.07 1.48 0.01 19.00 0.00 0.05 
Informal Rural not qualified informal 0.60 2.03 0.20 5.15 0.09 6.56 
Urban not qualified informal 0.37 2.92 0.10 12.10 0.04 15.75 
rural qualified informal 0.51 1.37 0.17 3.65 0.08 4.38 
Urban qualified informal 0.17 1.75 0.04 12.50 0.01 20.00 
Inactive Rural inactive 0.51 1.56 0.17 2.82 0.08 3.00 
Urban inactive 0.21 0.05 0.05 4.20 0.02 4.50 
  
               
Simulation 4 
formal Rural not qualified formal 0.40 2.63 0.16 6.00 0.08 6.50 
Urban  not qualified formal 0.28 1.93 0.08 12.38 0.03 14.67 
rural qualified formal 0.22 1.92 0.06 8.50 0.02 11.00 
Urban qualified formal 0.07 1.78 0.01 23.00 0.00 0.06 
Informal Rural not qualified informal 0.60 2.34 0.20 6.05 0.09 7.56 
Urban not qualified informal 0.37 3.33 0.10 13.50 0.04 17.50 
rural qualified informal 0.51 1.59 0.17 4.41 0.08 5.38 
Urban qualified informal 0.17 2.08 0.04 14.25 0.01 22.00 
Inactive Rural inactive 0.51 2.55 0.17 3.59 0.08 4.00 
Urban inactive 0.21 0.32 0.05 5.60 0.02 6.00 
Source: Author estimations 
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Table AI-3. Variety effect simulations 
variables  
 
Baseline 
Variety 
effect 
without 
markup  
Variety 
effect 
with  
markup 
15% 
Variety 
effect 
without 
markup 
100% 
Macro 
indicators 
Households 5329957.02 0.63 0.63 0.65 
Firm revenue 1946772.00 -0.07 -0.08 -0.13 
Goverment revenu 1509982.00 -0.12 -0.12 -0.14 
CPI 1.02 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 
GDP 6259528.00 0.17 0.17 0.17 
  
         
Production 
Other business Services  3139768.00 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Food Agriculture  2934049.00 0.22 0.22 0.22 
Agriculture of exportations 463327.00 0.10 0.09 0.08 
Industry 3915240.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Publics and social services 906059.00 0.69 0.69 0.69 
Transportations 572331.00 0.55 0.56 0.57 
Telecommunications 367000.39 3.49 3.54 3.82 
Finances 114205.58 2.11 2.12 2.19 
 
     
Composite 
prices 
Other business Services  1.01 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 
Food Agriculture  1.01 0.45 0.46 0.49 
Agriculture of exportations 1.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Industry 1.06 0.17 0.18 0.20 
Publics and social services 1.01 -0.28 -0.28 -0.26 
Transportations 1.06 -0.63 -0.63 -0.63 
Telecommunications 0.41 -36.55 -36.78 -38.09 
Finances 1.14 -2.40 -2.41 -2.47 
  
         
Formal sectors 
wages 
Wage of rural non qualified in formal activity 1.80 0.36 0.37 0.42 
Wage of rural qualified in formal activity  1.83 0.33 0.34 0.39 
Wage of urban non qualified in formal activity 2.35 0.36 0.37 0.42 
Wage of urban qualified in formal activity   3.16 0.33 0.34 0.39 
Informal 
sector wages 
Wage of rural non qualified in informal activity 0.50 0.92 0.93 0.97 
Wage of rural qualified in informal activity  1.25 0.92 0.93 0.97 
Wage of urban non qualified in informal activity 1.50 0.92 0.93 0.97 
Wage of urban qualified in informal activity  2.50 0.92 0.93 0.97 
  
          
Formal sector 
capital return 
Other business Services  4.00 1.00 1.01 1.07 
Food Agriculture  4.00 0.89 0.90 0.95 
Agriculture of exportations 4.00 0.80 0.80 0.82 
Industry 4.00 0.53 0.53 0.55 
Publics and social services 4.00 0.84 0.85 0.90 
Transportations 4.00 1.06 1.07 1.14 
Telecommunications 4.00 -9.91 -9.85 -9.52 
Finances 4.00 1.34 1.35 1.44 
Informal 
sector capital 
return 
Other business Services  3.00 0.77 0.78 0.82 
Food Agriculture  3.00 1.03 1.04 1.08 
Agriculture of exportations 3.00 0.90 0.91 0.94 
Industry 3.00 0.84 0.85 0.88 
Publics and social services 3.00 0.97 0.98 1.03 
Transportations 3.00 1.15 1.16 1.22 
Telecommunications 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Finances 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source: Author estimations 
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Table AI-4. Results of alternatives closures rules (sensitivity analysis) 
  
  
Baseline 
current 
account  
endogenous 
and  
investment 
exogenous 
government  
Consumption 
endogenous  
and  
government 
saving 
exogenous 
Labor supply 
endogenous 
and 
 wage 
exogenous 
capital 
endogenous 
 and  
capital price 
 exogenous 
IPC 
exogenous 
and  
TCN 
endogenous 
     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Macro 
indicators 
Households income 5237311 3.3 3.3 5.8 9.1 3.2 
IPC 1 -1.5 0.4 -0.7 1.7 0.0 
GDP 6345194 3.4 3.4 6.2 10.1 3.4 
Firms revenue 1946772 2.1 3.8 5.4 12.9 3.5 
Gov revenue 1509982 2.1 3.8 5.8 12.8 3.6 
  
              
production 
Other business 3139768 3.9 3.8 7.5 12.9 4.1 
Food Agriculture  2934049 1.9 1.9 5.1 7.3 2.7 
Agriculture of 463327 3.9 2.8 6.2 12.7 3.7 
Industry 3915240 3.8 3.2 5.7 12.6 3.6 
Publics and social 906059 3.6 5.9 6.2 3.2 2.6 
Transportations 572331 4.9 4.3 5.8 6.4 2.9 
Telecommunications 99399 6.5 6.1 7.5 11.5 5.1 
Finances 113683 3.6 3.1 9.3 12.6 4.8 
  
              
Prices 
Other business 1 -1.4 0.5 -0.3 1.7 0.3 
Food Agriculture  1 -2.0 -0.2 -1.8 3.1 -0.1 
Agriculture of 1 -2.0 -0.1 0.8 1.3 0.5 
Industry 1 -1.2 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.3 
Publics and social 1 -0.9 2.6 -1.6 2.2 -0.3 
Transportations 1 -0.8 1.3 -1.1 1.6 -0.3 
Telecommunications 1 -3.0 -0.7 -2.9 -4.6 -3.3 
Finances 1 -1.1 1.3 -1.8 2.9 -0.2 
  
              
Formal sector 
Wages 
 
WRUNQ1 2 2.6 6.0 0.0 10.0 3.4 
WRUQ1 2 2.7 6.1 0.0 9.5 3.3 
WURNQ1 2 2.6 6.0 0.0 10.0 3.4 
WURQ1 3 2.7 6.1 0.0 9.5 3.3 
Informal sector 
wages 
WRUNQ2 1 1.2 3.0 0.0 11.9 3.4 
WRUQ2 1 1.2 3.0 0.0 11.9 3.4 
WURNQ2 2 1.2 3.0 0.0 11.9 3.4 
WURQ2 3 1.2 3.0 0.0 11.9 3.4 
  
              
Formal sector 
wages 
Other business 4 2.3 4.5 6.4 0.0 4.6 
Food Agriculture  4 -0.4 1.6 2.1 0.0 2.5 
Agriculture of 4 3.0 2.4 7.0 0.0 4.1 
Industry 4 3.1 3.5 7.4 0.0 4.0 
Publics and social 4 2.8 9.2 3.3 0.0 2.3 
Transportations 4 4.3 6.0 3.7 0.0 2.6 
Telecommunications 4 10.8 13.4 10.7 0.0 7.7 
Finances 4 2.8 5.8 4.7 0.0 4.5 
Informal sector 
wages 
Other business 3 2.4 4.5 6.6 0.0 4.5 
Food Agriculture  3 -0.4 1.5 2.0 0.0 2.5 
Agriculture of 3 2.7 2.3 6.1 0.0 4.0 
Industry 3 2.7 3.1 6.1 0.0 3.9 
Publics and social 3 3.0 9.7 3.4 0.0 2.3 
Transportations 3 4.3 5.9 3.7 0.0 2.6 
Telecommunications 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Finances 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Source: Author estimations 
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Annex II.  SAM and Calibration 
 
Box1: Workers revenue estimation (Heckman model) 
Given that the estimation is based only on individual data for those who work, we correct for 
selection bias by using the model of Heckman. The Heckman correction takes place in two 
stages:  
 
 First stage  
We estimate a model of selection to predict the probability of working for each individual. In 
this stage, we assume that each individual at working age must make a choice to get into labor 
market or not (status-quo). This choice is made on the basis of the criteria, *
miS , that we 
assume as being a linear function of, 
miz , the individuals (i) and households (h) 
characteristics. It is formulated as * ( ) ( )mimi h mi h mi miS c dz pi= + +  where mid  is the vector of 
observables determinants of criteria while 
mic  and mipi  the intercept and the residue 
capturing the unobservable determinants. We assume that the criteria take the value zero in 
the case of status-quo ( *
miS =0).  
Let 
miS be a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the individual decide to get into the 
work market and zero otherwise.  
1 0
0 sin
mimi mi mi
mi
if
on
c dzS pi
= + + >
= 
=
 
The probability of choosing 
miS  is estimated through a probit model using the maximum 
likelihood 
. 
Second stage, 
In the second stage, we estimate the wage (in a statistically appropriate way) by correcting for 
self-selection through the incorporation of predicted individual probabilities (say mills ratio) 
as an additional explanatory variable, along with individual (sector and industry, age, gender, 
education level, marital status) and households (size, place of residence) characteristics. Here 
below (table AII-1) is the result of estimations from this stage. 
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Table AII-1.  Estimations of microeconomic revenues  
 
(1) (2) 
 Qualified 
wage 
Non 
qualified 
wage 
Age 0.025 -0.000 
 
(15.87)*** (0.35) 
Education 0.087 -0.015 
 
(15.37)*** (1.97)** 
working Days 
per week 
0.069 0.063 
 
(5.46)*** (4.28)*** 
Department -0.002 0.009 
 
(1.63) (5.47)*** 
Gender -0.286 -0.477 
 
(9.39)*** (11.13)*** 
Poor health -0.048 -0.000 
 
(3.12)*** (0.02) 
Region (city Vs 
village) 
-0.258 -0.298 
 
(11.26)*** (10.10)*** 
Sector  Para public -0.240 -0.091 
 
(3.08)*** (0.46) 
Sector Private 
formal 
-0.480 -0.225 
 
(10.87)*** (1.59) 
Sector Informal 
agricultural 
-1.373 -0.760 
 
(24.28)*** (5.87)*** 
Sector Informal 
nonagricultural 
-0.959 -0.684 
 
(21.99)*** (5.35)*** 
Number spouse 0.075 -0.284 
 
(2.05)** (0.88) 
Household Size 0.647 0.844 
 
(4.52)*** (2.19)** 
Constant 5.415 6.621 
 
(36.36)*** (32.93)*** 
Observations 7328 6679 
R-squared 0.55 0.48 
Robust t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table AII-2. Introduction of new services or new technologies in Cameroonian telecommunications market between 1999 and 2007 
Segments  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006  2007 Total
Internet 
number 2 4 0 4 1 1 2 0 2 16 
Services or 
technologies 
-Connection 
 RTC 
-“Liaison cable” 
-Connexion 
 - Wireless 
-Telephony (Voice IP) 
-Net fax 
-VPN 
Improvmment in 
existing product 
 
-Web Design 
-Web Hosting 
-Domain Name  
-Webcam, Visio Conference 
- V-SAT  
Connection 
  - WIFI Connection  
- U-SAT 
-ADSL Connection  
 
Improvmment 
in  
existing 
product 
 
-WAP  
(Internet  
through 
Cellular) 
-Possibility 
of 
connection  
through 
optical fiber  
 
 
fixe telephone  
number 0 0 0 1 0 0 1  0 2 
Services or 
technologies 
Urban and 
interurban 
telephony 
 
RAS RAS 
Schiff to 
 Numbers with 
  7 digits 
RAS RAS 
Entry in the market  in December of 
CTPHONE based on CDMA 
technology (In fact CTPHONE is 
a bridge between the fixed and 
mobile, since it allows the 
movement within a radius of 50 
km to the round) 
RAS RAS 
 
mobile telephone 
 
number 0 2 0 2 0 5 3 0 1 14 
Services or 
technologies 
RAS 
- Urban, interurban and 
international telephony 
 
-SMS 
RAS 
-management of double 
 calls 
- conférence max 5 Calls RAS 
-Pay as you GO POP 
-Pay as you GO  
PER Second 
-Pay as you GO GOLD 
-Business Solutions Flexi 
-Me2U transfert de crédit 
-GPS Localisation 
- Roaming 
-CSD DATA Link 
 Data transfer RAS 
WAP 
 (Internet  
through 
Cellular) 
 
Sources : collected by the author from different sources including (Cameroonian regulation authority of telecommunication website, Internet cafés, and telephone box owners 
in Yaoundé) 
Note: RAS= no inovation 
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Table AII-3. Social Accounting Matrix of Cameroon in 2001 
  
  RURTNQ URBTNQ RURTQ URBTQ CAP TER MNAGE ENTR ETAT RDM TAXREV TAXACT TVA LCX TAXDOM TVA IMP TAXVTE Tarif TAX exprt 
AGR 
VRIER- 
AGRV 
RIER- 
AGREXP- 
FOR 
AGR 
EXP-INF IND-FOR IND-INF 
SEVSO- 
FOR SEVSO-INF 
  Nunéros 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
RURTNQ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3963 226746 663 12509 5594 56183 14851 1460 
URBTNQ 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7055 403103 1173 22238 9944 99881 26402 2596 
RURTQ 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19842 70858 3314 3903 27968 17558 74254 457 
URBTQ 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 79366 283432 13255 15636 111870 70229 297008 1825 
CAP 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 129986 358443 84341 35181 1002977 140574 201991 1247 
TER 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6442 17767 8998 3753 0 0 0 0 
MNAGE 7 534018 949366 346545 1386179 1023248 36960 0 714386 408514 10400 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ENTR 8 0 0 0 0 1946772 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ETAT 9 0 0 0 0 172043 0 0 371689 0 0 399718 33507 168663 98805 115478 145200 0 4879 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RDM 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 69360 197347 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TAXREV 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 168761 230957 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TAXACT 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 355 1957 376 313 3289 2041 756 10 
TVA LCX 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TAXDOM 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TVA IMP 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TAXVTE 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tarif 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TAX exprt 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AGRVRIER-FOR 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AGRVRIER-INF 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AGREXP-FOR 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AGREXP-INF 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IND-FOR 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IND-INF 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SEVSO-FOR 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SEVSO-INF 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TRANS-FOR 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TRANS-INF 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TELCOM-FOR 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TELCOM-INF 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FINCE-FOR 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SEVTRDE-FOR 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SEVTRDE-INF 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AGRVRIER-C 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 1616363 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 71096 392096 1817 1515 138942 102939 8578 106 
AGREXP-C 35 0 0 0 0 0 0 55458 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4143 22845 28462 23744 41206 30534 108 2 
IND-C 36 0 0 0 0 0 0 1357395 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20780 114599 50907 42469 726972 293099 131987 1623 
SEVSO-C 37 0 0 0 0 0 0 378204 0 660749 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 68 375 90 76 1757 1185 984 13 
TRANS-C 38 0 0 0 0 0 0 402892 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27844 153559 6698 5588 54359 25546 20259 250 
TELCOM-C 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 81221 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 476 2622 2388 1992 6741 3056 14797 183 
FINCE-C 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 5966 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 358 1969 766 639 7110 2523 6803 84 
SEVTRDE-C 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 1013370 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 78927 435289 49727 41485 580582 355911 96994 1197 
AGRVRIER 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45837 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AGREXP 43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 201799 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IND 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1246178 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TRANS 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 112268 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TELCOM 46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4445 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FINCE 47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28608 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SEVTRDE 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 71076 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ACCUM 49 0 0 0 0 0 0 329986 560380 243372 -23037 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 50 534018 949366 346545 1386179 3142063 36960 5409616 1946772 1509982 1697574 399718 33507 168663 98805 115478 145200 0 4879 450701 2485660 252975 211041 2719311 1201259 895772 11053 
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TRANS 
-FOR 
TRANS 
-INF 
TELCOM 
-FOR 
TELCOM 
-INF 
FINCE 
-FOR 
SEVTRDE 
-FOR 
SEVTRDE 
-INF AGRVRIER-C AGREXP-C IND-C SEVSO-C TRANS-C TELCOM-C FINCE-C SEVTRDE-C AGRVRIER AGREXP IND TRANS TELCOM FINCE SEVTRDE ACCUM Total 
  Nunéros 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 
RURTNQ 1 3184 20202 606 68 1125 13920 172944 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 534018 
URBTNQ 2 5659 35914 1077 121 2000 24747 307456 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 949366 
RURTQ 3 15916 6313 3028 22 5625 43442 54045 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 346545 
URBTQ 4 63664 25252 12112 85 22498 173767 216180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1386179 
CAP 5 124956 36303 76032 205 10999 539309 399519 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3142063 
TER 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36960 
MNAGE 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5409616 
ENTR 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1946772 
ETAT 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1509982 
RDM 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 153457 21806 1051204 0 58594 5469 34824 105513 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1697574 
TAXREV 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 399718 
TAXACT 12 5497 3194 456 3 0 6375 8885 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33507 
TVA LCX 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1804 909 94391 3735 22665 10211 8639 26309 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 168663 
TAXDOM 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6360 0 92445 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 98805 
TVA IMP 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4213 2465 108800 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 115478 
TAXVTE 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26605 1907 116688 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 145200 
Tarif 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TAX exprt 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1775 5 3099 0 0 0 0 0 4879 
AGRVRIER-FOR 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 443938 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6763 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 450701 
AGRVRIER-INF 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2448361 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37299 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2485660 
AGREXP-FOR 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 142960 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 110015 0 0 0 0 0 0 252975 
AGREXP-INF 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 119262 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 91779 0 0 0 0 0 0 211041 
IND-FOR 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1656459 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1062852 0 0 0 0 0 2719311 
IND-INF 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1021032 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 180227 0 0 0 0 0 1201259 
SEVSO-FOR 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 895772 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 895772 
SEVSO-INF 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11053 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11053 
TRANS-FOR 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 296484 0 0 0 0 0 0 71009 0 0 0 0 367493 
TRANS-INF 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 172270 0 0 0 0 0 0 41259 0 0 0 0 213529 
TELCOM-FOR 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 134229 0 0 0 0 0 0 4421 0 0 0 138650 
TELCOM-INF 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 722 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 746 
FINCE-FOR 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96008 0 0 0 0 0 0 28608 0 0 124616 
SEVTRDE-FOR 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1359177 0 0 0 0 0 0 65535 0 1424712 
SEVTRDE-INF 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1724775 0 0 0 0 0 0 5541 0 1730316 
AGRVRIER-C 34 37 22 0 0 10 99841 171778 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 479598 3084738 
AGREXP-C 35 0 0 0 0 0 2864 6578 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 73365 289309 
IND-C 36 82690 48047 11322 61 4418 369916 286901 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 597833 4141019 
SEVSO-C 37 2358 1364 52 1 138 3948 4531 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -145333 910560 
TRANS-C 38 4536 2638 1395 8 2572 41636 19990 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -219757 550013 
TELCOM-C 39 9434 5482 5370 29 4908 30041 28789 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -46898 150631 
FINCE-C 40 17994 10456 879 5 48708 3659 3370 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28182 139471 
SEVTRDE-C 41 31568 18342 26321 138 21615 71247 49350 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 343711 3215774 
AGRVRIER 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45837 
AGREXP 43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 201799 
IND 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1246178 
TRANS 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 112268 
TELCOM 46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4445 
FINCE 47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28608 
SEVTRDE 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 71076 
ACCUM 49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1110701 
Total 50 367493 213529 138650 746 124616 1424712 1730316 3084738 289309 4141019 910560 550013 150631 139471 3215774 45837 201799 1246178 112268 4445 28608 71076 1110701   
Source: Author construction from original SAM provided by Emini (2004) 
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Table AII-4. Correspondences between Sam sectors and ECAM II products nomenclature 
Sectors in the SAM  Activities nomenclature in ECAMII 
Food Agriculture Agri/Pêche/Chasse  
Elevage  
Agriculture of exportations Agri/Pêche/Chasse  
Elevage  
Industry Mines et Minerais 
 Energie/Gaz/Eau  
Industrie Agro Ali 
Industrie Textile  
 Industrie de Bois 
 Industrie Chimique  
 Ind. Matériaux de Construction  
 Métaux Mécanique et Réparation  
Finances Banque / Assurance  
Transportations Transport et communication 
Telecommunications Transport et communication 
Other business Services BTP  
Commerce Général  
Commerce Alimentaire Spécialisé 
Autre Commerce  
Hôtellerie et Restauration  
Publics and social services 
 Services Publiques  
 Autres Services sociaux 
Source : Author construction  
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Table AII-5. Correspondences between SAM sectors and ECAM II nomenclature of expenditures 
Sectors of the SAM  Corresponding expenditure account in 
ECAMII  
Food Agriculture Dépenses d’alimentation, autoconsommation, 
boisson et tabacs  
Agriculture of exportations Dépenses d’alimentation, autoconsommation, 
boisson et tabacs  
Industry Dépenses logements, eau, électricité, gaz  et 
autres combustibles  
Dépenses d’habillement, équipements de 
maison, hôtels  
Other business Services Dépenses de transport  et communication 
finance Dépenses de transport  et communication 
Transportations Dépenses de transport  et communication 
Telecommunications Dépenses de transport  et communication 
Other business Services Dépenses d’éducation, santé, loisir, 
spectacles et culture  
Source : Author construction 
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ANNEX.III : CGE model 
Figure AIII-1. Allocations of consumptions and the domestic production  
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ANNEX. IV: Presentation of CGE model: (available on request) 
 
RESUME 
 
Cette thèse analyse les effets d’une libéralisation du commerce de services en Afrique. Au-delà d’un 
chapitre introductif (chapitre 1), la thèse contient trois chapitres: le chapitre 2 analyse les déterminants du 
pouvoir de marché dans le secteur des télécommunications. Le troisième étudie l'impact du commerce des 
services sur la croissance économique en mettant l'accent sur les services de télécommunications et de 
finances. Le quatrième procède à la simulation de l'impact de la libéralisation des services sur la pauvreté 
en s'appuyant sur le cas des télécommunications au Cameroun. 
 
Les chapitres 2 et 3 sont basés sur des données agrégées de 30 pays africains entre 1997 et 2004. Ils 
s’appuient sur les modèles structurels et utilisent les estimations du 3SLS. Leurs principales conclusions 
empiriques sont les suivantes: (i) Concernant les télécommunications, l'industrie africaine est confrontée à 
un fort pouvoir de marché. Trois facteurs politiques semblent avoir une incidence négative sur le pouvoir 
de marché: les efforts unilatéraux, en termes de libéralisation (en nombre d'opérateurs) et de renforcement 
de la réglementation sectorielle, aussi bien que les engagements multilatéraux à libéraliser dans le cadre de 
l'AGCS. Toutefois, il apparaît que l’effet des contacts multi-marchés des opérateurs de télécommunications 
est un important facteur de renforcement des comportements de coopération et de collusion. (ii) En ce qui 
concerne l’effet sur la croissance, le niveau de la concurrence a un effet important sur l'accès aux services 
de télécommunications, qui à son tour, influence de manière significative la croissance des revenus. (iii) 
Dans le cas du secteur financier, la libéralisation du commerce s’avère être un important déterminant de la 
structure du  marché, mesurée par le niveau de concentration, tandis que les indicateurs de performances 
sectorielles (crédit au secteur privé) apparaissent comme d’importants déterminants de la croissance.  
 
Le quatrième chapitre utilise les elasticités déterminées dans les deux précédents et adopte l’approche de 
micro-macro simulation pour analyser la pauvreté (Shen et Ravallion, 2004). Il se base sur la MCS 
camerounaise de 2001 et sur l’enquête sur les revenus de ménages camerounais en 2001 (ECAM II). Les 
résultats montrent que la libéralisation des télécommunications contribue à réduire la pauvreté au 
Cameroun, l’essentiel des gains étant généré par les effets de productivité. 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis assesses the impact of services trade liberalization in Africa. Beyond an introductive chapter 
(chapter1), the thesis contains three chapters: the chapter 2 assesses the determinant of market power in 
telecommunications industry. The third analyses the impact of service trade on economic growth focusing 
on the services of telecommunications and finances. The fourth proceed to the simulation of service 
liberalization impact on poverty relying on the case of telecommunication in Cameroon. 
 
The chapters 2 and 3 are based on aggregated data from 30 African countries between 1997 and 2004. 
Relying on structural models and using the 3SLS estimates, three sets of results emerge from our empirical 
analysis: (i) Concerning the telecommunications, the African industry faces significant market power 
practices: Three policy factors seem to be affecting negatively this market power: the unilateral efforts in 
terms of liberalization (increasing in number of operators) as well as strengthening of sectoral regulation, 
and the multilateral commitments to liberalize in the framework of the GATS. However, it appears that 
multimarket contact of telecommunications operators is an important factor enhancing the cooperative 
pricing behavior. (ii) Regarding the growth effect of services liberalization, the level of competition has a 
strong effect on telecommunications services accessibility, which in turn influences the income growth. (iii) 
In the case of financial sector, the services trade liberalization (openness) emerges to be a strong 
determinant of market structures, while the sectoral performances indicators (credit to private and spread) 
emerge as strong determinants of income growth. 
 
The chapter 4 uses the elasticities estimated in the previous chapters and adopts the micro-macro simulation 
approach to analyze the poverty (Shen and Ravallion, 2004). It relies on Cameroonian SAM of 2001 and 
Cameroonian household’s data of income survey for 2001 (ECAM II). Results show that liberalization of 
telecommunications contributes to reduce poverty in Cameroon, the main gain being generated by 
productivity effects. 
 
Mots clés: Afrique, Cameroun, AGCS, Commerce des services, libéralisation, télécommunications, 
finances, pauvreté, croissance, pouvoir de marché, modèle d’équilibre générale Calculable (EGC), 
économétrie de modèles structurels, panel, triple moindre carré ordinaire, modèle MIMIC. 
